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Executive Summary  
 
Corruption is blamed for reductions in operational efficiency, information asymmetry, limited 
income distribution, policy failure, and weak economic growth and development. Corruption 
can originate from either the “demand-side” (the recipients of the bribe) or the “supply-side” 
(the givers of the bribe). This double edge effect of corruption on the economy and society 
makes it a multidisciplinary subject and phenomenon. Thus, scholars from different fields and 
disciplines, such as finance, banking, economics, accounting, law, foreign aid, and 
international business, examined and analyzed corruption as a multidisciplinary subject. In this 
dissertation, I investigate and explore the characteristics and association of corruption with 
firms, international business, banking, foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign aid, and 
international trade flows.  
This dissertation comprises four essays/papers on corruption. In the first essay/paper, I 
conducted a hybrid literature review of corruption phenomena in international business. This 
paper explores the characteristics of corruption related to firm and international business 
literature. This review contributes to the literature on corruption in international business in the 
following ways: (i) identified seven research streams, (ii) presented definition and taxonomy 
of corruption in international business, (iii) identified influential aspects of literature, (iv) 
synthesize literature on corruption in international business, and (v) proposed 14 future 
research questions.  
The second essay/paper is a bibliometric review of the phenomena of corruption in banks. In 
this paper, I explore and summarize the characteristics of corruption in banks. This study has 
the following contribution to the literature on corruption related to banks: (i) identification of 
six streams, (ii) presentation of influential aspects of literature, (iii) calls for the establishment 
of an anti-corruption architecture system by considering corruption as a managerial issue in 
banks, and (iv) it posits 20 future research questions.  
The third essay/paper examines a combined nexus among corruption, foreign aid (Official 
Development Assistance (ODA)), and foreign direct investment (FDI). This study used 
concepts of neo institutional and transaction costs theory. In this study, I propose and 
investigate a framework that foreign aid (as a formal institution) moderates the negative impact 
of host country’s corruption (as an informal institution) on FDI at two levels; (i) FDI propensity 
(when a company considers investing abroad), and (ii) FDI inflows (when they increase their 
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investments in corrupt countries in which they already invested). By applying the two-stage 
Heckman model, I confirm that corruption's asymmetric effect on FDI depends on two 
investment phases (FDI propensity and inflows). Furthermore, foreign aid (ODA) as a formal 
institution negates corruption’s adverse impact as an informal institution on foreign investors.  
The final essay/paper concerns the link between corruption, Aid (ODA), Aid for Trade (AfT), 
and international trade flows (imports and exports). Through the lens of neo-institutional and 
transaction costs theory, I present a framework that foreign aid (ODA and AfT) (as a formal 
institution) moderates the negative effect of trading partner’s corruption (as an informal 
institution) on OECD countries’ international trade flows (imports and exports). The findings 
of the study confirm that trading partner’s corruption hurts OECD country’s imports and 
exports. Bilateral aid (ODA) has no moderating effect on corruption's negative impact on 
OECD countries’ imports, but only AfT has a moderating impact on OECD’s imports.  Finally, 
foreign aid (ODA and AfT) moderates the adverse effects of trading partners' corruption on 
OECD countries’ exports. This study confirms that OECD member countries signatory of the 
Anti-Bribery Convention 1997 and avoid business transactions with corrupt trading partners.  
 
Keywords:  Corruption; Firm; Banking; International Business (IB); Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI); Foreign Aid; Official Development Assistance (ODA); Aid for Trade (AfT); 
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1. Introduction  
Corruption is defined as an "illegal activity conducted through misuse of power by public or 
private officials or firms for personal benefits, financial or otherwise" (Bahoo, Alon, & 
Paltrinieri, 2019, p. 2). This broader definition of corruption represents the overall reported 
level of corruption in a country. Corruption is blamed for reductions in operational efficiency, 
information asymmetry, limited income distribution, failure of policy, and weak economic 
growth and development (Kouznetsov, Kim & Wright, 2019; Chen, Ding, & Kim, 2010; 
Mauro, 1995; Treisman, 2000). The controlling bodies (e.g., the IMF, OECD, and World Bank) 
are concerned about restricting corruption globally by introducing rules and regulations. Thus, 
academic scholars are also reviewing and analyzing the pathology of corruption in business, 
banking, economy, and society (Bahoo, Alon, & Floreani, 2020; Fisman & Miguel 2007; Olken 
2009).  
Different types of corruption are documented in the literature and include public corruption 
(Pontell & Geis, 2007), private corruption (Argandona, 2003), pervasive corruption, and 
arbitrary corruption (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005). Public corruption is further 
divided into four types: petty vs. grand corruption (Elliott, 1997) and organized vs. unorganized 
corruption (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Corruption can originate from either the “demand-side” 
(the recipients of the bribe) or the “supply-side” (the givers of the bribe) (Heimann & Boswell, 
1998). This double edge effect of corruption on the economy and society makes it a 
multidisciplinary subject and phenomenon. Thus, corruption as a multidisciplinary subject is 
examined and analyzed by scholars from different fields and disciplines. There are studies 
about corruption in many disciplines such as law (Mijares, 2015), finance (Pantzalis, Chul, & 
Sutton, 2008; Rose-Ackerman, 2002), economics (Brada, Drabek, & Perez, 2012; He, Xie, & 
Zhu, 2015), accounting (Everett, Neu, & Rahaman, 2007), banking (Srivastav & Hagendorff, 
2015; Nguyen, Hagendorff, & Eshraghi, 2017),  foreign aid (Charron, 2011; Okada & Samreth, 
2012; Mohamed et al., 2015) and international business (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Tanzi & 
Davoodi, 2000; Duanmu, 2011). Therefore, this dissertation's objective and scope are to 
explore and investigate the characteristics and association of corruption with firms (including 
banking), international business, banking, foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign aid, and 





1.1 Research Objectives of Four Essays/Papers 
This dissertation's common theme is to explore the phenomena of corruption related to firms 
(including banking), international business, banking, foreign aid, FDI, and international trade 
flows (imports and exports). Thus, this dissertation's objectives are sub-divided, explored, and 
investigated into four essays/papers. Table i presents the objective/research questions of each 
essay/paper. 
Table i. Research objectives of all four essays/paper 
Essay/paper title Type/nature Research questions/objectives 
Paper 1: 
 
Corruption in International 







i. What is the domain of corruption in international 
business? 
ii. What are the leading research streams? 
iii. What are the most influential perspectives in the 
literature in terms of key journals, articles, methods, data 
sources, measurements, and theoretical frameworks? 
iv. How does the literature synthesize corruption in 
international business? 
V. What are the future research directions? 
Paper 2: 
Corruption in Banks: A 







i. What are the key research streams in the literature on 
corruption in banks?  
ii. What are the influential aspects of literature, such as 
journals, institutions, countries, authors, articles, and 
networks among them?  
iii. What are the relevant future research questions? 
Paper 3: 
Corruption, Foreign Aid 





Is Foreign aid (ODA) has a moderating role on the 
negative impact of corruption on FDI at two stages: (i) 
FDI propensity and (ii) FDI flows?  
Paper 4: 
Impact of Corruption on 
International Trade Flows 
of OECD Countries: The 
Moderating Role of Aid 
and Aid for Trade 
 
Empirical 
is Foreign aid (ODA and AfT) moderating the negative 
impact of trading partner’s corruption on OECD countries' 
international trade flows?  
*Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Aid for 
Trade (AfT) 
*international trade flows include imports and exports 




The reaming part of the introduction chapter is divided into the following parts. Section 2 
explains the overview of corruption literature and the contribution of each paper. Section 3 
presents an overview of applicable theories. Section 4 presents the applied methodology in the 
dissertation. Finally, section 6 summarized four studies.  
2. Overview of Corruption Literature and Contributions of Four 
Essays/Papers 
In the essay/paper 01 (Corruption in International Business: A Review and Research Agenda), 
I explored corruption phenomena in international business. Corruption literature related to 
firms and international business is divided into seven research streams; (1) the legislation 
against corruption (Pacini et al., 2002; Kaikati et al., 2000), (2) its determinants (Guvenli & 
Sanyal, 2012; Frei, & Muethel, 2017), (3) combating it (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Rose-
Ackerman, 2002), (4) its effect on firms (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Roy & Oliver, 2009), (5) the 
political environment and corruption in international business (Rodriguez et al., 2006; Chen, 
Ding, & Kim, 2010), (6) corruption as a challenge to existing theories of management in 
international business (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016), and (7) corruption’s effect on foreign direct 
investments and trade (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). This paper 
contributes to the literature of corruption related to firms and international business in the 
following ways: First, it presents a broader definition of corruption and taxonomy of corruption 
in international business. Second, it identifies quali- quantitatively seven research streams in 
the literature (see Figure 03 in paper 01). Third this paper contributes in the literature by 
identifying the influential literature aspects, such as key journals, studies, methods, data 
sources, measurements, and theoretical frameworks. Forth, its synthesis the literature of 
corruption in international business (see Figure 04 in paper 01). Finally, the paper posits 14 
future research directions (Table 08 in paper 01) and call for establishing anti-corruption 
architecture, both global and local.  
In the second essay/paper (Corruption in Banks: A Bibliometric Review and Agenda), I studied 
corruption phenomena in banking. The banking companies and financial institutions play a key 
role in hiding illegal money (Srivastav & Hagendorff, 2015). The poor corporate governance 
(Nguyen, Hagendorff, & Eshraghi, 2017), incompetent bank officials, and banks' involvement 
in corrupt activities have resulted in the bankruptcy of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and 
Washington Mutual (Nguyen, Hagendorff & Eshraghi, 2014). Corruption literature related to 
banking firms and the sector is dispersed into six strands; (1) the determinants of banks’ lending 
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corruption (Akins, Dou, & Ng, 2017); (2) the impact of corruption on banks’ lending and 
operational risk (Fungáčová, Kochanova, & Weill, 2015); (3) the impact of bank corruption on 
firms (Qi & Ongena, 2019); (4) the impact of political connections on bank corruption (Chen 
et al., 2017); (5) the impact of corporate governance and regulations on bank corruption (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, 2006); and (6) the manipulation of the interbank offered rates 
(Fouquau & Spieser, 2015). This paper of the dissertation contributes to the literature on 
corruption in banks in the following ways.  First, it identifies six research steams in the 
literature (see Figure 6 in paper 02). Second, it presents quali- quantitatively the influential 
aspects of literature, such as key papers, methods, theories, data sources, and journals. Third, 
it posits 20 future research directions (see Table 6 in paper 02). Finally, it calls for an anti-
corruption architecture system and extension in theoretical frameworks by considering 
corruption as a managerial issue in banks.  
The third essay/paper (Corruption, Foreign Aid and Foreign Direct Investment) investigates a 
combined nexus among corruption, foreign aid, and FDI. The literature on corruption, foreign 
aid, and FDI is divided into three strands: corruption and FDI nexus (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008a; Yi et al., 2019); foreign aid and corruption 
nexus (Efobi, Beecroft, & Asongu, 2019; Mohamed et al., 2015); and foreign aid and FDI 
(Aluko, 2020; Garriga & Phillips, 2013; Kimura & Todo, 2010). I used neo institutional and 
transaction costs theory concepts to explain the theoretical background (see Figure 1 in paper 
03). I present a framework that foreign aid (as a formal institution) moderates the negative 
impact of the host country’s corruption on FDI at two levels: (i) FDI propensity and (ii) FDI 
inflows. The FDI propensity is a level when a company considers investing abroad, and FDI 
inflows are a level when they increase their investments in corrupt countries in which they are 
already invested. Furthermore, foreign aid is the Official Development Assistance (ODA) to 
low-income developing countries for economic development (OECD, 2019b).  
This study adds to the literature in three ways. First, I contribute to the neo-institutional theory 
that foreign aid as a formal institution negates corruption's adverse impact as an informal 
institution on foreign investors. Second, I extend and confirm the integrated model proposing 
that the asymmetric effect of corruption on FDI depends on two investment phases (FDI 
propensity and inflows) (Yi et al., 2019). Therefore, international business scholars should 
consider the phases of FDI when discussing corruption as sand or grease. Third, I introduce a 
new research line by considering the combined nexus among corruption, foreign aid, and FDI 
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to explain firms' international business strategies. I argue and confirm that foreign aid 
moderates the negative effect of corruption on FDI during two investment phases.  
In the fourth essay/paper (Impact of Corruption on International Trade Flows of OECD 
Countries: The Moderating Role of Aid and Aid for Trade), I explore the association between 
corruption, international trade flows, aid (ODA), and aid for trade (AfT). The literature on 
corruption, trade, and foreign aid divided into the following strands: corruption and trade nexus 
(D’agostina, Dunne, & Pieroni 2016; De Groot et al., 2004); foreign aid (ODA and AfT), and 
corruption (Menard & Weill, 2016; Okada & Samreth, 2012); and foreign aid and trade 
(Martinez-Zarzoso, 2019; Hoekman & Shingal, 2020). Used neo institutional economics and 
transaction cost theories to explain the theoretical model and argument (see Figure 1 in paper 
04). I propose that foreign aid (ODA and AfT) (as a formal institution) moderates the negative 
effect of trading partner corruption (as an informal institution) on OECD countries’ imports 
and exports.  
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways: I present three main findings. 
First, trading partner’s corruption hurts OECD country’s imports and exports. The results 
confirm that OECD countries follow the guidelines of the Anti-Bribery Convention 1997 and 
avoid business transactions with corrupt trading partners. Second, bilateral aid (ODA) has no 
moderating effect on corruption's negative impact on imports of OECD countries. However, 
only AfT has a moderating effect on OECD’s imports.  The findings show that the OECD 
member avoids importing from corrupt trading partners, and even AfT boosts aid recipient 
countries' trade. Finally, bilateral foreign aid (ODA and AfT) moderates the negative impact 
of trading partners’ corruption on OECD exports. The results confirm the role of foreign aid as 
formal institutions on OECD member exports.  Therefore, foreign aid (as a formal institution) 
deserves more attention from OCED policymakers and manager of MNEs to boost 
international trade flows.  
3. Applicable Theories  
In paper 01, the hybrid review of corruption in international business is conducted. I identified 
that out of 137 papers between the period of 1992-2019, only 39 (28%) papers have discussed 
and applied different theories. Of these 39 papers, 17 used institutional theory, 05 applied 
agency theory, and 03 papers examined the neo-institutional theory. The use of institutional 
theory is logical because researchers consider corruption a proxy for institutional quality at the 
country level. Furthermore, only a few papers used the resource-based view, transaction cost 
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theory, or the resource dependence theory. Other theories that appeared referred in the literature 
are structuration (Luo, 2006), socialization (Muethel et al., 2011), diversification and portfolios 
(Jimenez, 2010), stakeholders (Roy & Goll, 2014), property rights (Driffield et al., 2016), self-
selection (Gomes et al., 2018), anomie theory (Chen et al., 2015), and legitimacy theory (Blanc 
et al., 2019). 
In paper 02, I review the literature on corruption in banking and banking companies. Through 
this paper's review and analysis, I identified that banking literature considers corruption a 
financial issue instead of a managerial problem. Surprisingly, only one journal in the field of 
international business published on corruption and banks. The citation analysis of these papers 
shows that corruption is a critical management issue in banks, overlooked by management and 
business journals. Thus, this study suggests investigating corruption in banks as a managerial 
phenomenon. In paper 03, I present a framework that corruption, foreign aid, and FDI are 
associated through the lens of neo institutional and transaction costs theory. I propose that 
foreign aid (ODA and AfT) as a formal institution moderates the relationship between 
corruption and FDI and corruption and international trade flows (imports and exports).  
3.1 Neo-Institutional Theory 
Neo-institutional theory reflects the sociological view of institutions. It suggests that 
isomorphism, which is a process that forces one unit to resemble other units in the population 
because they face the same set of environments, plays a role in corruption (Hawley, 1968). 
Isomorphism consists of three mechanisms: coercive, mimetic, and normative (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). Currently, the neo-institutional perspective is quite popular in the organizational 
field and international business. It maintains that firms respond to the cognitive, normative, 
and regulatory pressures on other firms that are considered legitimate (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). 
Gao (2010) uses the neo-institutional framework to examine the effect of mimetic isomorphism 
on bribery by firms working in China. He confirms that the firms’ bribery behavior reflects the 
habits of other companies in China. This theory explains the firms’ choice about when to 
engage in corrupt practices themselves and when their subsidiaries do so as well (Lambsdorff, 
2013). Cuervo-Cazurra (2016) also recommends extending the neo-institutional theory by 
considering corruption as a laboratory. Paper 1 discussed, and paper 03 and 04 applied the 
concepts of neo institutional theory.  
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3.2 Transaction Costs Theory 
The transaction cost theory provides details of a firm’s behavior based on the cost of its 
economic transactions. Bribery and corruption are viewed as an additional cost of operating 
nationally and internationally because they result in uncertainty in the relationship between the 
firm and the government (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). Meschi (2009) examines corruption's effect 
on international joint ventures through the transaction cost theory perspective. Paper 01 
discussed, and paper 03 and 04 applied the concepts of transaction costs theory.  
4. Methodology  
This dissertation consists of four papers and used different methods, techniques, and data 
sources to fulfill each paper's objective. Paper 01 is a hybrid literature review of corruption in 
international business, consisting of two approaches: (i) systematic review and (ii) co-citation 
analysis. Paper 02 is a bibliometric review of literature on corruption in banks that consist of 
the following techniques: (i) citation analysis, (ii) co-citation analysis, (iii) citation network 
analysis, and (iv) cartography analysis. In paper 03, I used a two-stage Heckman model on the 
panel sample of corruption, bilateral FDI, and aid from18 European countries to 34 African 
countries. Finally, paper 04 applied the Fixed-Effect model on the panel sample of corruption, 
bilateral international trade (imports and exports), and foreign aid (ODA and AfT) from 29 
OECD countries to 150 trading partners. Table ii presents the detailed summary and 
methodology, and variables of all four papers.  
 
4.1 Data Sources and Variables 
The first two papers (No. 01 & 02) used previous literature and citation data of articles on the 
relevant topics. The articles and citation data are collected from ISI Web of Knowledge, which 
is most commonly used in top review papers (Alon et al., 2018; Bahoo, Alon, & Floreani, 
2020a, 2020b; Paltrinieri, Hassan, Bahoo, & Khan, 2019; Iddy & Alon, 2019). For paper 03, 
the FDI (propensity and inflow) data are collected from United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) (Barassi & Zhou, 2012; Yi et al., 2019). The foreign aid data 
(ODA commitment, ODA disbursement, and Aid-TOF) came from the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Asiedu, Jin, & Nandwa, 2009; Kimura & 
Todo, 2010; Selaya & Sunesen, 2012). I used the corruption index score of countries from two 
sources; (i) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) (Hayakawa, Kimura, & Lee, 2013), and 
(ii) Transparency International (TI) (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). 
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Furthermore, in paper 04, the international trade flows (imports and exports) data is collected 
from the database of International Monetary Funds (IMF) (Jong & Bogmans, 2011). Foreign 
aid (ODA and AfT) is collected from OECD (Charron, 2011; Isaksson & Kotsadam, 2018). 
The corruption data came from two sources: (i) ICRG and (ii) World Governance Indicator 
(WGI) (Hayakawa, Kimura, & Lee, 2013; Osabutey, Okoro, 2015; Hakimi & Hamdi, 2017; 
Habib & Zurawicki, 2002).  
Finally, the data for the control variable for paper 03 and 04 is collected from three primary 
sources; (i) World Development indicator, (ii) Heritage Foundation, and (iii) CePII database 
(Mayer & Zignago, 2011; Cali & Velde, 2011; La Porta et al., 1998) (see Table ii).  
5. Summary of Studies and Conclusion  
This dissertation comprises four related studies, and all of them share a similar structure. I 
presented these papers at several internal and external seminars and conferences and received 
constructed feedback to improve quality. At present, two of the four papers have been 
published in International Business Review (ABS 3) (paper 01) and Finance Research Letters 
(ABS 2) (paper 02). Paper 03 received a revision from the associate editor of International 
Business Review (ABS 3), and paper 04 is ready to submit to a good journal. The abstract of 
all four papers is given below. Moreover, I also present a summary of all four essays/papers in 
Table iii.  
5.1. Essay/paper 1: Corruption in International Business: A Review and Research 
Agenda 
Abstract: We systematically reviewed the literature on corruption in international business 
(137 articles) for the last 17 years between 1992 and 2019. Additionally, we identified seven 
research streams in this growing literature: (1) the legislation against corruption, (2) the 
determinants of corruption, (3) combating corruption, 4) the effect of corruption on firms, (5) 
the political environment, and corruption, (6) corruption as a challenge to existing theories of 
management, and (7) the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment and trade. Based on 
this review, we recommend that strong international laws are needed to minimize the negative 
impact of corruption on international business. Firms must also consider corruption when 
formulating strategies to increase operational efficiency and performance. Finally, corruption 
challenges some key assumptions of existing theories of management. Scholars need to test and 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.2. Essay/paper 2: Corruption in Banks: A Bibliometric Review and Agenda 
Abstract: This paper is a bibliometric review of 819 articles, between 1969 and 2019, on 
corruption in banks. We identified six research streams: (1) the determinants of banks’ lending 
corruption; (2) the impact of corruption on banks’ lending and operational risk; (3) the impact 
of bank corruption on firms; (4) the impact of political connections on bank corruption; (5) the 
impact of corporate governance and regulations on bank corruption; and (6) the manipulation 
of the inter-bank offered rate. We recommend an anti-corruption architecture system and an 
extension in theoretical frameworks related to corruption in banks. We propose 20 future 
research questions.  
5.3. Essay/paper 3: Corruption, Foreign Aid and Foreign Direct Investment 
Abstract: This paper examines the moderating effect of foreign aid on corruption and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) at two points: when companies consider investing abroad (FDI 
propensity) and when they increase their investments in corrupt countries in which they are 
already invested (FDI inflows). Corruption has an asymmetric relationship with FDI. We test 
an integrated framework in which foreign aid as a formal institution moderates the negative 
impact of corruption as an informal institution on FDI during these two investment phases. We 
present three findings. First, corruption has a negative effect on FDI propensity, confirming the 
"corruption as sand" theory. Second, corruption has a positive effect on FDI inflows, 
confirming the "corruption as grease" theory. Third, foreign aid negatively moderates the 
impact of corruption on FDI. This result suggests that for foreign investors, the formal 
institution of foreign aid negates the adverse outcomes of the informal institution of corruption. 
Countries that provide foreign aid contingent on reductions in corruption promote future 
economic activity, mitigate investment risks, and improve the corrupt country’s governance 
and institutional quality. Therefore, foreign aid deserves more attention from companies and 
governments when formulating strategies and policies related to FDI and controlling 
corruption.   
5.4. Essay/paper 4: Impact of Corruption on International Trade Flows of OECD 
Countries: The Moderating Role of Aid and Aid for Trade 
Abstract: This paper examines the moderating role of bilateral foreign aid (as a formal 
institution) on the impact of trading partners’ corruption (as an informal institution) on OECD 
countries’ international trade flows. This study considers two main categories of bilateral 
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foreign aid: Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Aid for Trade (AfT) as moderator. 
We investigate the proposed framework using the gravity model of bilateral trade flows 
between 29 OECD countries and their 150 trading partners from 1995 to 2018. We present 
three main findings. First, trading partner’s corruption hurts OECD country’s imports and 
exports. The results confirm that OECD countries follow the guidelines of the Anti-Bribery 
Convention 1997 and avoid business transactions with corrupt trading partners. Second, 
bilateral aid (ODA) has no moderating effect on corruption’s negative impact on imports of 
OECD countries. However, only AfT has a moderating effect on OECD imports.  The findings 
show that the OECD member avoids importing from corrupt trading partners, and even AfT 
boosts aid recipient countries’ trade. Finally, bilateral foreign aid (ODA and AfT) moderates 
the negative impact of trading partners’ corruption on OECD exports. The results confirm the 
role of foreign aid as formal institutions on OECD member exports.  Therefore, foreign aid (as 
a formal institution) deserves more attention from OCED policymakers and managers of MNEs 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6. Overview of Four Essays/Papers in Dissertation   
The updated status of all four essays/papers in this thesis is given below.  
Paper 1:      Corruption in International Business: A Review and Research Agenda 
Status:        Published 
Authors:    Salman Bahoo, Ilan Alon, and Andrea Paltrinieri 
Journal:   International Business Review (ABS 3, Impact Factor: 3.6) 
 
Bahoo, S., Alon, I., & Paltrinieri, A. (2020). Corruption in International Business: A Review and 
Research Agenda. International Business Review. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2019.101660. 
(Published) (ABS 3 IF 3.6) 
Award: This paper is the most download/popular paper journal of International Business Review.  
 
Paper 3:   Corruption, Foreign Aid and Foreign Direct Investment 
Status:       Received revision from associate editor 
Authors:    Salman Bahoo, Ilan Alon, Josanco Floreani  
Journal:    International Business Review (revision from the associate editor) 
 
Bahoo, S., Alon, I., & Floreani, J. (2020). Corruption, Foreign Aid, and Foreign Direct Investment. 
International Business Review. (Under review) 
 
 
Paper 2:    Corruption in Banks: A Bibliometric Review and Agenda 
Status:      Published 
Authors:   Salman Bahoo 
Journal:    Finance Research Letters (ABS 2, Impact Factor: 3.5) 
 
Bahoo, S. (2020). Corruption in Banks: A Bibliometric Review and Agenda. Finance Research 
Letters. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2020.101499. (Published) (ABS 2, IF 3.5) 
 
Award: This paper remains the most download/popular paper of journal: Finance Research Letters.  
Paper 4:    Impact of Corruption on International Trade Flows of OECD Countries: The 
Moderating Role of Aid and Aid for Trade 
Status:      Ready to submit any good journal.  
Authors:    Salman Bahoo, Josanco Floreani, Ilan Alon 
 
Journal:    Submitted to Journal: World Development (ABS 2)  
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We systematically reviewed the literature on corruption in international business (137 articles) 
for the last 17 years between 1992 and 2019. Additionally, we identified seven research streams 
in this growing literature: (1) the legislation against corruption, (2) the determinants of 
corruption, (3) combating corruption, 4) the effect of corruption on firms, (5) the political 
environment and corruption, (6) corruption as a challenge to existing theories of management, 
and (7) the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment and trade. Based on this review, 
we recommend that strong international laws are needed to minimize the negative impact of 
corruption on international business. Firms must also consider corruption when formulating 
strategies to increase operational efficiency and performance. Finally, corruption challenges 
some key assumptions of existing theories of management. Scholars need to test and expand 
these existing theories by considering corruption as an important issue in international business.  
 
Keywords:  Corruption, bribery, international business, politics, bibliometric analysis, 
literature review, firms, content analysis 














Corruption is a multidisciplinary subject that scholars from different fields and disciplines have 
examined and analyzed. There are studies about corruption in many disciplines such as law 
(Mijares, 2015), finance (Rose-Ackerman, 2002; Pantzalis et al., 2008), economics (Brada, 
Drabek, & Perez, 2012; He, Xie, & Zhu, 2015), accounting (Everett, Neu & Rahaman, 2007), 
and international business (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). However, research on corruption in 
international business was almost non-existent before the globalization of business in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Globalization prompted international business researchers to investigate and 
discuss the context, dimensions, models, and theories about corruption as well as its association 
with foreign direct investment. The first paper on corruption in international business was 
published in 1992, and a considerable amount of literature has accumulated on the topic during 
the last 17 years (see Figure 2). However, much of this literature is scattered in numerous areas 
and directions. Therefore, we maintain that a systematic, in-depth review that summarizes our 
current knowledge is essential.  
In an effort to capture the richness of the literature on corruption in international business, we 
conducted a systematic, comprehensive literature review for the last 17 years between 1992 
and June 2019 using bibliometric citation analysis (Fetscherin, Voss, & Gugler, 2010; White 
et al., 2016) and content analysis (Paul, Parthasarathy, & Gupta, 2017; Paul & Benito, 2018). 
This literature review is unique in terms of its objectives and methods, and explores several 
research questions: (1) What is the domain of corruption in international business? (2) What 
are the leading research streams? (3) What are the most influential perspectives in the literature 
in terms of key journals, articles, methods, data sources, measurements, and theoretical 
frameworks? (4) How does the literature synthesize corruption in international business? (5) 
What are the future research directions? As a result of our investigation, we identified 7 
research streams, 6 areas in which there are gaps in our knowledge, and 14 future research 
questions.  
2. A taxonomy of corruption in international business 
2.1 The definition of corruption  
Synthesizing the literature, we define corruption as “an illegal activity (bribery, fraud, 
financial crime, abuse, falsification, favoritism, nepotism, manipulation, etc.) conducted 
through misuse of authority or power by public (government) or private (firms) officeholders 
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for private gain and benefit, financial or otherwise.” Our definition of corruption captures 
three important characteristics of corruption in the international business context. The first is 
that the person or firm is conducting some form of illegal activity. The second is that the person 
or firm is misusing power or authority in violation of existing rules and regulations or acting 
beyond legal limits. The third characteristic is that the person or firm is using a position of 
power to reap personal benefits (financial or otherwise) instead of benefiting the nation or the 
shareholders. Our definition is intended to be inclusive of all forms of corruption, including 
bribery, fraud, financial crimes, abuse, falsification, favoritism, nepotism, manipulation, and 
misrepresentation by public or private officials, domestically or internationally, in a social, 
business, or governmental context.  
2.2 Types and causes of corruption  
Different types of corruption are documented in the literature and include public corruption 
(Pontell & Geis, 2007), private corruption (Argandona, 2003), pervasive corruption, and 
arbitrary corruption (Rodriguez et al., 2005). Public corruption is further divided into four 
types: petty vs. grand corruption (Elliot, 1997) and organized vs. unorganized corruption 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1993).  
Public corruption can be defined as an illegal activity conducted by a government official, 
bureaucrat, or politician that involves the offer or receipt of financial or non-financial benefits 
by other government or private persons. Public corruption is classified as petty when small 
gifts or favors are exchanged, and as grand when large sums of money are exchanged. Public 
corruption is further classified as organized when it is planned, and the individuals or firms 
involved must pay a lump sum, and as unorganized when it is unplanned, and the individuals 
or firms involved pay an unspecified sum at every step of the illegal activity. In contrast to 
public corruption, private corruption can be defined as an illegal activity conducted by an 
employee, manager, or firm that involves the offer or receipt of benefits by other private or 
government persons. Private corruption is classified as pervasive when the employee or 
manager can be certain of the necessity for bribery when dealing with government officials, 
and as arbitrary otherwise (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016, p. 38).  
Corruption can originate from either the “demand side” (the recipients of the bribe) or the 
“supply side” (the givers of the bribe) (Heimann & Boswell, 1998). Public and private 
corruption are associated with the demand side and supply side, respectively. In the 
international business context, Cuervo-Cazurra (2016) suggests that the demand-side 
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incentives of government officials be distinguished from the supply-side incentives of 
managers. Everett et al. (2006) maintain that the demand side of corruption is the activity of a 
few “rotten eggs” that takes place at the individual level due to “resource scarcity.” Hamir 
(1999) shows that private corruption originates at the organizational level when good 
governance procedures and proper oversight are lacking. Caiden, Dwivedi, and Jabbra (2001a) 
argue that both public and private corruption are endemic in individualistic societies where 
people are not exposed to traditional or collectivistic norms and education. Furthermore, they 
provide evidence that supply-side corruption in foreign investment commonly involves foreign 
investors who offer bribes to government officials.  
3. Methods   
To conduct this review, we adopted a unique approach that coupled bibliometric citation 
analysis (Fetscherin, Voss, & Gugler, 2010; White et al., 2016; Bahoo, Alon, & Paltrinieri, 
2019; Iddy & Alon, 2019; Naatu & Alon, 2019) and content analysis (Paul, Parthasarathy, & 
Gupta, 2017; Paul & Singh, 2017; Paul & Benito, 2018; Rosado-Serrano, Paul, & Dikova, 
2018a; Paul & Rosado-Serrano, 2019). Price first championed bibliometric analysis in 1965 to 
explore the relationships between articles based on the number of citations (Kim & McMillan, 
2008), using the article as the basic unit of analysis (Alon et al., 2018). We used HistCite 
software for the bibliometric analysis. We present the key terms related to the bibliometric 
analysis in Table 1. Content analysis, which is an accepted methodology in the social sciences 
(Bahoo et al., 2018; Gaur & Kumar, 2018; Ahmed et al., 2019), classifies textual material by 
reducing it to more relevant, manageable bits of data (Weber, 1990). Our method, illustrated 
in Figure 1, involves three steps: sample selection and data collection, analysis, and results 
(Gomezelj, 2016).  
3.1 Sample selection and data collection 
Our data collection involves three steps. First, we selected the journals from which to collect 
articles and citation data on the subject. To avoid selection bias in considering only top-ranked 
or international business journals (Terjesen, Hessels, & Li, 2013), we searched all of the 
journals that are listed on the ISI Web of Knowledge (henceforth WoS) database. The WoS 
consists of five databases covering several disciplines and provides citation data about articles 
dating back to 1950 (Alon et al., 2018). 
The second step was to choose the sample period and the search technique. We searched all of 
the articles on corruption in international business published between 1950 and June 2019 using 
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a variety of keywords. By following White et al. (2016), Alon et al. (2018), and Fetscherin, 
Voss, and Gugler (2010), we used 17 keywords for corruption in combination with words such 
as “international business, multinational enterprises, multinational corporations, MNEs, and 
MNCs” to cover the complete literature on the topic. Table 1 lists the 17 keywords for 
corruption and key filters applied to search the literature. These searches yielded 322 articles 
of potential interest that we examined cursorily to confirm their relevance. 
In the third step, two independent researchers read through and critically examined the 322 
articles using the following criteria: the article must explicitly state that it is about corruption 
in international business, and it must address the subject in a non-trivial and non-marginal way. 
After excluding irrelevant articles, our resulting dataset contained 137 articles. The first paper 
to address corruption in international business explicitly was published in 1992. As Figure 2 






Figure 1: Methodological approach. 
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Table 1. Key terms and process of selecting the sample 
(1)-Key terms entered into the HistCite software ((HistCite - Glossary, 2018) 
 
Term Sign Concept/Definition 
Total global citation (TGC) TGC is the number of times an article is cited by any other articles 
that are available on the WoS database. 
Total local citation  (TLC) TLC is the number of times an article is cited by the same literature 
sample (in our case, the 137 articles mentioned above). 
Total number of 
articles published on 
the subject 
(PCIB) PCIB is the total number of articles published on corruption 
in international business.  
(2)- The process of selecting the sample from the ISI Web of Knowledge 
Seventeen keywords for corruption  Search in combination with the following 
words 
(1) Corruption, (2) Bribe, (3) Bribery, (4) Abuse, (5) Crime, 
(6) Criminal, (7) Degradation, (8) Extortion, (9) Falsification, 
(10) Fraud, (11) Graft, (12) Manipulating, (13) Manipulation, 
(14) Misconduct, (15) Misconduct, (16) misrepresentation, 
and (17) wrongdoing.  
International Business, Multinational 
Enterprise, Multinational Corporation, 
MNEs, MNCs. 
Filters applied to search in the ISI Web of Knowledge 
(1) Search filters Topic (Search keywords in “Title, keywords, and Abstract”) 
(2) Paper type and language Articles and English. 
(3) Period of search 1950 to June 2019 (1st paper published in 1992 on the subject) 









Figure 2: Publications on corruption in IB between 1950 to June 2019*. *The first article on subject published in 1992. 




























We utilized various complementary tests such as (1) co-citation analysis, (2) citation analysis, 
and (3) content analysis during four stages of analysis. In the first stage, we identified research 
streams in the literature through bibliometric co-citation analysis (Fetscherin, Voss, & Gugler, 
2010; Dzikowski, 2018; Øyna & Alon, 2018; Paltrinieri, Hassan, Bahoo, & Khan, 2019). We 
used the HistCite software program, which accepts citation data as inputs and provides several 
outputs, for bibliometric analysis. In the second stage, we identified influential aspects of the 
literature, such as key journals, articles, methods, data sources, measurements of corruption, 
and theoretical frameworks (Rosado-Serrano, Paul, & Dikova, 2018). In the third stage, we 
created a taxonomy and synthesis of the literature on corruption in international business 
(Carvalho et al., 2014). Finally, through our analysis, we presented propositions and questions 
for future research (Fernando & Serra, 2014; Paul & Benito, 2018).  
4. Results 
4.1 Co-citation mapping: Research streams in the literature on corruption in 
international business 
Co-citation mapping is the mapping of top-cited papers in relation to the papers that cite them 
(Alon et al., 2018). Co-citation mapping is conducted through HistCite software. We 
established the criteria to identify the mapping by following Øyna and Alon (2018), Alon et al. 
(2018), and Apriliyanti and Alon (2017). However, the criteria depend on the nature of the 
subject and the growth of the literature. Therefore, we utilized a two-level procedure. First, to 
be included in the mapping, an article must have a minimum of one total local citation (TLC ≥ 
1). We identified 37 influential articles as a subsample. We then included all articles that cited 
these 37 influential articles in the mapping. As a result, we added 39 more papers to the 
subsample. Thus, the co-citation map has 76 articles, details of which appear in Table A1 
(Figure 3).   
In Figure 3, articles, represented by nodes, are positioned along the horizontal axis, and years 
of publication are positioned along the vertical axis. Co-citation linkages are depicted by lines 
that connect the nodes and citing vs. cited articles are indicated by arrows. The size of the node 
reflects the magnitude of influence of an article based on total local citations received (TLC). 
In our citation map, the largest nodes are 20 (i.e., Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005), 21 
(Sanyal, 2005), 24 (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006), and 14 (Doh et al., 2003). 
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We then asked two independent researchers to conduct the content analysis of the subsample 
of 76 articles. The content analysis consists of a critical review of each article’s title, author, 
journal, research question(s), theory, data sources, variables, category, and key findings 
(Salipante, Notz, & Bigelow, 1982; Ahmed, Bahoo, & Ayub, 2019; Bahoo et al., 2019). As a 
result of this content analysis, combined with our bibliometric analysis, we were able to 
identify seven distinctly but interrelated research streams in the literature on corruption in 
international business: (1) the legislation against it, (2) its determinants, (3) combating it, (4) 
its effect on firms, (5) the political environment and corruption in international business, (6) 
corruption as a challenge to existing theories of management in international business, and (7) 
corruption’s effect on foreign direct investments and trade (see Figure 3). We were also able 
to identify some outliers, namely, articles not cited by other articles but whose content fits in 
one or more of the research streams (1, 3, 36, 114, 105, 12, 102, 91, 60, and 15). We discuss 
these articles in their relevant research streams. The numbers refer to Figure 3. However, there 
are two articles cited by other articles but whose content does not fit in any of the research 
streams (102 and 115) (Jiménez & Bjorvatn, 2018). Lord and Levi (2017) (no. 102 in Fig. 3) 
and Karhunen et al. (2018) (no. 115 in Fig. 3) discuss the financial aspects of corruption related 
to money laundering and corrupt exchanges in Chinese Guanxi and Russian Blat/Svyazi, 
respectively. We now discuss the seven research streams.  
4.1.1 The legislation against corruption in international business 
In the 1990s, corruption emerged as a global political issue with dire implications for 
international business (Kaikati et al., 2000) and remained a persistent problem despite the 
passage of national and international legislation to control it (Nichols, 2012). Everett et al. 
(2006) (no. 23 in Fig. 3) argue that existing anti-corruption laws need to be updated by all 
relevant regulatory bodies. The United States was the first country to pass laws prohibiting 
corruption by individuals or firms, namely, the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 
(Hotchkiss, 1998) (no. 4 in Fig. 3). However, Klaw (2012) (no. 60 in Fig. 3) maintains that the 
FCPA is unable to prevent and punish demand-side corruption in business transactions. Kaikati 
et al. (2000) (no. 9 in Fig. 3) have recommended that the OECD broaden the scope of the FCPA 
and adopt the amended version in full. In 1997, for the first time, the UN, OECD, and EU 
convened to discuss passing legislation against bribery and corruption (Mijares, 2015) (no. 80 
in Fig. 3). The guidelines of the UN’s 1996 declaration, the OECD’s 1997 convention, and the 
EU’s 1997 convention were the foundation of current anti-corruption laws (Gantz, 1998). 
Under these guidelines many developed and emerging economies have established national 
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anti-corruption laws in international business, including Canada (Mijares, 2015) (no. 80 in Fig. 
3), the US (Spalding, 2011) (no. 54 in Fig. 3), and the EU (Pacini et al., 2002) (no. 11 in Fig. 
3).  Moreover, the OECD convention provides guidelines for member states to establish 
uniform laws and policies (Pacini et al., 2002). Implementation of the OECD’s 1997 
convention is compulsory for the 36 signatory countries.   
4.1.2 The determinants of corruption in international business 
The dominant research stream in the literature is the determinants of corruption in international 
business. Carmichael (1995) presents three common situations in which a multinational 
enterprise becomes involved in corruption in a host country. The first is when the company is 
unable to engage in a new business transaction or complete an existing one without offering a 
bribe. The second is when the legal institutions in the host country are weak. The third is when 
the multinational firm is involved in corruption in its home country as well. 
One group of studies argues that the determinant of corruption is the firm. Chen, Cullen, and 
Parboteeah (2015) (no. 82 in Fig. 3) explore the relationship between culture, management, 
shareholder control, and a firm’s propensity to bribe. They find that manager-controlled firms 
are more likely than shareholder-controlled firms to engage in bribery. 
The second group of studies maintains that the determinant of corruption is cultural factors. 
Based on a survey they conducted, Guvenli and Sanyal (2012) (no. 56 in Fig. 3) explore 
whether attitudes toward bribery differ between men and women in international business. 
They found that men are more inclined toward bribery than women. Recently, Tuliao and Chen 
(2017) (no. 99 in Fig. 3) analyzed gender as a determinant of bribery among CEOs and found 
that male CEOs are more likely to be involved in corruption. Relatedly, Frei, and Muethel 
(2017) (no. 103 in Fig. 3) argue that the host country provides a breeding ground for 
multinational firms for corruption through weak values and laws. Therefore, regional 
characteristics are significant determinants of corruption (Sanyal & Samanta, 2002) (no. 98 in 
Fig. 3). 
Finally, the third group of studies claims that the determinant of corruption is economic factors. 
Sanyal (2005) (no. 21 in Fig. 3) suggests that countries with low per capita income and poor 
income distribution, and those that score high on Hofstede’s scales of power distance and 
masculinity are more inclined toward bribery. Similarly, Sanyal and Guvenli (2009) (no. 33 in 
Fig. 3) show that firms from countries where the power distance or the long-term orientation 
is low, and individualism is high are less involved in corruption. Baughn et al. (2010) (no. 41 
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in Fig. 3) confirm that firms from countries that score high on power distance are more likely 
to be involved in bribery. Mazar and Aggarwal (2011) (no. 51 in Fig. 3) find that bribery varies 
with the degree of collectivism. Huang et al. (2015) (no. 81 in Fig. 3) argue that concern about 
evaluations plays a moderating role between collectivism and corruption: collectivism 
facilitates corruption in countries where there is little concern about evaluations.  
4.1.3 Combating corruption in international business 
Laws and regulations against corruption exist but are largely ineffective due to weak judicial 
systems and the indifference of governments (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). The major research 
question in this stream is related to the practical effectiveness of laws, the adoption of ethical 
standards, and the implementation of legal frameworks to combat corruption.  
Hotchkiss (1998) (no. 4 in Fig. 3) argues that the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was 
considered just a moral obligation until the US government began enforcing it in 1998. 
Kaczmarek and Newman (2011) show that extraterritorial intervention by US prosecutors to 
reduce corruption and bribery in target countries is effective. Weber and Getz (2004) (no. 17 
in Fig. 3) review the efforts of the EU, US, and OECD to combat corruption. Cuervo-Cazurra 
(2008) (no. 30 in Fig. 3) advocates an increase in the scope of implementation of existing anti-
corruption laws and a reduction in investment in corrupt countries by signatories to the OECD 
convention.   
Rose-Ackerman (2002) (no. 12 in Fig. 3) considers abstention from corruption to be the moral 
responsibility of the firms and argues that the formation of ethical standards can be helpful in 
this regard. Kaptein (2004) (no. 15 in Fig. 3) reviews the business codes and standards of 200 
of the largest firms and finds that 46% of them have ethical codes against corruption. Osuji 
(2011) (no. 52 in Fig. 3) highlights the importance of ethical corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) to combat corruption. Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, and Eden (2005) (no. 20 in Fig. 3) 
analyze the effect of public corruption on multinational enterprises in terms of organizational 
legitimacy, strategic decision-making, and entry choice. Cleveland et al. (2010) (no. 39 in Fig. 
3) build a model based on hard and soft laws, and enforcement and compliance mechanisms to 
assess progress in reducing the level of bribery.   
4.1.4 The effect of corruption on firms in international business 
How does corruption affect the entry strategy of a company, international joint ventures, and 
the performance of subsidiaries? Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) (no. 24 in Fig. 3) examine the effect 
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of corruption on firms’ entry strategies in foreign markets and find that firms in the 
telecommunication industry face pressure to engage in corrupt practices during short-term 
contracts and joint ventures. Kouznetsov, Dass, and Schmidt (2014) (no. 70 in Fig. 3) confirm 
the negative effect of weak laws against corruption on small-to-medium-sized foreign 
manufacturing enterprises in Russia. Roy and Oliver (2009) (no. 37 in Fig. 3) show that the 
rule of law and control of corruption have a strong impact on the selection of partners for joint 
ventures. Krueger (2009) (no. 38 in Fig. 3) argues that international firms doing business in 
China face ethical issues due to the authoritarian government, lack of transparency, and the 
high level of corruption.  
Jensen, Li, and Rahman (2010) (no. 46 in Fig. 3) report that in a political environment where 
freedom of the press is restricted, firms utilize a no-comment or false disclosure option as a 
self-protection strategy. Lambsdorff (2013) (no. 65 in Fig. 3) argues that firms should be liable 
for the illegal activities of the corrupt intermediaries with whom they engage in business 
transactions. Petrou (2014) (no. 84 in Fig. 3) finds that arbitrary corruption hurts the 
performance of subsidiaries. Finally, Gomes et al. (2018) (no. 106 in Fig. 3) provide evidence 
that the self-selection theory works only in environments with a low level of corruption.  
4.1.5 The political environment and corruption in international business 
This research stream examines the link between corruption, international business, and the 
political environment in the host and home countries. Rodriguez et al. (2006) (no. 25 in Fig. 3) 
review papers on the link between politics, corruption, and corporate social responsibility and 
propose some future research directions. Luo (2006) (no. 26 in Fig. 3) uses a structuration 
model to show that in a highly corrupt environment, multinational enterprises with a high level 
of ethics bargain with governments, while less ethical firms use social and political connections 
to engage in bribe-giving. Chen, Ding, and Kim (2010) (no. 47 in Fig. 3) find that corruption 
has more influence on the earnings forecasts of highly politically connected firms than less 
politically connected ones. Boubakri, Mansi, and Saffar (2013) (no. 64 in Fig. 3) document that 
sound political institutions have a positive effect on corporate risk-taking when government 
extraction is high, and the level of corruption is low. Yim, Lu, and Choi (2017) (no. 100 in Fig. 
3) show that in business transactions, political lobbying has a more positive impact on firm 
performance than bribery. Brockman, Rui, and Zou (2013) (no. 67 in Fig. 3) find that where 
there are strong legal institutions or a low level of corruption, politically connected firms’ post-
merger and acquisition performance is low compared to that of non-political firms. Hung, Kim, 
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and Li (2018) (no. 112 in Fig. 3) argue that politically non-connected firms issue more 
management forecasts than politically connected firms.  
4.1.6 Corruption as a challenge to existing theories of management in 
international business 
The sixth research stream is relatively new and at the fact-finding and evaluation stage. It often 
provides counterexamples to many existing theories of management in international business 
because the unethical, criminal nature of corruption challenges certain assumptions of those 
theories. For example, Gomes et al. (2018) (no. 106 in fig. 3) find that contrary to the self-
selection theory, if the level of corruption is high, productivity does not have a positive effect 
on the value of exports.  After reviewing the literature related to the firm’s response to 
government corruption, Galang (2012) (no. 58 in Fig. 3) summarizes the key theories that 
support its strategies, such as institutional economics, institutionalism, resource dependence, 
public choice, social network, and stakeholder theory. Doh et al. (2003) (no. 14 in Fig. 3) 
explore the impact of government corruption on multinational enterprises. They provide a 
framework based on two dimensions of government corruption: pervasiveness and 
arbitrariness. The framework proposes several strategies that firms should adopt to respond to 
corruption: avoidance, adjusting their entry mode, corporate codes of conduct, training, 
development and public education, social contributions and public donations, and laws and 
agreements. Cuervo-Cazurra (2016) (no. 88 in Fig. 3) proposes expanding this approach by 
considering corruption as a laboratory. He reviews and recommends extensions of several 
theories: agency theory, transaction cost economics, the resource-based view, resource 
dependence, and neo-institutional theory. He also argues that the agency and resource-
dependence theories are best for explaining the causes of corruption, whereas the resource-
based view and neo-institutional theory are more appropriate for exploring the consequences 
of corruption. Transaction cost theory is best for determining how to control corruption in 
international business.  
4.1.7 The effect of corruption on foreign direct investment and trade in 
international business 
The seventh research stream is also in the fact-finding and evaluation stage. It examines the 
impact of home- and host-country corruption on foreign direct investment and trade. Habib and 
Zurawicki (2002) find that corruption has a negative effect on foreign direct investment and 
operational efficiency. Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) (no. 27 in Fig. 3) shows that firms from 
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countries with a high level of corruption are more likely to invest in host countries with a high 
level of corruption than firms from less corrupt countries.  Driffield, Jones, and Crotty (2013) 
(no. 63 in Fig. 3) argue that firms from countries with a high level of corruption, weak legal 
institutions, and less concern about corporate social responsibility are more likely to invest in 
host countries with a high level of corruption. Sambharya and Rasheed (2015) argue that if the 
level of corruption is low, economic and political freedom has a positive effect on foreign direct 
investment and trade. Jime, Marcelus, Guoliang, and Jiang (2017) (no. 104 in Fig. 3) show that 
host-country corruption is positively related to a high failure rate of private participation 
projects. However, Egger and Winner (2005) demonstrate that corruption stimulates foreign 
direct investment. Driffield et al. (2013) (no. 63 in Fig. 3) argue that firms from corrupt 






Figure 3. Citation map of the literature on corruption in IB. The HistCite software is used to create map. *76 articles form 
this map. For details see Table A.1. 
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4.2 Influential aspects of the literature on corruption in international business  
We identified the key journals, studies, methods, data sources, measurements, and theoretical 
frameworks in the literature (Paul, Parthasarathy, & Gupta, 2017; Alon et al., 2018; Paul & 
Benito, 2018). In Section 6, we also highlighted the gaps in our knowledge and posited several 
propositions.   
4.2.1 Key journals 
The 137 articles in our sample came from 85 journals with 3,059 total global citations. Table 
2 lists the 34 leading journals having an ABS ranking (4*, 4, 3, 2, 1). We do not report the 
remaining 51 journals due to space limitations. Sixty-one percent of our sample accounted for 
2,685 of the citations. The largest number of articles was published by the Journal of Business 
Ethics (JBE) (18 articles), Journal of International Business Studies (JIBS) (13 articles), 
International Business Review (IBR) (6 articles), and Journal of World Business (JWB) (6 
articles). This ranking is logical, given that the first journal is the leading publication outlet in 
the field of ethics and business, and the second is the oldest and most prominent journal. The 
fact that we found articles on this topic in journals devoted to financing and law confirms its 
multidisciplinary nature.  







(TGC) References  
1 Journal of Business Ethics 18 551 
Armstrong, 1992; Tsalikis & Latour, 1995; Kaikati et 
al., 2000; Pacini et al., 2002; Kaptein, 2004; Sanyal, 
2005; Everett et al., 2006; Argandona, 2007; Peng & 
Beamish, 2008; Koerber, 2010; Pedigo & Marshall, 
2009; Krueger, 2009; Cleveland et al., 2010; Baughn 
et al., 2010; Darrough, 2010;Osuji, 2011; Blanc et al., 
2019; Horak, 2018. 
2 
Journal of International 
Business Studies 
13 908 
Rodriguez et al., 2006; Luo, 2006; Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2006; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Pajunen, 2008; Roy & 
Oliver, 2009; Franke & Jr Richey, 2010; Jensen et al., 
2010; Chen et al., 2010; Muethel et al., 2011; 






Jimenez, 2010; Driffield et al., 2013; Roy & Goll, 
2014; Yi et al., 2018; Krammer et al., 2018; Guo et al., 
2018.  
4 Journal of World Business 6 54 
Hearn, 2015; Petrou, 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; 
Driffield et al., 2016; Xie et al.,  2017; Lewellyn & 
Rosey, 2017. 
5 Business Ethics Quarterly 3 38 
Weber & Getz, 2004; Windsor, 2004; Gelbrich et al., 
2016 
6 
Journal of International 
Management 
3 21 
Tunyi & Ntim, 2016; Geleilate et al., 2016; Muellner 
et al., 2017 
7 
Journal of Management 
Studies 







Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management 
2 29 Meschi, 2009; Lee & Hong, 2012 
9 
Journal of Business 
Research 








2 26 Czinkota & Ronkainen, 2009; Jimenez et al., 2017  
 
Academy of Management 
Executive  
1 104 Doh et al., 2003 
12 
Academy of Management 
Journal 
1 178 
Martin et al, 2019 
13 
Academy of Management 
Review 
1 200 
Rodriguez et al., 2005 
14 Administrative Science  1 2 Lord et al., 2018 




1 0 Gomes et al., 2018 
16 
Journal of Banking & 
Finance 
1 39 Rose-Ackerman, 2002 
17 
Journal of Comparative 
Economics 
1 18 Perez et al., 2012 
18 
Journal of Empirical 
Finance 
1 12 Pantzalis et al., 2008 
19 
Journal of Management 
Inquiry 
1 0 Frei & Muethel, 2017 
20 Organization Science 1 150 Uhlenbruck et al., 2006 









1 0 Sanyal & Guvenli, 2009 
24 
Baltic Journal of 
Management 
1 3 Kouznetsov et al.,2014 
25 
European Journal of 
International Management 
1 0 Oesterle & Bjorn, 2017 
26 
European Journal of Law 
and Economics 
1 10 Lambsdorff, 2013 
27 
International Journal of 
Emerging Markets 
1 6 Dikova et al., 2016 
28 
Journal of East-West 
Business 
1 0 Sanyal & Samanta, 2017 








1 6 He, Xie, & Zhu, 2015 
32 
Review of Development 
Economics 
1 17 Brada, Drabek, & Perez, 2012 
33 
Western Journal of Legal 
Studies 
1 0 Mijares, 2015 
34 Culture and Organization 1 3 Maria, 2010 
Total  84 2685 (61% of total 137 articles) 




4.2.2 Key studies  
Through bibliometric citation analysis, we identified key empirical and theoretical papers that 
had at least 10 global citations (TGC≥ 10). Tables 3 and 4 provide summaries of these empirical 
and theoretical papers, respectively, through content analysis. Note that in previous literature, 
empirical papers have received more citations than theoretical ones. The most cited articles 
refer to the effect of corruption on firms in international business (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; 
Pantzalis et al., 2008; Meschi, 2009; Roy & Oliver, 2009; Jensen et al., 2010; Jiménez, 2010; 
Mazar & Aggarwal, 2011; Muethel et al., 2011; Lee & Hong, 2012; Hearn, 2015; Keig et al., 
2015; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016), confirming that the firm is the topic of most interest.  
4.2.3 Key methods  
The researchers utilized qualitative and quantitative methods in the literature to explore 
corruption in international business (see Table 5). Out of 137 articles, 35 (40%) used content 
analysis, 37 (48%) used regression analysis, and 12 (8%) used document analysis. Researchers 
used content analysis to formulate concepts, theoretical backgrounds, and models related to 
corruption (Kaptein, 2004; Everett et al., 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2006; Krueger, 2009; Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2016). They utilized simple and panel regressions to examine the effect of corruption 
(Sanyal, 2005; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; 2008; Jiménez, 2010; Jiménez, 2011; Boubakri et al., 
2013). Finally, they adopted the document analysis approach to critically examine, discuss or 
comment on the impact of laws on corruption in international business (Kaikati et al., 2000; 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ble 5.  Key methods used in the literature on corruption in IB 
















Content Analysis 35 Rodriguez et al., 2006; Kaptein, 2004; Everett et al., 2006; 
Krueger, 2009; Blanc et al., 2019; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Xie 
et al.,  2017; Weber & Getz, 2004; Windsor, 2004; Galang, 
2012; Celentani et al., 2004; Frei & Muethel, 2017; Nichols, 
2012; Foster, 2015; Doh et al.,2003; Marat, 2015; Funk & 
Treviño, 2017;  Maria, 2010; Lord & Levi, 2017; Lambsdorff, 
2013; Hefendehl, 2010; Fard & Hassanpour, 2016; Hotchkiss, 
1998; Mijares, 2015; Armstrong, 1992; Pedigo & Marshall, 
2009; Cleveland et al., 2010; Darrough, 2010; Osuji, 2011; 
Blanc et al., 2019; Guvenli & Sanyal, 2012; Kouznetsov et 
al.,2014; Bondy et al, 2008; Kaptein, 2004; Horak, 2018. 
Document Analysis  12 Kaikati et al., 2000; Pacini et al., 2002; Kaptein, 2004; Everett 
et al., 2006; Argandona, 2007; Nichols, 2012; George et 
al.,1998; Foster, 2015; Wenhao & Ahmad, 2011; Klaw, 2012; 
Laudone, 2016; Spalding, 2011. 
Contextual Analysis 5 Czinkota & Skuba, 2014; Keig et al., 2018; Rodriguez et al., 
2005; Doh et al.,2003. 















Regression (OLS) 20 Jensen et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2010; Hung et al., 2018; 
Sanyal, 2005; Peng & Beamish, 2008; Baughn et al., 2010; 
Jimenez, 2010; Roy & Goll, 2014; Driffield et al., 2013; 
Gelbrich et al., 2016; Muellner et al., 2017; Meschi, 2009; Lee 
& Hong, 2012; Rose-ackerman, 2002; Mazar & Aggarwal, 
2011; Zhu, 2017; Gao, 2011; Sanyal & Guvenli, 2009; 
Oesterle & Bjorn, 2017.  
Panel Regression 17 Boubakri et al.,2013; Brockman et al., 2013; Hung et al., 
2018; Peng & Beamish, 2008; Driffield et al., 2013; Pantzalis 
et al., 2008; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Mornah & Macdermott, 
2018; Sambharya & Rasheed, 2015; Jiménez, 2011; Lopatta 
et al, 2017; Mukherjee, 2018; Dikova et al., 2016; Kaczmarek 
& Newman, 2011; Sanyal & Samanta, 2017; Yim, Lu, & 
Choi, 2017; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008.  
Probit Model 07 Hung et al., 2018; Driffield et al., 2013; Krammer et al., 2018; 
Perez et al., 2012; He, Xie, & Zhu, 2015; Brada, Drabek, & 
Perez, 2012. 
Logistic regression 1 Hearn, 2015. 
Multinomial Logit 
Regressions 
3 Driffield et al., 2016; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016; Gomes et al., 
2018; Jimenez et al., 2017 
Binomial Regression 1 Keig et al., 2015 
Tobit Model 1 He, Xie, & Zhu, 2015 
Hierarchical Regression 
Analysis 
7 Roy & Goll, 2014; Petrou, 2015; Lewellyn & Rosey, 2017; 
Chen et al., 2015; Muethel et al., 2011; Lewellyn & Rosey, 
2017; Tuliao & Chen, 2017 
Structural Equation 
Modeling 
2 Luo, 2006; Roy & Oliver, 2009 
Fuzzy-set Analysis 1 Pajunen, 2008 
Bayesian Analysis 1 Franke et al., 2010/41 
Propensity Score Matching 1 Brockman et al., 2013 
ANOVA 1 Tsalikis & Latour, 1995 
ANCOVA 1 Wu & Huang, 2013 
MANOVA 1 Huang et al.,2015 
Meta-Analysis  1 Geleilate et al., 2016 
Delphi Method 1 Czinkota & Ronkainen, 2019 
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Note: The table lists the qualitative and quantitative methods researchers use to study corruption in 
international business. * Some papers utilize more than one method.  
 
4.2.4 Data sources and measurement of corruption  
Table 6 illustrates that 36 articles used a corruption index, which is a country-level variable, to 
measure corruption in international business. Of these 36 articles, 22 used the indexes of 
Transparency International, 9 used World Governance indicators, and 5 used The International 
Country Risk Guide as a proxy for corruption in international business. Very few researchers 
used the corruption indexes of Germany exporters (Hung et al., 2018), the GLOBAL survey 
(Mazar & Aggarwal, 2011), or the World Competitiveness Yearbook (Pajunen, 2008). 
Furthermore, Tuliao and Chen (2017) and Yim, Lu, and Choi (2017) used bribery surveys of 
firms from the World Bank as a proxy for corruption. Six articles utilized questionnaires or 
interviews to measure corruption at the firm level (Luo, 2006; Roy & Oliver, 2009; Gao, 2011; 
Muethel et al., 2011; Petrou, 2015; Zhu, 2017).  
Table 6. Data sources and measurement of corruption in the literature 
Measurement of 
Corruption  
Date Source   Articles  Reference 
Corruption 
Variable   
Questionnaire/Interview/S
urvey 
6 Luo, 2006; Roy & Oliver, 2009; Muethel et 
al., 2011; Petrou, 2015; Zhu, 2017; Gao, 2011.  
Corruption 
Perception Index 
Transparency International 22 Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Franke et al., 2010; 
Chen et al., 2010; Brockman et al., 2013; 
Sanyal, 2005; Peng & Beamish, 2008; Roy & 
Goll, 2014; Jimenez, 2010; Baughn et al., 2010; 
Gelbrich et al., 2016; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016; 
Muellner et al., 2017;  Keig et al., 2015; 
Meschi, 2009; Gomes et al., 2018; Uhlenbruck 
et al., 2006; Mornah & Macdermott, 2018; 
Jiménez, 2011; Oesterle & Bjorn, 2017; 
Kaczmarek & Newman, 2011; Sanyal & 
Samanta, 2017; Brada, Drabek, & Perez, 2012. 
Corruption Index World Governance 
indicator 
9 Jensen et al., 2010; Muethel et al., 2011; 
Lewellyn & Rosey, 2017; Tunyi & Ntim, 
2016;  Keig et al., 2015; Lee & Hong, 2012; 
Jimenez et al., 2017; Mornah & Macdermott, 
2018; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006. 
Corruption Index The International Country 
Risk Guide 
 
5 Boubakri et al.,2013; Driffield et al., 2013; 
Driffield et al., 2016; Meschi, 2009; 
Mukherjee, 2018  
Corruption Index  Corruption (German 
exporters index-Neumann, 
1994) 






1 Uhlenbruck et al., 2006 




4.2.5 Theoretical underpinnings   
Table 7 illustrates that we identified several theoretical frameworks in the literature. Of the 137 
papers, only 39 (29%) examined and discussed any management theory. Of these 39 papers, 
17 used institutional theory, 5 applied agency theory, and 3 papers examined the neo-
institutional theory. The use of institutional theory is logical because researchers consider 
corruption a proxy for institutional quality at the country level. Furthermore, only a few papers 
used the resource-based view, transaction cost theory, or the resource dependence theory. Other 
theories that appeared referred to structuration (Luo, 2006), socialization (Muethel et al., 2011), 
diversification and portfolios (Jimenez, 2010), stakeholders (Roy & Goll, 2014), property 
rights (Driffield et al., 2016), self-selection (Gomes et al., 2018), anomie theory (Chen et al., 
2015), and legitimacy theory (Blanc et al., 2019). Most papers did not specifically mention the 
theoretical framework the authors utilized. They may have failed to do so because corruption 
is a country-level indicator, and the measurement of corruption at the firm level is quite difficult 
and un-standardized. We also discuss the key theories in the literature in the next section. 
Table 7. Theories used in the literature on corruption in IB 
Theory Articles References 
Institutional Theory 17 Roy & Oliver, 2009; Baughn et al., 2010; Roy & Goll, 2014; Yi et al., 
2018; Krammer et al., 2018; Hearn, 2015; Lewellyn & Rosey, 2017; 
Tunyi & Ntim, 2016; Muellner et al., 2017; Keig et al., 2015; Lee & 
Hong, 2012; Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Oesterle & 
Bjorn, 2017; Dikova et al., 2016; Pantzalis et al., 2008. 
 
Agency Theory 5 Boubakri et al., 2013; Yi et al., 2018; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Chen et 




3 Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Lambsdorff, 2013; Gao, 2011 
Resource-Based View 2 Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Yim, Lu, & Choi, 2017  
Transaction Cost 
Theory 
2 Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Meschi, 2009 
Resource Dependence 
Theory 
2 Petrou, 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016  
Theory of Structuration 1 Luo, 2006 
Socialization Theory 1 Muethel et al., 2011  
Legitimacy Theory 1 Blanc et al., 2019 
Diversification and 
Portfolio Theory 
1 Jimenez, 2010  




Survey (PICS) of the 
World Bank Group 
1 Tuliao & Chen, 2017 
Bribery Survey of 
Firms 
World Bank's Enterprise 
Survey 
1 Yim, Lu, & Choi, 2017 
Corruption Index World Competitiveness 
Yearbook 
1 Pajunen, 2008 
Note: The table lists the data sources and measurements of corruption in the international business literature.  
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Stakeholder Theory 1 Roy & Goll, 2014 
Property Rights Theory 1 Driffield et al., 2016 
Anomie Theory 1 Chen et al., 2015 
Self-Selection Theory 1 Gomes et al., 2018 
Note: The table lists the key theories used or tested by scholars in the literature on corruption in international 
business. 
 
4.2.5.1 Institutional theory 
The institutional theory deals with regulatory structures, government laws and regulations, 
courts, and professions (Oliver, 1991). These institutions establish the social, political, and 
legal norms that affect decision-making and actions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The institutional 
theory posits that there is social and legal pressure on firms to adopt the beliefs, values, and 
norms of their environment (Roy & Goll, 2014). 
This theory also predicts the firm’s behavior. The institutional framework affects the strategies 
of firms and grants them legitimacy (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). The power of the host country’s 
institutional environment in terms of its control of corruption and the rule of law shapes and 
affects the firms’ entry strategy (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006), decisions about engaging in 
international joint ventures (IJVs) (Roy & Oliver, 2009), the composition of the board of these 
joint ventures (Hearn, 2015), the appointment of national managers (Muellner, Klopf, & Nell, 
2017), and bribery behavior (Baughn et al., 2010; Yi et al., 2018) in cross-national transactions. 
The institutional environment of host and home countries, of which the level of corruption is 
one factor, affects a firm’s export performance (Krammer et al., 2018), management of 
earnings (Lewellyn & Rosey, 2017), merger and acquisition activities (Tunyi & Ntim, 2016), 
and location of foreign direct investment (Dikova et al., 2016).  
Furthermore, the institutional theory raises concerns about how a corrupt institutional 
environment influences corporate social responsibility (Keig, Brouthers, & Marshall, 2015), 
profitability (Lee & Hong, 2012), values (Pantzalis et al., 2008), organizational legitimacy and 
strategic decision making (Rodriguez et al., 2005). This theory holds that the quality of 
institutions defines the level of corruption in the host and home country, which influences the 
nations and firms. The literature suggests that by improving the quality of institutions, the 
adverse effects of corruption can be minimized in international business. 
4.2.5.2 Neo-institutional theory 
Neo-institutional theory reflects the sociological view of institutions. It suggests that 
isomorphism, which is a process that forces one unit to resemble other units in the population 
because they face the same set of environments, plays a role in corruption (Hawley, 1968). 
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Isomorphism consists of three mechanisms: coercive, mimetic, and normative (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). Currently, the neo-institutional perspective is quite popular in the organizational 
field and international business. It maintains that firms respond to the cognitive, normative, 
and regulatory pressures on other firms that are considered legitimate (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991). 
Gao (2010) uses the neo-institutional framework to examine the effect of mimetic isomorphism 
on bribery by firms working in China. He confirms that the firms’ bribery behavior reflects the 
habits of other companies in China. This theory explains the firms’ choice about when to 
engage in corrupt practices themselves and when their subsidiaries do so as well (Lambsdorff, 
2013). Cuervo-Cazurra (2016) also recommends extending the neo-institutional theory by 
considering corruption as a laboratory.  
4.2.5.3 Agency theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed agency theory, which maintains that managers try to 
divert corporate resources to maximize private benefits at the cost of shareholders because 
incentives are lacking. Agency theory explains that this behavior creates investment risks and 
produces the agency problem in international business. In addition to agency problems, Stulz 
(2005) argues that there is a potential link between political institutions and the managers’ 
choice of investment risks. Political institutions are managed by governments, which play an 
important role in the firm managers’ decision making through the strict rule of law, over-
regulation, and level of corruption. Political institutions and the level of corruption affect 
corporate risk-taking decisions, and politically connected firms take more risks, which leads to 
agency problems (Boubakri et al., 2013). This theory explains the potential conflict between 
the firm’s headquarters and its foreign subsidiaries in cases of offering bribes due to political 
connections (Yi, Teng, & Meng, 2017). Firms have two options: lobbying or bribery in the host 
country. The effect of lobbying in the host country is more positive than offering bribes (Yi et 
al., 2017).  Agency theory suggests that manager-controlled firms offer more bribes than 
shareholder-controlled firms due to conflicting goals, a theory that Chen et al. (2015) confirmed 
empirically. There are associations between bribery and the corrupt behavior of firms and the 
characteristics of boards of governance such as CEO duality (Das-Gupta & Wu, 2008), 
manager, or shareholder-controlled firms (Chen et al., 2015), and gender (Tuliao & Chen, 




4.2.5.4. Other theories 
The resource-based view explores how a firm can create resources distinct from those of its 
competitors to satisfy customers or how firms can use competitive and institutional resources 
when operating aboard (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). Hillman (2005) argues that firms can create 
relationships with foreign government officials or politicians as their resource and can use them 
instead of bribes. Yim, Lu, and Choi (2017) confirm that lobbying adds more value to a firm 
than bribery.  
The transaction cost theory provides details of a firm’s behavior based on the cost of its 
economic transactions. Bribery and corruption are viewed as an additional cost of operating 
nationally and internationally because they result in uncertainty in the relationship between the 
firm and the government (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). Meschi (2009) examines the effect of 
corruption on international joint ventures through the transaction cost theory perspective. He 
documents that corruption adds more costs to such ventures, but the experience of foreign 
partners in the country moderates this relationship.  
Resource dependence theory provides a benchmark to explain the power relationship between 
two parties in which one party can exercise power over the other (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
One study utilizes this theory to analyze how firm managers in host countries gain the support 
of government officials by providing them with bribes because a foreign company has less 
power than local firms (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). Petrou (2015) uses the resource dependence 
viewpoint to document that the arbitrariness of corruption in a host country has a negative 
impact on a subsidiary’s performance.  
The greatest limitation of most of the theories used to investigate corruption in international 
business is the lack of clarity in explaining the multidisciplinary and complex dynamics of 
corruption at the country and firm levels. Therefore, we call for the extension of these theories 












































































5. A Synthesis of Corruption in International Business 
In the 1990s, corruption emerged as one of the most serious global political issues affecting 
international business (Mijares, 2015). To this day, corruption and bribery remain persistent 
and perplexing problems in investment and trading (Nichols, 2012). Therefore, one of the 
central questions is: what are the antecedents and consequences of corruption in international 
business?  Figure 4 illustrates our synthesis of the literature that we used to explore the answer 
to this question. We utilized our seven identified research streams to synthesize the antecedents 
and consequences of corruption in the international business literature.  
5.1 Country (macro)level antecedents: Host and home country 
Country-level antecedents play a crucial role as determinants of corruption in home and host 
countries. The key factors identified in research stream one (legislation against corruption in 
international business) are the lack of international laws (Everett et al., 2006; Nichols, 2012) 
and non-enforcement of the OECD convention and FCPA in non-member countries (Kaikati 
et al., 2000; Klaw, 2012). Therefore, it is essential to increase the bilateral implementation of 
anti-corruption laws through groups such as the WTO and the World Bank (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2008).  
In research stream two, scholars identified three factors that influence corruption: economic 
factors (Sanyal, 2005; Chen et al., 2015; Lopatta et al, 2017; Sanyal & Samanta, 2017), cultural 
factors (Roy & Goll, 2014), and other factors  (Gao, 2011; Sanyal & Samanta, 2017). Sanyal 
(2009) and Baughn et al. (2010) document the significant effect of economic and national 
cultural factors on the likelihood of individuals and firms to engage in bribery (see also 
Hofstede, 1980). Gelbrich et al. (2016) identify and resolve some discrepancies in the 
measurement of cultural factors and confirm them as determinants of corruption. Sanyal 
(2005), Sanyal and Guvenli (2009), and Frei and Muethel (2017) show that national cultural 
and economic factors lead to corrupt activities in both home and host countries.  
5.2 Corruption 
Country-level antecedents lead to a higher level of corruption. Corruption has two main causes: 
the demand side and the supply side (Everett, Nuh, & Rahaman, 2006). Corruption is also 
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divided into several types, such as public (Pontell & Geis, 2007), private (Argandon, 2003), 
pervasive, and arbitrary (Rodriguez et al., 2005). Public corruption is further divided into four 
subtypes: petty and grand (Elliot, 1997) and organized and unorganized (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1993). Analysts and researchers measure corruption through structured interviews, surveys, 
and indexes such as those of the World Bank and Transparency International. 
5.2.1 Controlling for firm-level antecedents 
Scholars have explored the country-level antecedents of the firm-level consequences of 
corruption by controlling for firm-level antecedents (see Figure 4). Their goal is to determine 
how corruption impacts the firm, which is the main subject of discussion in international 
business. Therefore, the scholars control for multiple firm-level factors such as size, age, sales, 
volume, asset growth, industry, international experience, ownership, loss frequency, leverage, 
length of operating cycle, earnings volatility, profitability, and number of subsidiaries (Luo, 
2006; Roy & Oliver, 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Driffield et al., 2013; Hung et al., 2018). 
5.2.2 Extending the concepts of corruption 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2016) proposes extending the five important firm theories—agency, 
transaction cost economics, the resource-based view, resource dependence, and the neo-
institutional theory—by considering corruption as a laboratory. Doh et al. (2013) also present 
a framework for multinational enterprises that deal with corruption in international business. 
5.3 Firm-level consequences 
As the fourth stream of research  indicates, on the macro-level, corruption affects the key 
players in international business with regard to their earnings forecasts and management (Chen 
et al., 2010; Lewellyn & Rosey, 2017), firm disclosures (Hung, Kim, & Li, 2018), risk-taking 
(Boubakri et al., 2013), corporate social responsibility (Luo, 2006), international joint ventures 
(Meschi, 2009; Roy & Oliver, 2009; Hearn, 2015), organizational legitimacy and decision 
making (Rodriguez et al., 2005), the prosocial values of the firm (Muethel et al., 2011), export 
performance (Krammer et al., 2018), the performance of foreign affiliates and subsidiaries 
(Petrou, 2015; Muellner et al., 2017), foreign affiliates’ ownership (Driffield et al., 2016), the 
firms’ volume of activities and performance (Lee & Hong, 2012; Geleilate et al., 2016; Tunyi 
& Ntim, 2016), social irresponsibility (CSR) (Keig et al., 2015), entry mode strategy 
(Uhlenbruck et al., 2006), SMEs’ performance (Kouznetsov, Dass, & Schmidt, 2014), and the 
performance of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) (Brockman et al., 2013). 
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5.3.1 Firm-level consequences: Politics and corruption 
As the fifth stream of research indicates, there is a connection between the political 
environment and corruption in international business. Luo (2006) argues that in very corrupt 
host countries, politically connected firms with few ethics engage in bribery. Similarly, 
politically connected firms reflect the weak performance of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), 
where the level of corruption is low in the host country. Politically connected firms in corrupt 
countries also issue fewer earnings forecasts (Hung, Kim, & Li, 2018). In contrast, Yim, Lu, 
and Choi (2017) maintain that political connections are suitable for firms because lobbying has 
a more positive effect than bribes.  
5.4 Combating corruption 
In the second research stream that explored combatting corruption in international business, 
scholars determined that corruption is an irregular tax and additional cost borne by society 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995). The IMF, OECD, UN, World Bank, EU, WTO, and 
Transparency International all play a key role in combating corruption. The 1997 conventions 
of the UN, OECD, and EU are major guidelines for the formation of national laws and 
regulations against corruption (Gantz, 1998). The implementation of the US Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977 and the OECD anti-bribery convention (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008) is 
essential to overcome the issue of corruption in business transactions. Rose-Ackerman (2002) 
and Kaptein (2004) suggest that firms should establish ethical standards and business codes 
against corruption. 
6. Research Agenda  
The literature on corruption in international business is maturing rapidly and covers multiple 
research areas. Nevertheless, there are still aspects of corruption in international business that 
are essential to explore. To provide recommendations for the future research agenda, we 
utilized a four-step methodology. First, we identified 79 influential articles through 
bibliometric citation analysis. Second, we analyzed the content of these influential articles 
through content analysis to determine a future research agenda. Third, we converted the 
potential research agenda into research questions and propositions. Finally, we verified and 
excluded identified research questions that scholars have already addressed. The procedure 
resulted in 14 future research questions (see Table 8), and 6 gaps in our knowledge and 




6.1 Future research questions  
6.1.1 Legislation against corruption in international business 
This research stream builds on the papers about the EU, FCPA, and OECD conventions to 
formulate international and national laws against corruption in international business. 
Therefore, it is essential to explore the real effects of these conventions on corruption in bribe-
demanding and bribe-supplying countries (Darrough, 2010). Furthermore, the scope of the 
analysis of anti-corruption legislation needs to be broadened to the country level to ascertain 
the role of national laws such as the 1999 Australian Criminal Act and the 1998 Canadian 
Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act in combatting corruption in the host and home 
countries (Pedigo & Marshall, 2009; Mijares, 2015).  
6.1.2 The determinants of corruption in international business 
In this stream, the research focuses on the economic (Sanyal & Guvenli, 2009; Roy & Goll, 
2014) and cultural factors (Armstrong, 1992; Tsalikis & Latour, 1995) that affect the level of 
corruption in international business. However, these factors are multi-faceted. Therefore, we 
must examine their link with the sustainability indicators of a country (including the avoidance 
of corruption) (Roy & Goll, 2014). Gender also affects a firm’s behavior about bribery, but it 
is interesting to explore the role of gender in CEO-plurality firms (Tuliao & Chen, 2017). The 
existence of a prior colonial relationship (for example, between the United Kingdom and India) 
between bribe-demanding and bribe-supplying countries may affect the propensity to engage 
in bribery (Baughn et al., 2010). 
6.1.3 Combating corruption in international business 
This research stream focuses on a practical analysis of anti-corruption measures and methods. 
An empirical examination of the impact of the extensive extraterritorial powers of the US, EU, 
and OECD on corruption in home and host countries across several industries is essential 
(Pacini, Swingen, & Rogers, 2002; Kaczmarek & Newman, 2011). Cultural, economic, and 
individual factors might moderate this impact. Moreover, the interdependence between 
antecedents (at the national, firm, and individual levels) and consequences (at the national and 





6.1.4 The effect of corruption on firms in international business 
This research area consists of studies on the challenges facing firms and the influence of 
corruption on them (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Roy & Oliver, 2009). 
Firms need to explore the cost and effect of corruption on their reputation, productivity, and 
export capabilities. Scholars must determine whether other variables such as entrepreneurship, 
innovation, and marketing capabilities mediate the relationship between corruption and a firm’s 
reputation, productivity, and export capabilities (Cleveland et al., 2010; Gomes et al., 2018).  
6.1.5 The political environment and corruption in international business 
This stream focuses on the relationship between politics, corporate social responsibility, and 
corruption in international business (Luo, 2006; Galang, 2012).). Future research in the field 
could investigate the direct and indirect associations between these components. It could also 
examine the effect of political connections or political risks on the corporate responsibility 
activities of multinational enterprises and whether corruption moderates this association 
(Rodriguez et al., 2006). Furthermore, a comparison of the relative advantages of corporate 
political lobbying vs. bribery for a firm’s performance and how financial crises moderate this 
relationship would help managers choose between the two approaches (Yim, Lu, & Choi, 
2017).  
6.1.6 Corruption as a challenge to existing theories of management in 
international business 
This research stream is in its infancy. Given that corruption is a very complex problem, Cuervo-
Cazurra (2016) recommends revisiting and confirming existing theories of the firm (agency, 
transaction cost economics, resource-based view, resource-dependence, and neo-institutional 
theory) by considering corruption as a laboratory.  
6.1.7 The effect of corruption on foreign direct investment and trade in 
international business 
This stream builds on studies that explore the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and trade in international business (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). Future research could 
focus on the impact of political connections or political risks on inward and outward foreign 
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direct investment and the moderating effect of corruption in the home and host countries. We 
also suggest broadening this focus to explore the impact of corruption on inward and outward 
foreign direct investment and the moderating role of political connections or political risks in 
the home and host countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2006).   
6.2 Gaps in our knowledge and propositions for dealing with them 
Our review also revealed a number of gaps in our knowledge about corruption in international 
business related to context, methods, theoretical frameworks, and measurements (Kedia & 
Lahiri, 2007; Terjesen et al., 2013; Gilal et al., 2019; Paul & Alexander Rosado-Serrano, 2019; 
Paul & Sanchez-Morcilio, 2019). We discuss these research gaps and our proposals for dealing 
with them below. 
6.2.1 Context of key studies 
The most cited articles examine the effect of corruption on the firm (e.g., Lee & Hong, 2012; 
Hearn, 2015; Keig et al., 2015; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016). Indeed, the firm is the main topic of 
interest in international business. However, we observed that, when analyzing the relationship 
between corruption and the firm, researchers control for firm-level factors such as performance, 
operations, earnings management, and profitability. We believe that researchers should 
examine the relationship between corruption and firm-level factors, which are controlled in the 
literature. Therefore, we propose that: 
Proposition 1. Firm-level factors such as age, industry, size, international experience, 
ownership, sales, loss frequency, and length of the operating cycle prompt firms to engage in 
bribery when conducting international business.  
6.2.2 Key methods 
Table 5 reports that studies on corruption in international business usually use content analysis 
(Krueger, 2009; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016), regressions (Jiménez, 2011; Boubakri et al., 2013), 
and document analysis (Pacini et al., 2002; Kaptein, 2004). However, a challenge for 
international business researchers is to confirm the effect of corruption on firms, their tendency 
to engage in bribery, and inward foreign direct investment. To accomplish these goals, other 
forms of analysis are needed. Therefore, we propose that:  
61 
 
Proposition 2. Utilizing meta-analysis and network analysis will be useful in exploring the 
effect of corruption on firms, their tendency to engage in bribery, and inward foreign direct 
investment at the firm and country level.   
6.2.3 Measurement of corruption 
Most studies used data about corruption from country-level indexes such as Transparency 
International, World Governance Indicators, and the International Country Risk Guide. As 
Table 6 indicates, only six papers used primary firm-level survey data. We believe that firm-
level surveys and interviews about corruption will be useful in identifying anti-corruption 
measures in international business. Therefore, we propose that: 
Proposition 3. A firm-level survey to measure the level of corruption and identify the factors 
that lead to a  firm to engage in bribery will be useful for initiating attempts to combat 
corruption in international business.  
6.2.4 Theoretical frameworks 
 The most frequently utilized framework to predict a firm’s engagement in corruption in 
international business is an institutional theory (North, 1990; Scott, 1995; Dikova et al., 2016; 
Krammer et al., 2018). Based on this framework, the literature suggests that by improving the 
quality of institutions, the adverse effects of corruption can be minimized in international 
business. Therefore, we propose that: 
Proposition 4. Improving the quality of institutions in terms of the rule of law and the structure 
of government will reduce the level of corruption and tendency of a firm to engage in bribery 
when conducting international business.  
The second most frequently utilized theoretical framework is the neo-institutional perspective, 
which is quite popular in the organizational field and international business. It maintains that 
firms respond to the cognitive, normative, and regulatory pressures of the community and 
society where they operate (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Gao (2010) also confirmed the effect 
of mimetic isomorphism on the tendency of international firms operating in China to engage 
in bribery because they see other firms in the business community doing so.  Consequently, we 
posit that:  
Proposition 5. Coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism affect the level of corruption at 
the country level as well.    
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Finally, researchers utilize agency theory to explore corruption and international business 
(Stulz, 2005; Boubakri et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2015; Tuliao & Chen, 2017).  Managers’ 
decisions to engage in bribery and corrupt activities nationally and internationally result in 
agency problems. However, managers defend these actions on the grounds that they are 
beneficial for the firm.  Therefore, we propose that: 
Proposition 6. The firm’s managers' involvement in bribery and corrupt activities nationally 
and internationally is for their own self-interests rather than those of the firm, which leads to 
agency problems.  
Table 8. Future research questions 






1 What is the effect of EU, FCPA, and OECD conventions on 




How do the 1999 Australian Criminal Act and 1998 Canadian 
Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act impact the 
propensity of Australian and Canadian individuals or MNEs 
to bribe foreign public officials in the home and host country? 
Mijares (2015) 
The Determinants 





Which combination of the gender of the principal (chair of the 
board) and manager (CEO) is more effective in reducing the 
firm’s propensity to bribe in CEO plurality firms? 
Tuliao and Chen 
(2017) 
4 
What is the effect of cultural and economic factors on the 
country’s sustainability indicators such as environmental 
performance, human development, and the avoidance of 
corruption around the world? Is there any interrelationship 
among the country’s sustainability indicators as well? 
Roy and Goll 
(2014) 
5 
How do prior colonial relationships (for example, the United 
Kingdom and India) between bribery-supplying and bribery-
receiving countries affect the propensity to bribe in 
international business? 







How do the extensive extraterritorial powers of the United 
States and the EU, such as financial services, antitrust laws, 
and product scope combat corruption in the host country, 
particularly in a highly corrupt industry and country? How do 




Is there any interdependence between the antecedents (poor 
management, poor leadership, culture, economic factors, lack 
of the rule of law) and consequences (poverty, inflation, 
reduction in foreign direct investment, and trade) of 
corruption in international business? How does this 
interdependence impact the process of combating corruption? 
Frei and Muethel 
(2017) 






What is the actual cost of bribery such as fines, time and 
resources, and lawsuits for firms, and how does bribery 
affect the firm’s reputation? 
 
Cleveland et al. 
(2010) 
9 
What is the effect of corruption on the firm’s productivity 
and exports, and how do other variables such as levels of 
entrepreneurship, innovation, and marketing capabilities 





7. Conclusion  
Based on our in-depth review of corruption in international business, we have several policy 
recommendations. First, strong international laws are needed to minimize the negative impact 
of corruption on foreign direct investment, trade, business, and firms. Second, firms are the key 
players in international business. Therefore, managers and policymakers need to consider 
corruption when formulating the firms’ organizational structure and creating strategies to 
increase operational efficiency and performance. Third, the establishment of an organizational 
anti-corruption architecture system in firms is essential to overcome corruption in international 
business. Finally, corruption challenges some key assumptions of existing theories of 
management. Scholars need to test and expand these existing theories by considering 















What is the effect of political connections or political risk on 
the CSR activities of firms in the host and home country, and 
how does corruption play a moderating role?  
Rodriguez et al. 
(2006) 
11 
Which has a stronger impact on the financial performance of 
the firm-corporate political activities (firm’s political 
connections or CEO’s political connections) or bribery in the 
host country, and do financial crises play a moderating role? 
Yim, Lu, and 
Choi (2017) 
Corruption as a 
Challenge to 
Existing Theories 




How can we extend the existing theories of the firm (agency, 
transaction cost economics, resource-based view, resource-
dependence, and neo-institutional theory) by considering 
corruption as a laboratory in international business? 
Cuervo-Cazurra 
(2016) 








What is the effect of political connections or political risk on 
inward and outward foreign direct investment in the home and 
host country, and how does corruption moderate this link? 




What is the effect of corruption on inward and outward 
foreign direct investment in the home and host country, and 
how do political connections or political risk moderate it? 
Rodriguez et al. 
(2006), Cuervo-
Cazurra (2006)  
Note: The table lists 14 future research questions. 
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Abstract 
This paper is a bibliometric review of 819 articles, between 1969 and 2019, on corruption in 
banks. We identified six research streams: (1) the determinants of banks’ lending corruption; 
(2) the impact of corruption on banks’ lending and operational risk; (3) the impact of bank 
corruption on firms; (4) the impact of political connections on bank corruption; (5) the impact 
of corporate governance and regulations on bank corruption; and (6) the manipulation of the 
inter-bank offered rate. We recommend an anti-corruption architecture system and an extension 
in theoretical frameworks related to corruption in banks. We propose 20 future research 
questions.  
 
Keywords: Corruption; banks, bibliometrics analysis; content analysis; corporate governance; 
bank regulations 













Corruption exists despite efforts by national and international controlling bodies (including 
central banks, agencies, OECD conventions, and the IMF). Corruption results in poverty, 
greed, unemployment, weak institutions, and non-enforcement of law. According to Global 
Witness Organization1 corrupt businesspeople, government officials, dictators, warlords, and 
other criminals always need a bank to hide and lander their looted money. Consequently, banks 
and other financial institutions play a key role in hiding illegal money. Banks’ poor corporate 
governance (Srivastav & Hagendorff, 2015; Nguyen, Hagendorff, & Eshraghi, 2017), 
incompetent bank officials (Nguyen, Hagendorff & Eshraghi, 2014), and the involvement of 
banks in corrupt activities has resulted in the bankruptcy of financial institutions in the past, 
such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Washington Mutual. Bank scandals have led to 
investigations and research into corruption in banks by regulatory bodies and academic 
researchers, respectively. As a result, a considerable amount of literature has been compiled on 
corruption related to banks or financial institutions over the last 50 years (see Figure 1). This 
literature is scattered across numerous areas and types of corruption (see Table 1 for synonyms 
of corruption) and needs to be analyzed through a systematic, in-depth, and quali-quantitative 
fashion.  
To capture the richness of literature on corruption in banks, we employ bibliometric citation 
analysis (Zhang, Zhang, & Managi, 2019; Helbing, 2018; Bahoo, Alon, & Paltrinieri, 2019a) 
and content analysis (Vigne et al., 2017; Garner, Humphrey, & Simkins, 2016; Bahoo et al., 
2018) to analyze 819 articles for the 50 years from 1969 to 2019. This review is unique and 
addresses the following questions: (1) What are the key research streams in the literature on 
corruption in banks? (2) What are the influential aspects of literature, such as journals, 
institutions, countries, authors, articles, and networks among them? (3) What are the relevant 
future research questions? Through this qualitative and quantitative review and analysis, we 
identified six research streams (see Figure 6) and summarized the data sources, methods, and 
content of key papers (Tables 4 and 5). In addition, we identified influential journals, countries, 
institutions, authors, key research areas, articles/topics, and networks among them (Tables 2 
and 3 and Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5). Finally, Table 6 presents 20 thought-provoking future research 
questions. 
1Chairman Gooch— “gotten gains don’t disappear by themselves, those with suspect money to hide, need a bank (financial institutions) that won’t ask awkward 
questions; a lawyer to help them find loopholes and skirt laws (tax havens), and a legal smokescreen (offshore financial centers) so they can get it out of the 




The method used in this paper consists of bibliometric citation analysis and content analysis. 
We performed the following tests under bibliometrics citation analysis (using HistCite and 
VOSviewer software): (1) citation analysis, (2) co-citation analysis, (3) citation network 
analysis, and (4) cartography analysis by following the Paltrinieri, Hassan, Bahoo, and Khan 
(2019) and Zamore et al. (2018).  
Furthermore, we applied traditional content analysis to explore the content of articles (French 
& Vigne, 2019; Carter, Rogers, Simkins, & Treanor, 2017; Ahmed, Bahoo, & Ayub, 2019). 
The HistCite and VOSviewer software accepts bibliometric data as input and provides several 
key findings as output. The HistCite software only deals with the data of ISI Web of Knowledge 
(ISI WOK), and VOSviwer deals with ISI WOK and Scopus. The HistCite software only deals 
with the data of ISI Web of Knowledge (ISI WOK), and VOSviwer deals with ISI WOK and 
Scopus. Table 1 explains in detail the key terms of bibliometrics analysis, key software terms, 
the keywords selection process, and search techniques.  
To conduct a bibliometric analysis of literature on corruption in banks, we selected a database 
of ISI WOK as high-quality journals are listed on it. In our search process, we used 17 
keywords for corruption in combination with words like banks, bank, banking, financial 
institutions, and financial institution to cover the complete literature on the topic (see Table 1). 
This search produced 1106 articles. In the next step, we reviewed all article titles and abstracts 
to exclude irrelevant articles and eventually found a sample of 819 articles between 1969 and 
2019. Figure 1 shows the number of articles published by year in the literature on corruption 
in banks. A sharp growth trend since 2008 indicates a substantial increase in research on 
corruption in banks due to the bankruptcy scandals of American banking companies, such as 
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Washington Mutual. We explain the key findings in the 
















Table 1. Key methodological terminologies  
(i) Key Methodological Terms  
Terms Explanation/Details   
Co-Citation Analysis 
Co-citation means that other articles cite an article because they belong to the same 
concept or topic. 
 
Cartography Analysis This analysis is based on the repetition of keywords in the articles.  
HistCite Software 
This software accepts only ISI WOS citation data as input and provides several types of 
results.  
 
VOSviewer Software  
This software accepts citation data of ISI WOS and Scopus as input files and provides 
several outputs.   
    
(ii) Key Patterns of HistCite Software (HistCite - Glossary, 2018)  
PCORB Number of articles published on topic; corruption in banks   
TLC 
Total Local Citations mean how many times an article is cited by other articles in a 




Total global citations represent how many times an article is cited by other articles, 
which are available on the entire ISI WOS database.  
 
TLC/t Total local citations per year means the average citations per year.   
TGC/t Total global citations per year means the average citations per year.   





Search in combination with words 
Keywords for 
Corruption 
Search in combination with words  













Corruption 276 32 Misconduct  33 10  
Bribe 1 1 Misrepresentation 7 1  
Bribery 43 6 Wrongdoing 11 0  
Fraud 157 58 Falsification 7 0  
Crime 82 39 Criminal 90 24  
Manipulation 104 13 Manipulating 19 5  
Extortion 7 5 Abuse 37 11  
 
Figure 1. Growth of literature. The HistCite software is used to present per year publications. 
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Initial Sample (Applied following filters: (i) article category; economics, business finance, 
business, management, law, and ethics, (ii) search filters; topic (search keywords in title, abstract 
or author keywords), (iii) paper type and language: articles and English) 
1106 
 
Final Sample for Bibliometrics Analysis (Screening of irrelevant by reading titles and abstracts) 819  
Note: The table shows details about key methodological terms, software’s key terms, sample selection process, and 




3.1 Influential aspects of literature 
3.1.1 Key journals distribution and networks 
The HistCite and VOSviwer software packages were used to identify the journal distribution 
and networks. We ranked the top 10- journals into two categories: first, those publishing a 
higher number of papers on the topic, and second, those having a higher number of citations, 
as given in Table 2. In both rankings, the finance journals have the highest number of citations 
and publications on the topic. Also, a few of the pertinent topics were found in law journals. 
Surprisingly, only one journal in the field of international business falls into the category of 
having the highest citations. It would seem that the phenomenon of corruption is a critical 
management issue in banks, which is overlooked by management and business journal. 
Furthermore, from what we have shown in our citation network among journals in Figure 2, 
citing articles largely from top finance journals and neglecting less prominent journals may 
lead to citation bias. 
 
 
Figure 2. Citation network among journals. The VOSviewer software is used create network.  
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Table 2. Influential aspects of literature   
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Note: The table shows the ranking of top 10 journals, countries, institutions, and authors. The HistCite 
software is used to create the rankings. 1 = ranking of journals sorted based on TLC. 2, 3,4 = rankings of 
journals, countries, and institutions sorted based on PCORB. 5 = ranking of authors based on TGC. For details 
of TLC, TGC, and PCORB, see Table 1. The abbreviations are 6 = National Bureau of Economic Research, 
USA, 7=Centre of Economic Policy Research, UK.  
 
3.1.2 Influential authors, their countries of origin, institution affiliations, 
and networks 
The influential authors and their countries of origin, institutional affiliations, and networks 
were identified using the HistCite and VOSviwer software. We ranked the authors, their 
countries of origin, and institutional affiliations in Table 2 and also presented networks among 
them in Figures 3 and 4. The ranking of authors based on highest citations during the last 50 
years will be useful to start the future projects with them. Further, the ranking of top 10 
countries shows that the first country (USA) explored and worked to eliminate the multiple 
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aspects of corruption related to banks or financial institutions more extensively than others; for 
example, the United States is one of pioneering countries in terms of formulating national-level 
laws against corruption and bribery. The Western world has produced several anti-corruption 
laws and world leader conventions with respect to this global issue. At the same time, China is 
an emerging economy that is focusing on combating corruption in banks as well. Although the 
contribution of the developing economies in the literature is rare due to insufficient resources, 
corruption is one of their main problems. Therefore, the controlling bodies and Western world 
should consider starting projects in the developing countries to eliminate corruption in banks, 
which will be effective at reducing money laundering and terrorism financing through banks.  
3.1.3 Keyword network: analysis for identifying research areas   
We conducted a keyword network analysis by using VOSviwer software to identify several 
areas and directions of research on corruption in banks. Figure 5 shows a network based on the 
repetition of keywords in the literature on corruption in banks. This network shows that 
corruption, banking regulation, money laundering, corporate governance, bank lending, 
LIBOR, and monetary policy are the main areas or concerns in the literature we have observed. 
We have found that the keywords firm performance, growth, and earning management do not 
often occur in the literature on corruption in banks. The results show that finance, management, 
and international business researchers have overlooked a critical and essential area of research 
on how bank corruption affects the firms. We would like to close this gap in the knowledge of 






Figure 3. Citation network among author’s countries of origin. The VOSviewer software is used create 
network.  
 
Figure 4. Citation network among author’s institutional affiliations. The VOSviewer software is used 
create network.  
 
Figure 5. Keywords network analysis. The VOSviewer software is used create network.  
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3.1.4 Influential articles in the literature 
Our sample examines 819 articles published by 391 journals that have 362 and 10,097 total 
local and global citations, respectively. We have divided our influential articles into two 
categories based on total local citation per year (TLC/t) and total global citation per year 
(TGC/t) by using HistCite software. Table 3 reports the top 10 articles in two categories. The 
top-ranked articles have been taken from finance journals only. As a result, we recommend that 
management and international business journals should consider publishing on the topic of 
corruption in banks while considering managerial challenges. 
Table 3. Influential articles 
Influential Articles/Topics1 based on TLC/t  Influential Articles/Topics2 based on TGC/t 
Rank Author (s) and Year TLC TLC/t Author (s) and Year TGC TGC/t 
1 (Barth et al., 2009) 
26 2.36 
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Maksimovic, 2005) 
558 37.2 
2 (Chen, Liu, & Su, 2013) 
13 1.86 
(Claessens, Feijen, & 
Laeven, 2008) 
360 30 
3 (Houston, Lin & Ma, 2011) 15 1.67 (Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2008) 239 19.92 




& Maksimovic, 2010) 
194 19.4 
5 (Zheng et al., 2013) 8 1.14 (Dinç, 2005) 268 17.87 
6 (Park, 2012) 8 1 (Barth et al., 2009) 116 10.55 
7 (McConnell, 2013)  7 1 (Allen et al., 2012) 56 7 
8 (Akins, Dou, & Ng, 2017) 3 1 (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2012) 56 6.63 
9 (Fungáčová, Kochanova, & 
Weill, 2015) 
4 0.8 
(Cornett et al., 2010) 
64 6.4 
10 (Weill, 2011a) 6 0.67 (Zheng et al., 2013) 43 6.14 
Note: This table represents the 10 most influential articles/topics. 1 = The influential articles/topics are 
sorted based on TLC/t. 2 = And based on criteria of minimum TGC/t. For details about TGC/t and TLC/t, 
see Table 1.  
 
3.2 Co-citation mapping: Identification of research streams and synthesis  
We identified research streams in literature by applying bibliometrics citation analysis and 
content analysis (Bahoo, Alon, & Paltrinieri, 2019b; Ahmed et al., 2019). We applied the 
following two steps in identifying streams. First, we used HistCite software to apply co-citation 
analysis that created citation mapping, as given in Figure 6. The mapping is the result of 56 
top-cited articles in the relevant literature. Second, we conducted a traditional detailed content 
analysis of these 56 articles (Jia, Popova, Simkins, & Wang, 2019; Bahoo et al., 2019). As a 
result of our quali-qualitative analyses, we have identified the following six research streams 
in the literature: (1) the determinants of banks’ lending corruption, (2) the impact of corruption 
on banks’ lending and operational risk, (3) the impact of bank corruption on firms, (4) the 
impact of political connections on bank corruption, (5) the impact of corporate governance and 
regulations on bank corruption, and (6) the manipulation of the inter-bank offered rate (IBOR). 
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The six above identified streams are interlinked with each other. The key determinants of bank 
lending corruption are cultural factors (Zheng et al., 2013), state media ownership (Houston, 
Lin, & Ma, 2011), state ownership of banks (Laeven, 2001), and borrower and lender 
competition (Barth et al., 2009). The political connections also impact the bank lending 
decision and result in high corruption (Claessens et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2017). The bank 
lending corruption effects the credit and operational risk of banks and results in an increase in 
non-performing loans (Fiordelisi, Soana, & Schwizer, 2014; Chen et al., 2015). The negative 
effect of bank lending corruption is high in developing countries with weak institutions, poor 
governance, and weak democracy (Boudriga, Taktak, & Jellouli, 2009). Corruption in banks 
also impacts the firm’s growth (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2005) and access to 
finance (Qi & Ongena, 2019) negatively in emerging and developing countries. Moreover, 
corruption and misconduct in banks leads to manipulation of the LIBOR rate by bank officials, 
which was even present in the case of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy scandal (Fouquau & 
Spieser, 2015). Finally, the literature is concerned about the elimination of corruption and 
misconduct by bank officials through strong corporate governance (Nguyen, Nguyen, & Sila, 
2019; Nguyen, Hagendorff, & Eshraghi, 2016) and supervision (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Levine, 2006).  
 
 




Beyond this, the data sources, methods, and content of these 56 key articles that create citation 
mapping are summarized in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. The summary of key articles shows 
that the literature on corruption in banks has developed in multiple directions. However, the 
third stream (the effect of corruption on firms) and fourth stream (the effect of political 
connections on bank corruption) have yet to be developed in the literature relating to emerging 
and developing countries. Based on the findings, we suggest that there is a need for more 
research on corruption with respect to the emerging and least developed countries.  
4. Future research agenda  
We adopted a four-step method to identify a future research agenda by using bibliometrics and 
content analyses (Bahoo, Alon, & Paltrinieri, 2019b). First, we reviewed 56 top-cited articles 
that create a citation map. Second, we reviewed all the trending and influential articles during 
the last seven years (2013 to 2019). Third, we reviewed the remaining articles in our sample of 
study to avoid top citation bias. Fourth, we converted the potential research agenda into 
research questions and excluded those questions that had already been investigated by 
researchers. This systematic process resulted in the 20 future research questions listed in Table 
6. Through in-depth quali-quantitative review, we recommend a need to establish an anti-
corruption architecture system and extension of existing management theoretical frameworks 
by considering corruption in banks as a managerial issue.  
Table 4. Data sources and methods of key papers  
(i) Data Sources 
Measurement of Corruption  Date Source   Reference 
Bank Lending Corruption   World Bank Enterprise 
Survey on Corruption in 
2000. 
(Barth et al., 2009; Houston, Lin, & Ma, 
2011; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, 
2006; Zheng et al., 2013; Weill, 2011a; 
Akins, Dou, & Ng, 2017; Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2005) 
Firm Offers Bribery to Banks 
Officials for lending 
Hand-collected data on 
extra-expenses as a gift from 
firm reports. 
(Chen, Liu, & Su, 2013) 
Corruption Perception Index  Transparency International 
(TI) 
(Park, 2012; Weill, 2011a; Petrou & 
Thanos, 2014; Chen et al., 2015) 
Sub-Index of Corruption  World Economic Forum (Park, 2012) 
Corporate misreporting (fraud) 
data 
U.S. General Accounting 
Office (GAO) 
(Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2008) 
Corruption Survey in 2000 Transparency International 
and Information for 





Corruption Index of the World 
Bank 
World Bank’s Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
(Weill, 2011a; Chen et al., 2015) 
Corruption Index  International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) Ratings 
(Petrou & Thanos, 2014; Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2005) 
Corruption Freedom Score Heritage Foundation’s 
Corruption Freedom score 
(Petrou & Thanos, 2014) 
Bribery to Bank Official BEEPS databases (Fungáčová, Kochanova, & Weill, 2015) 
Reputational Events About Banks  ALGO OpData™ database (Fiordelisi, Soana, & Schwizer, 2014) 
Bank Official Corruption in 
Lending 
World Bank Investment 
Climate Survey in China  
(Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Maksimovic, 2010) 
Operational Risk Events 
(including fraud and others.) 
FIRST Database  (Wang & Hsu, 2013) 
(ii) Methods 
Method References  
Regression Analysis (OLS) (Barth et al., 2009; Houston, Lin, & Ma , 2011; Chen, Liu, & Su, 2013; 
Dinç, 2005; Park, 2012; Zheng et al., 2013; Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2008; 
Weill, 2011b; Weill, 2011a; Chen et al., 2015; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Maksimovic, 2005; Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2010) 
Panel Regression Analysis  (Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008; Fungáčová, Kochanova, & Weill, 
2015; Chen et al., 2015; Wang & Hsu, 2013; Qi & Ongena, 2019) 
Probit Model (Barth et al., 2009; Houston, Lin, & Ma, 2011) 
Multiple Structural Breaks (Monticini & Thornton, 2013) 
Threshold Regression Mode (Fouquau & Spieser, 2015) 
Bivariate Probit Model 
Estimation 
(Nguyen, Hagendorff, & Eshraghi, 2016) 
Univariate analysis (Chen et al., 2017) 
Note: The table shows the data sources and methods applied by key papers that create citation mapping.  
 
Table 6. Future research agenda  
Sr. 
No 
Reference  Research Questions/Explanation 
1 (Weill, 2011a) Is there any theoretical framework that exists to explain the relationship between 
corruption and bank lending? Is there any need to formulate a theoretical 
framework? 
2 (Petrou & Thanos, 
2014) 
How does corruption impact bank entry in foreign markets? 
Is there any need to measure corruption through a survey at the firm and government 




Is bribery for bank lending to firms beneficial for economic development through 
the channel of a higher bank debt ratio? 
4 (Akins, Dou, & 
Ng, 2017) 
What are the effects of bank and regulatory bodies' timely loan loss recognition on 
the efficiency of firms’ investment strategies and how does it lead to economic 
development? 
5 (Feng, Fu, & 
Kutan, 2019) 
What is the effect of government intervention on bank lending in micro-finance 
institutions, and how does it impact the small browser and SMEs’ access to finance 
and performance?  
6 (Haß, Vergauwe, 
& Zhang, 2019) 
What is the effect of state ownership of banks on banks’ lending decisions and 
corruption?  
7 (Haß, Vergauwe, 
& Zhang, 2019) 
What is the effect of corruption in bank lending when the borrower and lender both 
are state-owned companies on economic growth and development?  
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8 (Azim & Kluvers, 
2019) 
How can organizational anti-corruption architecture system be applied to 
developing, emerging, and developed economies? Are multiple theoretical 
frameworks required for different economies?  
9 (Azim & Kluvers, 
2019) 
Does the organizational anti-corruption architecture system moderate the effect of 
weak institutions and organizational environment on malfeasant organizational 
behavior? 
10 (Sethi, Martell, & 
Demir, 2017) 
What is the impact of the component business units in large financial institutions on 
the quality of CSR reporting, scope, and independence of assurance providers? 
11 (Qi & Ongena, 
2018) 
What are the effects of the foreign bank entry on banking lending corruption and 
anti-corruption campaigns in developing, emerging, and developed countries?  
12 (Dheera-Aumpon, 
2019) 
How can the institutional collectivism and teamwork cultural among national and 
foreign banks official be used to overcome corruption in banks?  
13 (Alraheb, Nicolas, 
& Tarazi, 2019) 
What is the effect on institutional environment and national level governance on 
corruption in the banking sector? Does a strong institution help overcome the 
problem of corruption?  
14 (Toader et al., 
2017). 
Does strong corporate governance mediate the impact of national corruption on 
bank stability in developing countries? 
15 (Chen et al., 2018) How do the connected political CEOs of the private banks affect banks’ lending 
decisions and bank stability in developing, emerging, and developed countries, and 
how does institutional quality moderate this relationship?  
16 (Gozgor, 2018). What is the effect of political risk components (that is, the rule of law, control on 
corruption) on domestic credit in developed countries?  
17 (Köster & Pelster, 
2017) 
What are the motives of misconduct by management and board in banks, and what 
could be preventive measures other than financial penalties?  
18 (Tajaddini & 
Gholipour, 2016) 
What are the effects of national and individual cultural factors on the mortgage 
default rate in developing, emerging and developed countries?  
19 (Venard & Hanafi, 
2007) 
What effect do financial intuitions (banks) have on economic development, and how 
does the level of corruption negatively moderate this effect?  
20 (Repousis, Lois, & 
Veli, 2019) 
What mechanisms and structures are needed in banks to eliminate the different fraud 
risk channels such as mobile banking, international banking, and online shopping?  


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Corruption is one of the major challenges to the growth of the economic and financial system 
globally. It negatively impacts the world economy and societies when banks or financial 
institutions are involved in corrupt activities. Hence, corruption in banks is a managerial and 
business issue beyond the only subject of technical finance. There may be a need to consider 
establishing a better organizational anti-corruption architecture system within banks. The 
academic researchers and journals from finance, management, and international business 
should consider developing and publishing more on theoretical frameworks to explain the 
corruption in banks. Further, we propose a policy recommendation that developed economies 
and controlling bodies start funding research projects and anti-corruption conventions in 
developing countries to overcome the problem of money laundry and terrorism financing 
through banks. This paper is an attempt to summarize the literature on corruption in banks. A 
possible limitation of this study concerns the bibliometric analysis of only ISI WOK. We 
recommend applying bibliometric analysis on other databases, such as Scopus or Google 

















List of References 
Abrantes-Metz, R. M., Kraten, M., Metz, A. D., & Seow, G. S. (2012). LIBOR Manipulation? Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 36(1), 136–150.  
Ahmed, F., Bahoo, S., & Ayub, A. (2019). Accountability, Governance, and Structure of Non-Profit 
Organizations: Evidence from Ghana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. New Horizons, 13(2), 19–
36. 
Ahmed, F., Bahoo, S., Aslam, S., & Qureshi, M. A. (2019). Meta-Analysis on American Presidential 
Election-2016 and American Stock Market. Estudios de Economia Aplicada, 38 (1), 1–7. 
Akins, B., Dou, Y., & Ng, J. (2017). Corruption in Bank Lending: The Role of Timely Loan Loss 
Recognition. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 63(2–3), 454–478.  
Allen, F., Chakrabarti, R., De, S., Qian, J. Q. J., & Qian, M. (2012). Financing Firms in India. Journal 
of Financial Intermediation, 21(3), 409–445.  
Alraheb, T. H., Nicolas, C., & Tarazi, A. (2019). Institutional Environment and Bank Capital 
Ratios. Journal of Financial Stability, 43, 1–24.  
Ayyagari, M., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Maksimovic, V. (2010). Formal Versus Informal Finance: 
Evidence from China. Review of Financial Studies, 23(8), 3048–3097.  
Azim, M. I., & Kluvers, R. (2019). Resisting Corruption in Grameen Bank. Journal of Business Ethics, 
156(3), 591–604.  
Bagus, P., & Howden, D. (2009). The Legitimacy of Loan Maturity Mismatching: A Risky, But Not 
Fraudulent, Undertaking. Journal of Business Ethics, 90(3), 399–406.  
Bahoo, S., Alon, I., Paltrinieri, A., (2019a). Sovereign Wealth Funds: Past, Present, Future. 
International Review of Financial Analysis (in Press), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2019.101418.  
Bahoo, S., Alon, I., Paltrinieri, A., (2019b). Corruption in International Business: A Review and 
Research Agenda. International Business Review (in Press), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2019.101660.  
Bahoo, S., Hassan, M. K., Paltrinieri, A., & Khan, A. (2019). A Model of the Islamic Sovereign Wealth 
Fund. Islamic Economic Studies, 27(1), 2–22. 
Bahoo, S., Saeed, S., Iqbal, M. J., & Nawaz, S. (2018). Role of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in 
Pakistan’ s Trade, Investment, Energy, Infrastructure, and Stock Market. Journal of Independent 
Studies and Research-Management, Social Sciences and Economics, 16(1), 63–84. 
Barth, J. R., Lin, C., Lin, P., & Song, F. M. (2009). Corruption in Bank Lending to Firms: Cross-Country 
Micro Evidence on The Beneficial Role of Competition and Information Sharing. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 91(3), 361–388.  
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2006). Bank Supervision and Corruption in Lending. 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 53(8), 2131–2163.  
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Maksimovic, V. (2005). Financial and Legal Constraints to Growth: 
Does Firm Size Matter? Journal of Finance, 60(1), 137–177.  
98 
 
Boudriga, A., Taktak, N. B., & Jellouli, S. (2009). Banking Supervision and Nonperforming Loans: A 
Cross‐Country Analysis. Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 1(4), 286–318.  
Carter, D. A., Rogers, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & Treanor, S. D. (2017). A Review of the Literature on 
Commodity Risk Management. Journal of Commodity Markets, 8, 1–17.  
Chen, D., Guan, Y., Zhang, T., & Zhao, G. (2017). Political Connection of Financial Intermediaries: 
Evidence from China’s IPO Market. Journal of Banking and Finance, 76, 15–31.  
Chen, H.-K., Liao, Y.-C., Lin, C.-Y., & Yen, J.-F. (2018). The Effect of The Political Connections of 
Government Bank CEOs on Bank Performance During the Financial Crisis. Journal of Financial 
Stability, 36, 130–143.  
Chen, M., Jeon, B. N., Wang, R., & Wu, J. (2015). Corruption and Bank Risk-Taking: Evidence from 
Emerging Economies. Emerging Markets Review, 24, 122–148.  
Chen, Y., Liu, M., & Su, J. (2013). Greasing the Wheels of Bank Lending: Evidence from Private Firms 
in China. Journal of Banking and Finance, 37(7), 2533–2545.  
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., & Laeven, L. (2008). Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: 
The Role of Campaign Contributions. Journal of Financial Economics, 88(3), 554–580.  
Cornett, M. M., Guo, L., Khaksari, S., & Tehranian, H. (2010). The Impact of State Ownership on 
Performance Differences in Privately-Owned Versus State-Owned Banks: An International 
Comparison. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 19(1), 74–94.  
Corruption and Money Laundering. (2019). Chairman Gooch from Global Witness Organization, 
Retrieved from https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/corruption-and-money-
laundering/#more. 
Dheera-Aumpon, S. (2019). Collectivism and Connected Lending. Research in International Business 
and Finance, 48, 258–270.  
Dinç, I. S. (2005). Politicians and Banks: Political Influences on Government-Owned Banks in 
Emerging Markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 77(2), 453–479.  
Ding, Y., Chowdhury, G. G., & Foo, S. (2001). Bibliometric Cartography of Information Retrieval 
Research by Using Co-Word Analysis. Information Processing and Management, 37(6), 817–
842.  
Duffie, D., & Stein, J. C. (2015). Reforming LIBOR and Other Financial Market Benchmarks. Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 29(2), 191–212. 
Feng, L., Fu, T., & Kutan, A. M. (2019). Can Government Intervention Be Both A Curse and A 
Blessing? Evidence from China’s Finance Sector. International Review of Financial Analysis, 
61(October 2018), 71–81.  
Fiordelisi, F., Soana, M. G., & Schwizer, P. (2014). Reputational Losses and Operational Risk in 
Banking. European Journal of Finance, 20(2), 105–124.  
Fouquau, J., & Spieser, P. K. (2015). Statistical Evidence About LIBOR Manipulation: A “Sherlock 
Holmes” Investigation. Journal of Banking and Finance, 50, 632–643.  
99 
 
French, D., & Vigne, S. (2019). The Causes and Consequences of Household Financial Strain: A 
Systematic Review. International Review of Financial Analysis, 62, 150–156.  
Fungáčová, Z., Kochanova, A., & Weill, L. (2015). Does Money Buy Credit? Firm-Level Evidence on 
Bribery and Bank Debt. World Development, 68, 308–322.  
Garner, J., Humphrey, P. R., & Simkins, B. (2016). The Business of Sport and the Sport of Business: 
A Review of the Compensation Literature in Finance and Sports. International Review of 
Financial Analysis, 47, 197–204.  
Gozgor, G. (2018). Determinants of The Domestic Credits in Developing Economies: The Role of 
Political Risks. Research in International Business and Finance, 46, 430–443.  
Graham, J. R., Li, S., & Qiu, J. (2008). Corporate Misreporting and Bank Loan Contracting. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 89(1), 44–61.  
Haß, L. H., Vergauwe, S., & Zhang, Z. (2019). State-Ownership and Bank Loan Contracting: Evidence 
from Corporate Fraud. European Journal of Finance, 25(6), 550–567.  
Helbing, P. (2019). A Review on IPO Withdrawal. International Review of Financial Analysis, 62, 200–
208. 
HistCite Glossary. (2018). HistCite Glossary. Retrieved from: 
http://www.public.asu.edu/~majansse/ihdp/glossary.html.  
Houston, J. F., Lin, C., & Ma, Y. (2011). Media Ownership, Concentration, and Corruption in Bank 
Lending. Journal of Financial Economics, 100(2), 326–350.  
Huang, H., & Wei, S.-J. (2003). Monetary Policies for Developing Countries: The Role of Corruption. 
Journal of International Economics, 70(1), 239–252. 
Jia, Y., Popova, I., Simkins, B., & Emma Wang, Q. (2019). Second and Higher Moments of 
Fundamentals: A Literature Review. European Financial Management, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12215. 
Kim, J., & McMillan, S. J. (2008). Evaluation of Internet Advertising Research: A Bibliometric 
Analysis of Citations from Key Sources. Journal of Advertising, 37(1), 99–112.  
Köster, H., & Pelster, M. (2017). Financial Penalties and Bank Performance. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 79, 57–73.  
Laeven, L. (2001). Insider Lending and Bank Ownership: The Case of Russia. Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 29(2), 207–229.  
McConnell, P. J. (2013). Systemic Operational Risk – The Libor Manipulation Scandal. Journal of 
Operational Risk, 8(3), 59-99. 
Monticini, A., & Thornton, D. L. (2013). The Effect of Underreporting on LIBOR Rates. Journal of 
Macroeconomics, 37(1), 345–348.  
Nguyen, D. D. L., Hagendorff, J., & Eshraghi, A. (2014). Which Executive Characteristics Create Value 
in Banking? Evidence from Appointment Announcements. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 23(2), 112–128.  
100 
 
Nguyen, D. D., Hagendorff, J., & Eshraghi, A. (2016). Can Bank Boards Prevent Misconduct? Review 
of Finance, 20(1), 1–36.  
Nguyen, D. D., Hagendorff, J., & Eshraghi, A. (2017). Does a CEO’s Cultural Heritage Affect 
Performance under Competitive Pressure? The Review of Financial Studies, 31(1), 97–141.  
Nguyen, D. D., Nguyen, L., & Sila, V. (2019). Does Corporate Culture Affect Bank Risk-Taking? 
Evidence from Loan-Level Data. British Journal of Management, 30(1), 106–133.  
Paltrinieri, A., Hassan, M. K., Bahoo, S., & Khan, A. (2019). A Bibliometric Review of Sukuk 
Literature. International Review of Economics & Finance (In Press), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2019.04.004.  
Park, J. (2012). Corruption, Soundness of The Banking Sector, And Economic Growth: A Cross-
Country Study. Journal of International Money and Finance, 31(5), 907–929.  
Petrou, A. P., & Thanos, I. C. (2014). The “Grabbing Hand” Or The “Helping Hand” View of 
Corruption: Evidence from Bank Foreign Market Entries. Journal of World Business, 49(3), 444–
454.  
Qi, S., & Ongena, S. (2019). Will Money Talk? Firm Bribery and Credit Access. Financial 
Management, 48(1), 117–157. 
Repousis, S., Lois, P., & Veli, V. (2019). An Investigation of The Fraud Risk and Fraud Scheme 
Methods in Greek Commercial Banks. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 22(1), 53–61.  
Sethi, S. P., Martell, T. F., & Demir, M. (2017). An Evaluation of the Quality of Corporate Social 
Responsibility Reports by Some of the World’s Largest Financial Institutions. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 140(4), 787–805.  
Srivastav, A., & Hagendorff, J. (2015). Corporate Governance and Bank Risk-Taking. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 24(3), 334–345.  
Tajaddini, R., & Gholipour, H. F. (2016). National Culture and Default on Mortgages. International 
Review of Finance, 17(1), 107–133.  
Toader, T., Onofrei, M., Popescu, A.-I., & Andrieș, A. M. (2017). Corruption and Banking Stability: 
Evidence from Emerging Economies. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 54(3), 591–617.  
Venard, B., & Hanafi, M. (2007). Organizational Isomorphism and Corruption in Financial Institutions: 
Empirical Research in Emerging Countries. Journal of Business Ethics, 81(2), 481–498.  
Vigne, S. A., Lucey, B. M., O’Connor, F. A., & Yarovaya, L. (2017). The Financial Economics of 
White Precious Metals — A Survey. International Review of Financial Analysis, 52, 292–308.  
Wang, T., & Hsu, C. (2013). Board Composition and Operational Risk Events of Financial Institutions. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 37(6), 2042–2051.  
Weill, L. (2011a). Does Corruption Hamper Bank Lending? Macro and Micro Evidence. Empirical 
Economics, 41(1), 25–42.  
Weill, L. (2011b). How corruption affects bank lending in Russia. Economic Systems, 35(2), 230–243.  
Zamore, S., Ohene Djan, K., Alon, I., & Hobdari, B. (2018). Credit Risk Research: Review and Agenda. 
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 54(4), 811–835.  
101 
 
Zhang, D., Zhang, Z., & Managi, S. (2019). A Bibliometric Analysis on Green Finance: Current Status, 
Development, And Future Directions. Finance Research Letters, 29(January), 425–430.  
Zheng, X., Ghoul, S. El, Guedhami, O., & Kwok, C. C. Y. (2013). Collectivism and Corruption in Bank 







































































































Corruption, Foreign Aid and Foreign Direct Investment 
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This paper examines the moderating effect of foreign aid on corruption and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) at two points: when companies consider investing abroad (FDI propensity) 
and when they increase their investments in corrupt countries in which they are already 
invested (FDI inflows). Corruption has an asymmetric relationship with FDI. We test an 
integrated framework in which foreign aid as a formal institution moderates the negative impact 
of corruption as an informal institution on FDI during these two investment phases. We present 
three findings. First, corruption has a negative effect on FDI propensity, confirming the 
"corruption as sand" theory. Second, corruption has a positive effect on FDI inflows, 
confirming the "corruption as grease" theory. Third, foreign aid negatively moderates the 
impact of corruption on FDI. This result suggests that for foreign investors, the formal 
institution of foreign aid negates the adverse outcomes of the informal institution of corruption. 
Countries that provide foreign aid contingent on reductions in corruption promote future 
economic activity, mitigate investment risks, and improve the corrupt country’s governance 
and institutional quality. Therefore, foreign aid deserves more attention from companies and 
governments when formulating strategies and policies related to FDI and controlling 
corruption.   
Keywords: Corruption; FDI propensity; FDI inflows; foreign aid; institutions 









Corruption is defined as an "illegal activity conducted through misuse of power by public or 
private officials or firms for personal benefits, financial or otherwise" (Bahoo, Alon, & 
Paltrinieri, 2019, p. 2). This broader definition represents the overall reported level of 
corruption in a country. It is blamed for reductions in operational efficiency, information 
asymmetry, limited distribution of income, and weak economic growth and development 
(Kouznetsov, Kim & Wright, 2019; Chen, Ding, & Kim, 2010; Bahoo, 2020; Bahoo, Alon, & 
Floreani, 2020). In the international business discipline, the study and analysis of corruption 
became more important as multinational enterprises (MNEs) from developed countries entered 
emerging and developing countries often having a high level of corruption and a poor 
institutional environment (Rodriguez et al., 2006). MNEs may exercise care when formulating 
their international business strategies related to foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions about 
entering very corrupt locations because managers are concerned about the additional costs, 
uncertainties, and investment risks (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). Nevertheless, according to a 2014 
Foreign Bribery Report published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), MNEs are still willing to pay bribes and invest in such locations to 
obtain a competitive advantage.   
Despite the popularity of the subject among international business scholars, MNE managers, 
and policymakers, there are conflicting findings in the literature about the question of how 
corruption affects the attraction of FDI. On one hand, the dominant view sees "corruption as 
sand" with regard to FDI location decisions (Wei, 2000a; 2000b; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; 
Lambsdorff, 2003; Voyer & Beamish, 2004). However, one ongoing stream of research sees 
"corruption as grease" with regard to these same decisions, contending that it does not impede 
the flow of FDI to them (Wheeler & Mody, 1992; Henisz, 2000; Egger & Winner, 2005; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008a; Barassi & Zhou, 2012). More nuanced voices condend that corruption 
has an asymmetric effect on FDI. Yi, Meng, Macaulay, and Peng (2019) argued and confirmed 
that the asymmetric effect of corruption on FDI depends on the moderating effect of formal 
(FDI freedom) and informal institutions (freedom of the press) during two investment phases 
(FDI stocks and flows). However, it is still unclear how corruption can have a dual (positive 
and negative) effect on FDI. 
Through the lens of transaction costs and neo institutional theory, we explain the asymmetric 
effect of corruption on FDI. We argue that foreign aid as a formal institution negates the 
negative impact of corruption as an informal institution on FDI. We extend the integrated 
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model proposed by Yi and colleagues (2019) by considering the moderating effect of foreign 
aid (a formal institution) between the relationship of corruption (an informal institution) and 
FDI during two investment phases (FDI propensity1 and FDI flows2). We argue that bilateral 
foreign aid moderates negatively the association between corruption and FDI because 
managers of MNEs consider aid an indication of future economic activity, and a factor that will 
reduce investment risk and improve governance and institutional quality (Wheeler & Mody, 
1992). Figure 1 shows our extended integrated framework of corruption (an informal 
institution), foreign aid (a formal institution), and FDI.  
To test our framework, we analyzed bilateral FDI and foreign aid data from 18 European3 
countries, which are the signatories of the OECD, to 34 African4 countries with a high level of 
corruption and a weak institutional environment. We created a pairwise (from home to the host 
country) and cross-time panel data set for 2001 through 2012. Our results show a direct 
negative effect of corruption as an informal institution on the propensity of FDI. However, 
corruption also has a positive impact on FDI inflows for MNEs that have already entered a host 
country. Thus, the two investment phases (FDI propensity and inflows) explain the seemingly 
contradictory results from before: corruption can act as either “sand or greese” with respect to 
FDI. The results show that the formal institution of foreign aid negatively moderates the impact 
of corruption as an informal institution on FDI inflows. As a result, the direct negative effects 
of corruption on FDI becomes positive.  
This study adds to the literature in three ways. First, we contribute to the neo-institutional 
theory that foreign aid as a formal institution negates the adverse impact of corruption as an 
informal institution on foreign investors. As a formal institution, foreign aid affects the 
international business strategies of MNEs related to FDI. Thus, international business scholars 
should consider the role of foreign aid as a formal institution in explaining the institution-based 
view of the business strategies of firms. Second, we extend and confirm the integrated model 
proposing that the asymmetric effect of corruption on FDI depends on two investment phases 
(FDI propensity and inflows) (Yi et al., 2019). Therefore, international business scholars 
should consider the phases of the FDI when discussing corruption as sand or grease. Third, we 
introduce a new line of research by adding the consideration of the combined nexus among 
corruption, foreign aid, and FDI to explain the international business strategies of firms. We 
argue and confirm that foreign aid moderates the negative effect of corruption on FDI during 
two investment phases.  
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Based on our framework, analysis, and findings, we can also make several policy 
recommendations for MNE managers, governments, and controlling bodies. First, our findings 
underscore how bilateral foreign aid from the MNEs' home government shapes the 
internationalization of firms and their FDI decisions. Therefore, MNE managers should 
observe and critically analyze foreign aid commitments and the government policies of their 
home countries when considering potential countries in which to invest. Second, countries that 
are victims of a high level of corruption should concentrate on attracting bilateral foreign aid 
contracts to increase the level of FDI. The need to fulfill the requirements and conditions 
attached to foreign aid contracts will build the confidence of foreign investors. Thus, foreign 
aid policies influence a country’s FDI. Finally, controlling bodies such as the OECD, World 
Bank, and IMF can utilize foreign aid policies to influence and control corruption and weak 
institutional environments through strict sanctions and conditions.  
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
We combine both neo institutional and transaction cost theories to develop our hypotheses. 
Transaction cost theory suggests that the foreign direct investment decision depends on the 
economic, business, and social costs of different categories (Driffield et al., 2013). The 
business and economic costs include markets, efficiency, geographical distance (tariffs and 
transport), strategic assets, and resources (Dunning, 1998; Peng, 2003; 2017; Jiménez et al., 
2017; Jiménez & Alon, 2018). The social costs arise from the institutional environment (e.g., 
bribes, corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, weak parliaments, dictatorships, and non-
implementation of the rule of law) (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Alon & 
Herbert, 2009). MNE managers use modern IT and globalization as international business 
strategies to control economic costs (Calhoun, 2002). However, the social costs associated with 
FDI decisions are more complicated. Using insights of neo-institutional theory, social costs 
include corruption, transparency, governance, and the rule of law as formal and informal 
institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Peng, Wang, Yi, 2008; Estrin, & Prevezer, 2010; Godinaz 
& Liu, 2015; Alon, Li, & Wu, 2016; Li, Alon, & Wu, 2017; Yi et al., 2019; ).  
Corruption affects the attractiveness of FDI and may result in increased costs (Wheeler & 
Mody, 1992; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008a). Corruption is one of several 
informal institutional factors. Researchers consider corruption as a result of a country’s 
political, legal, cultural, business, and economic institutions (Svensson, 2005). By applying the 
concepts of transaction costs and neo institutional theory, the FDI decisions of MNEs to any 
corrupt location depends on assessments on the comparison between the potential costs and 
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benefits of the transaction (Rose-Ackerman, 2008). Therefore, prior literature on corruption 
and FDI is divided into two competing strands. The first stream of research considers 
"corruption as sand" for FDI because it results in high cost and uncertainty (Wei, 2000a). The 
second stream of research accepts "corruption as grease" for FDI because it improves efficiency 
and reduces costs in the corrupt host locations with poor formal institutions (Wheeler & Mody, 
1992).  
Following Yi et al. (2019), we maintain two phases involved in FDI. The first is pre-entry, 
called FDI propensity, where MNEs have yet to decide about investing. The second is post-
entry, referred to as FDI inflows, where MNEs have already invested in a host country 
(location). Thus, this study proposes that the asymmetric impact of corruption as an informal 
institutional factor affecting FDI is due to foreign aid's moderating role as a formal institutional 
factor during the two investment phases: FDI propensity and FDI inflows.  
2.1 Corruption as Sand  
In the prior literature, the dominant and negative view is that “Corruption is a sand” for business 
and commerce wheels and reduce FDI (Habib & Zurawicki, 2001; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). 
Corruption is considered and proven as an additional tax for commerce, business, and investors 
(Wei, 2000a; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Karhunen, & Ledyaeva, 2012). 
It increases the costs of doing business (Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1993; Jain,  Kuvvet, & 
Pagano,2017), and firms need to devote extra financial and human resources to managing the 
corrupt environment (Kaufmann, 1997). Corruption also results in additional contract-related 
costs and risks (Boycko et al., 2017).  
The researchers confirm through empirical research that corruption harms FDI. We summarize 
the key empirical research in Table 1. For example, in a critical study of Wei (2000a), he 
investigated the impact of corruption on bilateral FDI from 12 home countries to 45 host 
countries and confirmed that corruption hampers FDI negatively. In another study considering 
government policies towards FDI, Wei (2000b) also corroborated that corruption negatively 
impacts such investments. Lambsdorff (2003) demonstrates the negative impact of corruption 
on FDI by analyzing FDI in 54 countries. In another study, Voyer and Beamish (2004) 
examined Japanese investment and found that corruption affects FDI per capita negatively in 
developing countries. Similarly, the association between corruption and bilateral FDI for 106 
countries is investigated by Cuervo-Cazurra (2006). He reports that different corruption types, 
such as pervasive corruption, have a more detrimental effect on FDI than arbitrary (Cuervo-
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Cazurra, 2008b). Furthermore, the association between corruption distance and FDI is 
investigated by Habib and Zurawicki (20002) on a sample of bilateral FDI inflows from 7 home 
countries to 89 host countries. They confirm that corruption distance hurts FDI. 
Building on previous researchers, we argue that, as an informal institution, corruption 
negatively affects potential new entrants into the host country. Thus, corruption as an additional 
tax and cost discourse MNEs decision to enter (FDI propensity) in a new corrupt location (Yi 
et al., 2019). Thus, corruption is a significant barrier to new investors. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1a: Corruption has a negative impact on the propensity of FDI during the pre-entry 
phase. 
2.2 Corruption as Grease  
In the second view, some scholars consider "corruption as grease to the wheels of commerce" 
(Egger & Winner, 2005). They highlight that corruption facilitates transactions by speeding up 
the process (Huntington, 1968) and introducing a market procedure into environments that are 
corrupt, monopolistic, and have misguided regulations (Leff, 1989). In developing countries, 
corruption serves as grease for firms when the revenues outweigh the costs of their business 
transactions (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008a). MNEs can leverage the advantages of corruption where 
government and bureaucratic systems have failed to speed up the process (Boddewyn & 
Brewer, 1994) by avoiding complicated regulations (Tanzi, 1998) and having internal 
information and access to government projects (Duanmu, 2011; Tanzi & Davoodi, 2000). 
Although corruption is an imperfect mechanism for promoting efficiency, MNEs prefer 
corruption and bribery as an alternative to misguided or weak institutional environments.   
Indeed, as Table 1 indicates, few studies have not found corruption hurts FDI. Wheeler and 
Mody (1992) confirm that there is no association between corruption and FDI. Similiary, Hines 
(1995) affirms that corruption has no adverse effect on inward FDI. Henisz (2000) also 
documented that host country corruption does not affect US MNEs’ investment decisions. 
Furthermore, Barassi and Zhou (2012) found that corruption has a positive association with 
FDI after controlling for firms’ host-country selection mechanisms.  
Building on this research, we argue that corruption as an informal institution has a positive 
impact on FDI inflows. In other words, once an MNE has entered a corrupt host country and 
learned how to deal with the situation, its managers may invest more if the benefits outweigh 
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the costs. MNEs that do not want to become involved in such countries will pause at the pre-
entry stage. Therefore, we posit that: 
Hypothesis 1b:  Corruption has a positive impact on decisions about FDI inflows of MNEs 
that have already entered a host country.  
  2.3 Corruption, Foreign Aid, and FDI 
Institutions, "the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction,”  are defined 
by North (1990, p.3). Similarly, the institutions are considered "regulative, normative, and 
cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior" (Scott, 
1995, p.33). Keeping in mind these institutions' concepts, they are classified as formal and 
informal (Peng, Want, and Jiang, 2008). The formal and informal institutions influence 
transactions in the area of law (e.g., economic and trade liberalization), politics (e.g., 
transparency, governance, and government structure), society (e.g., attitudes, behavior, ethics, 
norms, and culture), and international business (FDI and trade) (North, 1990; Peng et al., 2008; 
Bevan, Estrin, & Meyer, 2004). MNE managers must consider the quality of and differences 
between institutions because they operate in multiple, varied locations (Meyer & Peng, 2016). 
Thus, the institutions' quality influences MNEs' foreign investment decisions by reducing the 
information asymmetry about the host country’s market and economic conditions (Meyer et 
al., 2009).  
The institutions' quality determines the FDI by moderating the cost of economic activity in the 
foreign markets (Blonigen, 2005; Stevens et al., 2016). The institutional conditions and 
boundaries determine the economic benefits and costs of business transactions, which influence 
the international business strategies of MNEs (Zhou & Peng, 2010). MNE managers formulate 
strategies to overcome the problem of high costs in foreign markets with weak institutions 
(Stevens et al., 2016). Previous literature discusses two types of institutions: formal (e.g., the 
rule of law, government, bureaucracy, competition, legal, and information institutions) and 
informal institutions (e.g., norms, corruption, religion, media, culture) (Zhou & Peng, 2010; 
Sartor & Beamish, 2014; Mudambi, Navarra, & Delios, 2013). Corruption, as an informal 
institution, reduces FDI (Badinger & Nindl, 2014). Thus, it is valuable to explore the 
association of corruption on FDI by considering different institutions' types. Recently, Yi et al. 
(2019) presented and confirmed an integrated model that FDI freedom (a formal institution) 
and press freedom (an informal institution) have a moderating effect between corruption and 
FDI. We extend this integrated framework by arguing that foreign aid as a formal institution 
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moderates corruption's negative impact as an informal institution on FDI. In other words, 
foreign aid (as a formal institution) negates the negative effect of corruption (as an informal 
institution) on the FDI decisions of MNEs.  
We argue that MNEs consider foreign aid to developing countries with weak institutional 
environments to mitigate and reduce investment risks in such countries. Research findings have 
supported this theory in several ways. First, bilateral foreign aid flow in the developing country 
indicates an increase in future economic activity (Ear, 2007). Second, such aid contains several 
conditions and sanctions, resulting in improving the corrupt country’s governance, institutions, 
democratic systems, and law rule (Ear, 2007; Okada & Samreth, 2012). Third, in the event of 
bilateral foreign aid, the donor country may ask about the recipient country's internal 
information about business scenario, environment, and economic position that can be 
transmitted exclusively to the donor's MNEs (Kimura & Todo, 2010). Fourth, the donor 
country can make the aid contingent on implementing their specific business practices, rules, 
and quality requirements (Kimura & Todo, 2010). Fifth, the aid also helps reduce petty 
corruption by government officials in developing countries because it helps pay their salaries 
(Knack, 2011).  
The prior empirical literature is divided into three strands: corruption and FDI, foreign aid and 
corruption, and foreign aid and FDI. We summarize the critical papers in Table 1. Despite the 
importance of the nexus between foreign aid and corruption, existing research is limited. The 
dominant view is that foreign aid reduces corruption and increases economic activity (Knack, 
2001; Tavares, 2003; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Charron, 2011; Mohamed et al., 2015). Okada 
and Samreth (2012) investigated the association between foreign aid and corruption in the 
recipient country. They confirm that foreign aid improves the institutional environment and 
reduce corruption. Mohamed et al. (2015) examined the association between bilateral foreign 
assistance and corruption in a sample of 42 Sub-Saharan African (SSF) countries between 
2000-2010. They confirmed that foreign aid reduces corruption. Similarly, Knack (2001) 
empirically confirms that foreign aid improves governance and reduce corruption in a sample 
of 86 countries data between 1975 to 1995. Nevertheless, a few scholars found no association 
between foreign aid and corruption (Menard & Weill, 2016; Efobi, Beecroft, & Asongu, 2019).  
In the literature, the third strands have also explored foreign aid and FDI nexus. Most of the 
studies confirm the positive effect of foreign aid in attracting FDI (Karakaplan, Neyapti, & 
Sayek, 2005; Rao et al., 2020; Harms & Lutz, 2003; Kimura & Todo, 2010; Selaya & Sunesen, 
2012; Garriga & Phillips, 2013; Aluko, 2020) (see Table 1).  
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Foreign aid attracts FDI by improving aid recipient countries' institutional quality and 
governance (Karakaplan, Neyapti, & Sayek, 2005). Kimura and Todo (2010) confirmed that 
foreign aid positively impacts FDI inflow from the same donor country. They examined this 
association in a sample of 5 homes and 98 host countries from 1985 to 1989. Harms and Lutz 
(2003) investigated and confirmed the positive effect of aid on FDI inflows of the recipient 
country. Similarly, Selaya and Sunesen (2012) documented a noteworthy link between foreign 
aid and capital investment. They discovered that foreign aid attracts investment (physical 
transfer of capital) by improving the capital's marginal productivity. Notably, foreign aid is 
also a positive signal for foreign investors in low-income countries (Garriga & Phillips, 2013). 
On the other hand, a few scholars argued that there is no relationship between foreign aid and 
FDI (Asiedu, Jin, & Nandwa, 2009; Rao et al., 2020).  
Taken together, we highlight a joint nexus among corruption (an informal institution), foreign 
aid (a formal institution), and foreign direct investment. We present a new line of research that 
foreign aid as a formal institution impacts the international business strategies of MNEs related 
to FDI. We argue that MNEs decide to invest in a corrupt location because of bilateral foreign 
aid (a formal institution). Foreign aid increases economic activity, mitigates investment risk, 
and reduces FDI in the pre-entry phase (Wheeler & Mody, 1992). Thus,  
Hypothesis 2a: Foreign aid negatively moderates the relationship between corruption and the 
propensity of FDI.  
As a formal institution, foreign aid improves the governance, institutional quality, and 
investment circumstances in corrupt host countries through the sanctions attached to aid 
contracts with aid recipient countries (OECD, 2016). In the post-entry phase, firms increase 
their investment in a corrupt host country if they receive foreign aid. The incumbent firms also 
have experience in dealing with corruption in the host country. Thus,  
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3.1 Sample and Data Sources 
To test this study's framework, we choose bilateral aid, and FDI flows of 18 OECD European 
to 34 African countries from 2001 to 2012 (Bartels et al. 2014). The European countries are 
the signatories of the OECD conventions against bribery (OECD, 1997) and foreign aid and 
corruption (OECD, 2016). The OECD member countries are committed to providing official 
development aid to achieve sustainable goals. The developing countries from Africa receive 
significant aid from OECD. The sample is limited to European OECD countries for which 
bilateral FDI and aid flows to Africa available.  
The bilateral FDI data come from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) (UNCTAD, 2019), which are extensively used in related literature on corruption 
and FDI (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Barassi & Zhou, 2012). We used bilateral aid data from the 
OECD database (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Schudel, 2008; Asiedu, Jin, & Nandwa, 2009; 
Kimura & Todo, 2010). The host country’s level of corruption index scores is collected from 
two sources: (i) the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and (ii) Transparency 
International (TI). The data on control variables come from multiples sources such as World 
Development Indicators, Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, and CEPII (2019) (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2006; Yi et al., 2019). We created a pairwise (home country to the host country) and 
cross-time panel data set for 2001-2012. Table 2 summarizes the key variables and data 
sources.   
3.2 Variables and Measures 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
We used two dependent variables (see Table 1): FDI propensity and FDI inflows. FDI 
propensity (dummy variable, 1 or 0) reflects an investor's tendency to invest in a host country 
(Barassi & Zhou, 2012; Yi et al., 2019). FDI inflows represent an investment from home to 
host in US million dollars (Lambsdorff, 2003; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Wei, 2000b). We treated 
negative or missing values as zero and add 1000 before taking the natural logarithm (Aisbett, 
2009; Kimura, & Todo, 2010; Hattari and Rajan, 2009). Zero means there are no FDI inflows, 
whereas a positive number indicates investments between home and corrupt host countries 
(Qian & Sandoval-Hernandez, 2016).  
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3.2.2 Independent Variables 
In this study, the host country’s corruption is an independent variable. We used the corruption 
index score of ICRG, which is rescaled to simplify the interpretation of the coefficients 
(Hayakawa, Kimura, & Lee, 2013; Osabutey, Okoro, 2015; Hakimi & Hamdi, 2017). Then, to 
assess the robustness test, we use the TI corruption index after rescaling (Habib & Zurawicki, 
2002; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, 2008a, 2008b; Javorcik & Wei, 2009). See Table 2 for details.  
3.2.3 Moderators  
To test our hypothesis that bilateral foreign aid moderates the association between corruption 
and FDI, we used three foreign aid types. Our first moderator is the official development 
assistant (ODA)-disbursement: net total5 meaning the aid disbursement from the home to the 
host country in US million dollars priced as a constant of 2017. The second moderator is official 
development assistance (ODA)- total commitment6, meaning the home's commitment to the 
host country in US million dollars. The final moderating variable is total official inflows (TOF)-
disbursement: net total7 meaning the disbursement from the home to the host country in US 
million dollars priced as a constant of 2017. The data of foreign aid is collected from the OECD 
database (Kimura & Todo, 2010; Selaya & Sunesen, 2012) (see Table 1 for details).  
3.2.4 Control Variables 
We used the gravity model of FDI, which is based on the proximity-concentration hypothesis 
(Bevan & Estrin, 2004). Thus, MNEs face challenges during expansion across the border due 
to ownership, locations, and international paradigm (Dunning, 1988). We controlled for the 
three types of variables for this study: (i) host country’s factors, (ii) home country’s factors, 
and (iii) the bilateral factors. The first type of control is the host country’s factors.  
We controlled for their market-seeking and natural resource-seeking motivations for host 
country GDP and host country oil rents. (Wei, 2000a; Buckley et al., 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2006). We also controlled for any potential agglomeration effects of FDI through host country 
net FDI inflows (Wei, 2000a) because MNEs favor investing in countries with a large number 
of foreign firms (Disdier & Mayer, 2004). Furthermore, we controlled for investment policy 
and for formal and informal institutions such as the host country’s openness to FDI and the 
host country’s openness to the press that might affect decisions about FDI (Yi et al., 2019).  
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Second, we controlled for the market size of the home country through the home country's 
GDP. Even companies in a large economy might tend to invest in corrupt locations to achieve 
economies of scale (Selaya & Sunesen, 2012).   
Finally, it is essential to control bilateral factors. Thus, we control the geographical distance 
representing tariffs and freights and might impact FDI and trade decisions (Linneman, 1966). 
We also control common language as a proxy of cultural and political similarity (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977). Finally, we controlled for administrative commonalities through the common 
colony, meaning whether the host country had been a home country colony. Traditionally, 
colonies have received their administrative traditions, such as their legal systems, from the 
colonial powers that once ruled them (La Porta et al., 1998). See Table 2 for details.  
3.3 Estimation Strategy  
We applied the two-stage Heckman model analysis to investigate the presented framework by 
following previous literature (see Figure 1) (Yi et al., 2019; Hakkala et al., 2008; Qian & 
Sandoval-Hernandez, 2016). The two-stage Heckman model is the best option to control the 
endogeneity of the data's zero-censored structure (Qian & Sandoval-Hernandez, 2016; Shaver, 
1998). 
In the first stage, we examined the investor's FDI propensity to invest in a specific country. We 
assessed the moderating role of foreign aid in the relationship between corruption and FDI 
decisions. We used a probit regression with random effects (Wooldridge, 1995).  
We calculated inverse Mills ratios and included them in the second-stage Heckman regression 
to control for selection bias. To meet the exclusion restrictions and control the problem of 
collinearity between the Mills ratios and the independent variables, we excluded the host 
country’s openness to the press, which represents the effect of informal institutions on FDI 
decisions, from the second-stage Heckman regression (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Yi et al., 
2019). However, the host country’s institutions likely have no effect on FDI inflows once a 
firm already entered a corrupt host country. Thus, the following are the model specifications at 
the first stage. 
FDI Propensityij,t= αij,t +β1Host Country Corruptionij,t-1 + β2Aidij,t +β3Host-Country 
Corruptionij,t-1 X Aidij,t + γ Xij, t-1 + εij,t . ……..Equation 1. 
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Where FDI Propensityij,t is a bilateral FDI decision (dummy zero or 1) from home country i to 
host country j at time t. Aidij,t represents the bilateral aid inflows from home country i to host 
country j at time t. Host Country Corruptionij,t-1 X Aidij,t is the interaction term (moderators) 
generated by multiplying the independent variable (corruption) by the moderator (aid) (Aiken, 
West, & Reno, 1991). The change in the independent variable (corruption) due to the dependent 
variable (FDI) is contingent on the interaction term of the moderating variable (aid) (Jaccard, 
Wan, & Turrisi, 1990). Xij, t-1 is the vector of the control variables, and εij,t is the error term. We 
lagged all independent variables to avoid the problem of reverse causality (Qian & Sandoval-
Hernandez, 2016), and considering aid as a formal institution may take time to effect FDI 
decision. We also applied year effects.  
Further, we assessed the association between FDI inflows, explanatory, moderating, and 
control variables during the second stage of the Heckman model analysis. In the second stage, 
we investigate foreign aid's moderating role on the negative impact of corruption on FDI 
amounts to be invested after a favorable decision to enter in the host country in the first stage. 
The pooled OLS regression is applied to our panel in the second stage. The Mils ratios retrieved 
from Equation 1 ae included in Equation 2 and analysis in the second stage. Thus, our model 
specification for the second stage is the following.  
LnFDI inflowij,t= αij,t +β1Host Country Corruptionij,t-1 + β2Aidij,t +β3Host-Contry Corruptionij,t-
1 X Aidij,t + β4 IMRij,t+ γ Xij, t-1 + εij,t . ……..Equation 2. 
Where LnFDI inflowij,t is the amount of bilateral FDI from the home to the host country. The 
log of dependent and independent variables is used to ensure the homoscedasticity of the error 
term (Wei, 2000a p.4). The term IMRij,t is the inverse Mills ratio retrieved in stage one and 
included in stage two of the Heckman procedure. Further, the year effect is also included in the 








Table 2 Key Variables and Data Sources  
 Variables  Measurement Sources (References) 
Dependent 
variables  
Ln FDI Inflows It is a natural log of FDI inflows from home 
to host country in a year in US million dollars  
 
UNCTAD (2019) 
FDI propensity  It is a dummy variable that equals 1 if FDI 






A corruption index score of host country 
from 0 (low) and 6 (high) (6 minus the 
original score) 
 
It is constructed using 




A corruption index score of the host country 
from 0 (low) and 10 (high) (10 minus the 
original score).  
Constructed using data 
of TI. (2019) on 
corruption. 






Natural log of ODA disbursement-net total 
from home to host country in US million 







It is a natural log of TOF disbursement-net 
total from home to host country in US million 







Natural log of ODA commitments- total 
commitments from home to host country in 





Host country’s GDP It is a natural log of gross domestic product 
in US million dollars measured as a constant 
of 2010.  
WDI (2019) 
Host country’s oil 
rents 
Oil rents as a percentage of GDP  WDI (2019) 
Host country’s total 
net FDI 
The net FDI inflows to the host country as a 
percentage of GDP 
WDI (2019) 
Host country’s 
openness to FDI 
 
It represents the investment freedom in the 
host country, from 1 (high barrier) and 100 




Host country’s press 
freedom 
The indicator of the level of press freedom in 
the host country, from 1 (high barrier) and 
100 (low barrier) 
 
Freedom House (2019) 
Home country’s 
GDP 
It is a natural log of gross domestic product 
in US million dollars measured as the 
constant year 2010.  
WDI (2019) 
Distance It is a natural log of the greater circle distance 
between home and host countries  
CePII database by 
Mayer and Zignago 
(2011) 
Common language Dummy indicator of the existence of a 
common language between the home and 
host country, 1 or 0 
CePII database by 
Mayer and Zignago 
(2011) 
Common colony If the home and host country ever had a 
colonial link, dummy indicator 1 or 0. 
CePII database by 




Note: The table presents the details of the variables. 1= The corruption index by Transparency International is 
used for the robustness test in Table A1.  
 
4. RESULTS  
Table 3 shows the pairwise correlations, summary statistics, and variance inflation factors 
(VIF). The correlations do not indicate any multicollinearity problem because they are all 
below the suggested threshold of 0.7 (Kennedy, 2008). Another alternative approach to 
detecting the problem of multicollinearity between explanatory variables is the VIF score 
(Studenmund, 2011). Our VIF score for all variables is less than 5 from the suggested rule of 
thumb (Studenmund, 2011).  
Table 3 also indicates how corruption, foreign aid, and FDI correlate in African countries. A 
high correlation level is expected because several country-level indicators are correlated 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). The correlation matrix results show a 
statistically significant negative association between FDI propensity and FDI inflows, and level 
of corruption (ICRG and TI) at p < 0.01. Thus, we can conclude host country corruption hurts 
bilateral FDI from Europe to Africa. The results support Hypothesis 1a and are in line with 
previous literature (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008a). We infer that 
corruption reduces bilateral FDI from Europe to Africa because it increases costs and 
uncertainty. All three bilateral foreign aid indicators-ODA-disbursement: net total, TOF- 
disbursement: net total, and ODA-total commitment-have a significant positive correlation at 
p < 0.01, with FDI propensity, FDI inflows, and level of corruption (ICRG and TI). The 
findings confirm our direction of hypothesis, theoretical argument, and also in line with the 
past empirical literature. We also conclude that bilateral foreign aid attracts bilateral FDI from 
the same home investors and donors to host countries and reduces corruption through the strict 
conditions and sanctions under the OECD convention's guidelines on foreign aid (OECD, 
2016).  
Table 4 presents the two-stage Heckman regression analysis results, the first with FDI 
propensity and the second with FDI inflows. In the first stage, we used probit regressions with 
random effects to assess Models 1-4. In the second stage, we used pooled OLS regressions to 
assess Models 5-8. Models 1 and 5 are basic models that the host country’s corruption hurts 
FDI propensity and FDI inflows. Models 2-4 and 6-8 are models that explore the moderating 
role of foreign aid between corruption and FDI propensity and FDI inflows.  
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Model 1 analyzes Hypothesis 1a that the host country’s corruption impacts FDI propensity 
negatively during the pre-entry phase. The pre-entry phase is the time when European MNEs 
consider investing in Africa.  We accept Hypothesis 1a. Furthermore, in Model 5, we test 
Hypothesis 1b that corruption has a positive association on FDI inflow during the post-entry 
phase. In the post-entry phase, European MNEs are ready to increase investment in Africa. The 
coefficient of host country corruption (ICRG) is significantly positive, confirming Hypothesis 
1b.  
Models 2-4 test Hypothesis 2a that bilateral foreign aid from Europe to Africa negatively 
moderates the negative impact of host country’s corruption on FDI's propensity during the pre-
entry phase.  
It is expected that if foreign aid moderates the association between corruption and FDI, the 
original negative impact of corruption on FDI will become positive. This result would suggest 
that as foreign aid increases, the negative impact of corruption on FDI weakens. In Models 2, 
3, and 4, we included three different types of bilateral foreign aid indicators (ODA-
disbursement: net total, TOF- disbursement: net total, and ODA-total commitment) and 
interaction terms separately to avoid the problem of multicollinearity.  
 In Model 2, the aid indicator's interaction term (ODA-disbursement: net total X host country 
corruption) has a significant and negative coefficient.  But the original association between 
corruption and FDI propensity remains significantly negative and confirms foreign aid has no 
moderating effect.  
Model 3 also shows that the interaction term for aid (TOF- disbursement: net total X host 
country corruption) has a negative but non-significant effect. And direct effect also remains 
negative, confirming no moderation effect of aid. Similarly, Model 4 presents the same results. 
Thus, we conclude that European MNEs are reluctant to make foreign direct investments in 
corrupt developing African countries even when they are bilateral foreign aid recipients from 
the MNEs’ home governments. Hence, we reject Hypothesis 2a.  
We posit in Hypothesis 2b that bilateral foreign aid negatively moderates the effect of the host 
country’s corruption on bilateral FDI inflows during the post-entry phase. Hypothesis 2b is 
tested in Model 6-8 by considering bilateral foreign aid three indicators and their interaction 
terms individually to avoid the problem of multicollinearity.  
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Model 6 shows a negative coefficient of foreign aid's interaction term (ODA-disbursement: net 
total X host country corruption) and, as a result, a positive coefficient of the direct effect of 
corruption on FDI inflows. The results show that foreign aid moderates the negative impact of 
corruption on FDI inflows. Similarly, in Models 7 and 8, the results confirm the moderating 
role of foreign aid's interaction terms (TOF- disbursement: net total X host country corruption, 
and ODA-total commitment X host country corruption). Hence, Models 6-8 confirms the 
moderating role of bilateral foreign aid on the relationship between the host country’s 
corruption and bilateral FDI inflows during the post-entry phase of investment. Thus, we 
conclude that European MNEs that have already invested in corrupt developing African 
countries are willing to invest more if the benefits outweigh the costs. 
Furthermore, as Figure 2 illustrates, the average marginal effect of corruption on the entire 
range of the three types of foreign aid confirms foreign aid's moderating role. We argue that 
these MNEs have the experience to deal with corrupt institutional environments. They also 
consider foreign aid an indication of future economic activity and a reduction in investment 
risks due to the bilateral aid from home governments to host countries.  
4.1 Robustness Test 
We also apply a robustness check to confirm our framework. We used another indicator of 
corruption index by TI widely used in literature (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; 2008a; 2008b; Yi et 
al., 2019). Here again, we conducted a two-stage Heckman regression analysis, the results of 
which we present in Table A1 in the appendix.  
Models A1-A4 utilized probit regressions with random effects, where FDI propensity is the 
dependent variable in the first stage. In the second stage, Models A5-A8 used pooled OLS 
regressions, where FDI inflows are the dependent variable. Models A1 and A5 are baseline 
models to test Hypothesis 1a and 1b. Furthermore, Models A2-A4 test Hypothesis 2a that 
bilateral foreign aid has a moderating effect on the negative impact of corruption and FDI's 
propensity. Finally, Models A6-A8 explores Hypothesis 2b, positing bilateral foreign aid 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.1 Contributions in Literature  
In this paper, we proposed and tested an extended integrated framework to examine foreign 
aid's moderating effect (a formal institution) on corruption (an informal institution) and FDI 
during two investment phases. We explained the asymmetric impact of corruption on FDI 
through our extended framework. In doing so, we make the following contributions to the 
international business literature.   
First, we enrich the existing literature and confirm that foreign aid as a formal institution 
negates corruption's negative impact as an informal institution on FDI. We introduced and 
established foreign aid's importance as a formal institution that impacts the corrupt host 
country’s governance and institutional quality through conditions attached to the aid. Second, 
we extend and confirm the integrated framework presented by Yi et al. (2019) that the overall 
effect of corruption (an informal institution) on FDI is asymmetric and depends on two 
investment phases: (i) the propensity of FDI and (ii) FDI inflows. Therefore, it is essential to 
consider the phases of FDI when investigating whether corruption is sand or grease for foreign 
investors.  
Third, Yi et al. (2019) proposed and confirmed the moderating effect of FDI freedom (formal 
institution) and press freedom (an informal institution) on the relationship between corruption 
and FDI during two investment phases (FDI propensity and FDI stocks). We extended this 
integrated framework by proposing and confirming foreign aid's moderating role (a formal 
institution) on the impact of corruption (an informal institution) on FDI. We also controlled for 
FDI freedom and press freedom to confirm our framework and model. We underscored the 
importance of understanding how bilateral foreign aid as a formal institution shapes firms' 
internationalization, particularly concerning MNEs’ choices about where and whether to 
invest. Thus, foreign aid impacts firms' international business strategies related to FDI because 
it reduces transitions costs, uncertainty, and investment risks. We conclude that bilateral 
foreign aid is an essential factor in explaining the institution-based view of firms. Finally, this 
study contributes to literature related to corruption, foreign aid, and foreign direct investment. 
Previous studies have established the nexus between corruption and FDI (Habib & Zurawicki, 
2002; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008a), foreign aid, and corruption (Knack, 2001; Tavares, 2003), and 
foreign aid and FDI (Harms & Lutz, 2003; Kimura & Todo, 2010). However, this is the first 
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study that proposed and examined the nexus among corruption, foreign aid, and FDI by 
considering foreign aid's moderating role.  
5.2 Policy and Managerial Implications 
The following are the managerial and policy implications for governments and managers. First, 
governments or controlling bodies can help reduce corruption in host countries by adding strict 
conditions and sanctions to the foreign aid they offer. Doing so will encourage MNEs to make 
FDI in these corrupt host countries. Therefore, policymakers should establish proper 
mechanisms for providing aid to corrupt countries that require them to take active steps to 
reduce their corruption or face sanctions. A “carrot and stick” approach could promise them 
increased FDI as a reward.  
For managers of MNEs, our framework suggests that they should consider their home country’s 
foreign aid when deciding whether to invest in corrupt foreign countries. This consideration is 
particularly important in the stage before they choose to invest. However, having made initial 
investments in such countries, they can be reasonably assured that continued investments will 
bring more benefits with fewer risks.  
5.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions  
The following are the limitations of this study that suggests a future research agenda. First, we 
analyzed data from 2001-2012 because that was the period for which we had information. 
Therefore, we recommend that future studies cover more recent periods. Second, in accordance 
with earlier studies, we used bilateral foreign aid and FDI data at the country level (Habib & 
Zurawicki, 2002; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008a; 2008b). Future research can use firm-level or 
industry-level datasets to confirm the framework and demonstrate how corruption affects FDI. 
Third, we did not account for other types of corruption, such as pervasive or arbitrary 
corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). Considering these forms of corruption would help validate 
our framework. 
Fourth, we considered bilateral foreign aid only as a moderator between corruption and FDI. 
We did not consider the role of multilateral foreign aid, which future research should do. Fifth, 
we examined foreign aid's moderating role in the relationship between corruption and FDI 
during two investment phases (FDI propensity and inflows). Future research can investigate 
multiple phases of the investment cycle to examine the nexus among corruption, foreign aid, 
and FDI. Sixth, we did not consider the impact of corruption (heterogeneous) on low-income 
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developing and developed countries (Bailey, 2018). Future research can examine this effect by 
considering the effect of corruption distance on FDI. Finally, we investigated investments from 
European OECD members in African countries. Future research studies can examine such 
connections between other regions such as Europe and Asia, India and Africa, and China and 
Africa.  Despite these limitations, our new framework helps explain when and how corruption 
functions as sand or grease for prospective MNE investors. 
Foot Notes: 
 
1. The propensity of FDI represents the pre-entry phase of an MNE in a host country.  
2. The FDI inflows represent the decision of MNEs to make additional investments in a host country 
in which they have already invested.  
3. List of 18 European home countries that are investors (FDI) and also provide foreign aid. 
“Austria, (2) Belgium, (3) Denmark, (4) Finland, (5) France, (6) Germany, (7) Iceland, 
(8) Ireland, (9) Italy, (10) Luxembourg, (11) the Netherlands, (12) Norway, (13) Poland, 
(14) Portugal, (15) Spain, (16) Sweden, (17) Switzerland, (18) the United Kingdom.” 
4.  List of 34 African host countries that are receivers of investments (FDI) and receivers of foreign 
aid.  
“(1) Algeria, (2) Angola, (3) Botswana, (4) Cote d Ivoire, (5) Cameroon, (6) Cape Verde, (7) 
Chad, (8) Djibouti, (9) Egypt, (10) Ethiopia, (11) Equatorial Guinea, (12) Gabon, (13) Ghana, 
(14) Guinea, (15) Guinea-Bissau, (16) Kenya, (17) Liberia, (18) Libya, (19) Morocco, (20) 
Madagascar, (21) Mali, (22) Mozambique, (23) Mauritania, (24) Mauritius, (25) Malawi, (26) 
Namibia, (27) Niger, (28) Nigeria, (29) Sudan, (30) Senegal, (31) Seychelles, (32) South Africa, 
(33) Tunisia, (34) Zambia.” 
5.       Official Development Assistance-Disbursement: Net total  
“Aid for development and welfare purposes. It may be provided bilaterally, from donor to recipient, 
or channeled through a multilateral development agency such as the United Nations or the World 
Bank. The aid includes grants, "soft" loans (where the grant element is at least 25% of the total), 
and the provision of technical assistance. It does not include credit for military purposes. For this 
study, we considered only bilateral aid (OECD, 2019).” 
6. Official Development Assistance-Total Commitments 
“Total commitments under ODA, which are expected to be disbursed on a pre-defined date as per 
the contract (OECD, 2019).” 
7. Total Official Flows-Disbursement: Net total 
“The combination of official development assistance (ODA) and other official inflows (OOF) by 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the moderating role of bilateral foreign aid (as a formal institution) on the 
impact of trading partners’ corruption (as an informal institution) on OECD countries’ 
international trade flows. This study considers two main categories of bilateral foreign aid: 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Aid for Trade (AfT) as moderator. We investigate 
the proposed framework using the gravity model of bilateral trade flows between 29 OECD 
countries and their 150 trading partners from 1995 to 2018. We present three main findings. 
First, trading partner’s corruption hurts OECD country’s imports and exports. The results 
confirm that OECD countries follow the guidelines of the Anti-Bribery Convention 1997 and 
avoid business transactions with corrupt trading partners. Second, bilateral aid (ODA) has no 
moderating effect on corruption’s negative impact on imports of OECD countries. However, 
only AfT has a moderating effect on OECD imports.  The findings show that the OECD 
member avoids importing from corrupt trading partners, and even AfT boosts aid recipient 
countries’ trade. Finally, bilateral foreign aid (ODA and AfT) moderates the negative impact 
of trading partner’ corruption on OECD exports. The results confirm the role of foreign aid as 
formal institutions on OECD member exports.  Therefore, foreign aid (as a formal institution) 
deserve more attention from OCED policymakers and manager of MNEs to boost international 
trade flows.  
 
Keywords: Corruption; Foreign Aid; Official Development Assistance; Aid for Trade; 
International trade Flows: OECD  




1. INTRODUCTION  
International trade size is significantly less, which leads to the “mystery of missing trade” 
(Trefler, 1995). According to Eaton and Kortum (2002), it should be five times higher than the 
current recorded volume. International trade researchers have highlighted institutional quality, 
corruption, and weak governance as the key factors shaping trade and production patterns 
(Andersson & Marcouiller, 2002; Levchenko, 2007). Corruption interprets the international 
trade volumes in corrupt low-income countries where government and customs officials reduce 
trade and revenue by taking bribes against imports and export contracts (Jong & Bogmans, 
2011).  
Broadly, corruption is defined as an “illegal activity conducted through misuse of power by 
public or private officials or firms for personal benefits, financial or otherwise” (Bahoo, Alon, 
& Paltrinieri, 2019, p.2). Corruption impacts international trade through three main channels: 
transaction cost or high price, efficiency channel, and contract-awarding (Musila & Sigué, 
2010). An ongoing stream of research has explored the effect of corruption (as an informal 
institution) on the international business transaction (FDI and trade) (Badinger & Nindl, 2014; 
Karhunen & Ledyaeva, 2012; Narayan & Bui, 2019; Worku, Mendoza & Wielhouwer, 2016).  
In particular, corruption negatively impacts developing countries’ trade volume, and trade 
liberalization is insufficient to improve development and trade flows (Narayan, & Bui, 2019; 
United Nations, 2007). Thus, developing countries repeatedly called for help to improve their 
ability and capacity to contribute to Multilateral Trading Systems (MTS) (Gnangnon, 2018). 
Consequently, in the wake of the “anti-corruption movement” in mid-1990, the official aid 
assistance initiative called Official Development Assistance (ODA) was started to support 
economic development, increase in trade flows, and reduction in the level of corruption through 
conditions attached with aid contracts (Charron, 2011). Thus, researchers are exploring this 
stream of research that how foreign aid affects the level of corruption in a recipient country 
(Okada & Samreth, 2012; Charron, 2011; Mohamed et al., 2015; Isaksson & Kotsadam, 2018; 
Dalgaard &  Olsson, 2008; Tavares, 2003; Kangoye, 2013).   
Furthermore, the low-income aid recipient countries also need a specific type of aid to reduce 
transaction costs associated with trade activity, other than technical assistance (Suwa-
Eisenmann and Verdier, 2007). Against this backdrop, the Ministerial Conference of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) launched another type of aid called; Aid for Trade (AfT) in 2005 
to support international trade (Hühne, Meyer, & Nunnenkamp, 2014a). The OECD issued 
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guidelines for member countries to reduce corruption in the development sector to boost 
economic development and trade (OECD, 2016). OECD policymakers also investigating that 
is AfT fulfills its objective of increasing the trade volume of the recipient. Therefore, academic 
researchers are also exploring the association between foreign aid (ODA and AfT) and trade 
(imports and exports) (Hoekman, & Shingal, 2020; Hühne, Meyer & Nunnenkamp, 2014b; 
Martínez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, & Rehwald, 2017).    
The literature on corruption, foreign aid, and international trade is divided into three strands: 
the association between corruption and trade (corruption and trade nexus), the impact of foreign 
aid on corruption (foreign aid and corruption), and the role of foreign aid on trade (foreign aid 
and trade nexus). Taken together, we propose a joint nexus among corruption, foreign aid, and 
international trade flows. By utilities the concepts of neo institutional economics and 
transaction costs theory, we theoretically propose that foreign aid (as a formal institution) 
moderates the negative impact of corruption (as an informal institution) on international trade 
flows (imports and exports) (See Figure 1). 
We investigate our framework empirically using the gravity model of bilateral trade from 29 
OECD countries with their 150 trading partners from 1995-2018. We create a pairwise between 
the OECD member and trading partner and a cross-time panel data set to investigate Model-A 
& B. The selection of OECD countries as a sample to evaluate our framework depends on the 
following factors. First, OECD member countries have a low level of corruption on average. 
Second, OECD members avoid business transactions with corrupt trading partners as a 
signatory of the Anti-Bribery Convention 1997 to combat corruption in international business 
transactions (FDI and trade). Third, OECD members a key donor of bilateral foreign aid (ODA 
and AfT). Thus, it is valuable to explore the moderating role of bilateral foreign aid on the 
negative impact of trading partners’ corruption on ODEC members’ imports and exports.  
This study has three main and unique findings. First, trading partner’s corruption hurts OECD 
country’s imports and exports. The results confirm the OECD member follow the guidelines 
of the Anti-Bribery Convention 1997 to combat corruption in international business 
transactions. Second, bilateral aid (ODA) has no moderating effect on corruption’s negative 
impact on imports of OECD countries. However, only AfT having a moderating impact on 
OECD imports.  The findings show that the OECD member avoids importing from corrupt 
trading partners and AfT boost trade of aid recipient country. Finally, bilateral foreign aid 
(ODA and AfT) moderates the negative impact of trading partners’ corruption on OECD 
exports. The results confirm the role of foreign aid as formal institutions on OECD member 
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exports.  Further, we explain contributions in literature and policy and managerial implications 
in the discussion and conclusion section.  
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS 
According to neo-institutional economics, institutions are the game rules in a society that 
incentivizes or constrain business and economic activities (Coase, 1937; Davis & North, 1971; 
North, 1990). Institutions have a significant role in neo-institutional economics as they avoid 
uncertainty and provide to any business and economic exchange by reducing transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985; North, 1990). The economic players, such as firms and countries, 
consider transaction costs and institutions while conducting any business and economic activity 
(Noth, 1990; Peng et al., 2009). According to North (1991), institutions are designed by 
humans, which provide a mechanism for economic interaction. The institutions have formal 
and informal rules that are created to reduce uncertainty in exchange (North, 1991). Formally, 
Peng, Want, and Jiang (2008) classified institutions as formal (e.g., the rule of law, government, 
bureaucracy, competition, legal, and information institutions) and informal institutions (e.g., 
norms, corruption, religion, media, culture). Formal and informal institutions play a crucial role 
in supporting or distorting transactions in international business activities (FDI and trade) 
(Peng et al., 2009; North, 1990; Bevan, Estrin, & Meyer, 2004). An ongoing stream of research 
has sought to explore the impact of corruption as an informal institution on the international 
business transaction (FDI and trade) (Badinger & Nindl, 2014; Karhunen & Ledyaeva, 2012; 
Narayan & Bui, 2019; Worku, Mendoza, & Wielhouwer, 2016).  
Hence, recognizing both formal and informal institutions is an essential breakthrough in neo-
institutional economics. Accordingly, foreign aid’s formal and centralized nature makes it a 
formal institution, which impacts economic exchange and transaction costs of economic 
activity. Foreign aid as a formal institution has specific standard norms, rules & regulations 
defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization of Economic 
Development (OECD) in 1969 (OECD, 1972). Foreign aid as formal institutions has different 
types and structures to influence the overall economic activities (official development 
assistance) (OECD, 1972) and international business transactions such as trade through Aid for 
Trade (OECD, 2005b). An ongoing stream of research has explored the association between 
foreign aid on international business transactions (trade) (Hühne, Meyer & Nunnenkamp, 
2014b; Hoekman, & Shingal, 2020).  
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Therefore, we combine neo-institutional economics and transaction costs theory to explore how 
corruption and foreign aid impact international trade flows (imports and exports)? We argue 
that corruption and foreign aid as informal and formal institutions impact global trade flows 
(import and exports) by increasing or decreasing the transaction costs if other things remain 
constant. Prior literature explores the following three strands related to corruption, foreign aid, 
and international trade flows.  
The first strand, the effect of corruption on international trade (imports and exports) (corruption 
and trade nexus), is controversial. The high level of corruption in a country reduces economic 
development and discourages international trade (Kaufmann & Wei 1999; D’agostina, Dunne, 
& Pieroni 2016; De Groot et al., 2004).  
On the other hand, corruption could be socially beneficial (Leff, 1964). Some studies found a 
positive effect of corruption on efficiency and growth of the economic system, capital 
formation, foreign direct investment, and trade (Méon & Weill, 2008; Mironov, 2005; Egger 
& Winner, 2005). Specifically, corruption is a limitation for international trade (imports and 
exports) (De Groot et al., 2004). The high level of corruption in institutions and customs 
discourse international trade as results deprive government revenues (Jong & Bogmans, 2011).  
Corruption has a reduction effect on trade through three main channels: transaction cost or high 
price mark-up, low efficiency, and contract-awarding (Musila & Sigué, 2010). First, it may 
reduce economic activity efficiency, such as trade, because of corrupt bureaucratic systems and 
cumbersome rules & regulations in a country (Musila & Sigué, 2010). However, Leff (1964) 
argues that corruption could positively affect the efficiency of economic activity by paying 
bribes to government officials (customs) to conduct a transaction. Second, corruption may 
increase (decrease) transaction cost or price mark-up depends on the type of corruption with 
theft (pay bribe to government officials and less tax payment) and without theft (pay bribe plus 
full tax payments) (Sheliefer & Vishny, 1993). The corruption with theft (without theft) results 
in low (high) cost or price mark-up for a firm that was importing or exporting from corrupt 
locations (Anderson & Marcouiller, 1999). Finally, in the contract-awarding channel, the bribe 
and corruption in a country negatively impact the trade (import or exports) if the firm that will 
provide the particular commodity or service is unwilling to pay bribes to government officials 
(Lambsdorff, 1998). Hence, as a theoretical argument, the effect of corruption on trade (imports 
and export) is diverse.  
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Prior empirical research has dominantly founded that corruption hampers the trade (imports 
and exports) (see Table 1). Jong and Bogmans (2011) explored the effect of corruption on 
export on a sample of 100 business firms from 1999-2002 and found that corruption hurts 
exports. Similarly, Thede and Gustafson (2012) confirm that corruption impacts imports 
negatively. Further, Narayan and Bui (2019) analyzed the effect of Vietnam corruption on their 
bilateral imports. They found that, in general, corruption hampers the trade. But Vietnam’s 
corruption impacts bilateral imports more than exports, and its effect is high when trading with 
developing countries.  
In a new direction, Lambsdorff (1998) explored the impact of corruption on import and export. 
He studied the effect of importing the country’s corruption on the exporting trading partner’s 
trade structure. He found that Sweden and Malaysian exports have a negative impact due to 
trading with corrupt counterparts. But some countries like Luxembourg, Italy, France, 
Belgium, and South Korea exports are positively related to trade partner’s corruption. 
Similarly, Musila and Sigue (2010) found that high corruption in Africa adversely affects their 
exports. They studied the bilateral trade of 47 African countries with 180 trading partners and 
found that corruption in African countries adversely affects their exports. Worku, Mendoza, 
and Wielhouwer (2016) also explored the impact of corruption on Sub-Saharan Africa's 
bilateral trade. They found the corruption of African countries negatively affects their trade 
with trading partners. Hence, the association between corruption and trade also depends on 
importing and exporting countries’ characteristics and institutional quality.  
Thus, in this study, we investigate a new research line related to corruption and international 
trade. This study explores the impact of trading partners’ corruption on the imports and exports 
of OECD countries. The trade structure of OECD countries is the key element of analysis as 
they are a signatory of the Anti-Bribery Convention, 1997, and provider of bilateral foreign aid 
(ODA and AfT). Hence, we posit that.  
H1a: Trading partner’s corruption has a negative impact on OECD countries’ bilateral trade 
flows (imports).  
H1b: Trading partner’s corruption has a negative impact on OECD countries’ bilateral trade 
flows (exports).  
The second strand of literature investigates foreign aid’s impact on corruption (foreign aid and 
corruption nexus). Researchers dominantly confirm that foreign aid reduces corruption 
(Schudel, 2008; Menard & Weill, 2016; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Charron, 2011; Mohamed et 
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al., 2015; Isaksson & Kotsadam, 2018; Dalgaard &  Olsson, 2008; Tavares, 2003; Kangoye, 
2013). Okada and Samreth (2012), on data of 1995-2009 by applying OLS and quantile 
regression, confirmed that foreign aid reduces corruption. They also found that partially, aid 
reduces corruption when provided by multilateral agencies. Charron (2011) also explored the 
association between aid and corruption in a sample of 140 countries on data from 1984-2006. 
He concluded that aid reduces corruption, and ODA also has an anti-corruption movement 
effect. Similarly, Mohamed et al. (2015) studied the impact of aid on corruption for 42 African 
countries on data of 2000-2010 by applying the gravity model. They found that aid has a 
reduction effect on corruption, and the effect of multilateral and bilateral aid is different and 
unique.  
Further, Kangoye (2013) examined the effect of aid on governance (including corruption) for 
80 developing countries from 1984 to 2004. He confirms that conditions attached to the aid 
help to reduce corruption and increase governance. Dalgaard and Olsson (2008) also explored 
the relationship between foreign aid and corruption on data of 2002. They found that the impact 
of aid is nonlinear that low levels of aid may reduce corruption, but this not valid for a high 
level of aid and corruption. Contrarly, Isaksson, and Kotsadam (2018) also found no effect of 
foreign aid on corruption. Overall, the view that aid has a reduction effect on corruption is 
dominant empirically and theoretical in literature. The empirical research also confirms the 
policy objective of the Development Assistance Committee (DA) of OECD. The Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD implements several conditions on the recipient of 
bilateral aid to increase their governance, institutions, and economic development (OECD, 
1972). In 2016, the OECD also issued recommendations adopted by all member countries to 
reduce corruption in development sectors to increase the positive effect of aid on recipient 
countries’ governance and economic development (OECD, 2016).  
The final strand in the literature investigates the impact of foreign aid on international trade 
flows (imports and exports) (foreign aid and trade nexus) (Pettersson & Johansson, 2013; 
Martinez-Zarzoso, 2019; Hoekman & Shingal, 2020; Calì & Velde, 2011). Pettersson and 
Johansson (2013) examined bilateral trade aid's effect by applying the gravity model on 184 
countries on data from 1990-2005. They confirmed the Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) positive impact and the Aid for Trade (AfT) on the donor’s trade structure and volume 
as well recipient. Martinez-Zarzoso (2019) also confirms the direct and indirect effect of ODA 
on international trade and income. He applied the gravity model on 33 donors and 125 recipient 
countries and found that ODA positively impacts donor and recipient’s exports.  
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Similiary, Calì, and Velde (2011) also examined the association between AfT and trade 
performance for 124 countries from 1995 to 2001. He concluded that AfT reduces the cost of 
trade and increase exports. Recently, Hoekman and Shingal (2020) explored the impact of aid 
(AfT) on trade and the trade of goods and services for 28 donors and 162 recipient countries 
by applying the gravity model. They found that AfT has a weak effect on aggregate trade but 
a substantial effect on the bilateral trade of services. Thus, theoretically and empirically, the 
ODA and AfT positively impact exporter and importer’s trade and income (Gnangnon,2018; 
Martínez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, & Rehwald, 2017; Hühne, Meyer & Nunnenkamp, 
2014a; Hühne, Meyer & Nunnenkamp, 2014b). From the point of policy, the empirical 
literature also supports the OECD recommendations and objectives that the purpose of ODA 
and AfT is to support and help recipient countries to achieve economic development and 
increase trade volume (OECD, 2005).  
Take together; we propose a joint nexus among corruption (an informal institution), foreign aid 
(as a formal institution), and international trade flows (import and export). We argue that 
foreign aid as a formal institution plays a moderating role between corruption and international 
trade. Therefore, our objective is to explore the moderating role of bilateral foreign aid on the 
impact of trading partners’ corruption on OECD countries’ international trade flows (imports 
and exports). Thus, we posit that; 
H2a: Bilateral foreign aid negatively moderates the impact of trading partners’ corruption on 
OECD countries’ bilateral trade flows (imports). 
H2b: Bilateral foreign aid negatively moderates the impact of trading partners’ corruption on 
OECD countries’ bilateral trade flows (exports). 
We present two separate models to understand the impact of corruption and foreign aid on 
OECD countries’ imports and exports, individually. The Model-A consists of H1a, and H2a 
presents a framework that explores OECD countries’ imports.  And Model-B, based on H1b 
and H2b, represents a framework to examine OECD countries’ exports. Figure 1 summarizes 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3. METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources   
We test our model related to corruption, foreign aid, and international trade flows on a sample 
of 29 OECD countries and their 150 trading partners. These OECD countries are also donors 
of bilateral foreign aid to these 150 trading partners (recipient). We selected OECD countries’ 
international trade flows to examine our framework due to the following reasons. First, they 
signify the Anti-Bribery Convention, 1997, to combat corruption in international business 
transactions (FDI and trade) (OECD, 1997). As a result, they avoid business transactions with 
corrupt trading partners. Second, OECD countries are the prominent donors of ODA and AfT 
to boost economic development and trade of low-income aid recipient countries (OECD, 1972, 
2005. Third, together, OECD and WTO established a monitoring framework to monitor that 
ODA and AfT fulfill the required policy objectives (OECD, 1972). In 2016, OECD also issued 
recommendations for member countries to reduce corruption in the development sector in aid 
recipient low-income countries (OECD, 2016). Finally, the level of corruption in OECD 
member countries is low on average compared to their trading partners, making them a perfect 
sample to examine the framework.  
The bilateral trade flows (imports and exports) data of 29 OECD countries are collected from 
IMF Directions of Trade Statistics (IMF, 2020) (Musila & Sigué, 2010). The bilateral foreign 
aid (ODA and AfT) data of OECD countries is collected from the OECD database on 
development aid (Okada & Samreth, 2012; Schudel, 2008). Further, country-level corruption 
data for 150 trading partners came from two sources; (i) World Governance Indicator (Okada, 
& Samreth, 2012) and (ii) International Country Risk Guide (Charron, 2011). We also 
controlled for multiple factors, and data came from several sources, such as World 
Development Indicators, Heritage Foundation, and CePII (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Pettersson 
& Johansson, 2013). We investigate this framework by applying the gravity model that bilateral 
trade flows between 29 OECD countries and their 150 trading partners (excluding OECD 
members) from 1995 to 2018. The list of 29 OECD and their 150 trading partners is given in 






3.2 Variables and Measurements  
 3.2.1 Dependent Variable  
In this study, two dependent variables are used to examine the association between corruption, 
aid, and international trade. First, Bilateral Imports1, which is the total volume of imports in 
US dollars to the importing country (OECD country (i)) from the exporting country (trading 
partner, (j)) (Narayan, & Bui, 2019). The second dependent variable is Bilateral Exports2 that 
represents the total volume of exports in US dollars from the exporting country (OECD country 
(i)) to the importing country (trading partner (j)) (Jong & Bogmans, 2011). We present two 
separate models to understand the impact of corruption and foreign aid on OECD countries’ 
imports and exports individually (See Figure 1).  
 3.2.2 Independent Variable 
The independent variable is trading partner corruption at the country level. We used two 
proxies for corruption at the country level: (i) corruption index by the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG), and (ii) corruption index by World Governance Indicators (WGI) 
(Hayakawa, Kimura, & Lee, 2013; Osabutey, Okoro, 2015; Hakimi & Hamdi, 2017; Habib & 
Zurawicki, 2002; Schudel, 2008; Okada, & Samreth, 2012). We rescaled both indicators to 
simplify the interpretation of coefficients (See Table 2 for details). 
 3.2.3 Moderating Variables 
Foreign aid is a moderating variable in our framework (Figure 1). We used two main categories 
of aid: (i) Official Development Assistance (ODA) and (ii) Aid for Trade (AfT). Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) is a government aid for promoting overall economic welfare 
and development in developing countries. We used two types of ODA. First, Official 
Development Assistance-Disbursement: net total3 represents bilateral aid disbursement from 
OECD country (i) (donor) to trading partner (j) (recipient) in US million dollars. And Official 
Development Assistance-Commitment: net total4 is the bilateral aid commitment from OECD 
member country (i) (donor) to trading partner (j) (recipient) in US million dollars. Further, Aid-
for-Trade (AfT)5 is defined as an aid for the specific development of trade in developing 
countries. And Aid for Trade-Disbursement: net total represents bilateral aid disbursement for 
promoting trade from OECD country (i) (donor) to trading partner (j) (recipient) in US million 
dollars (see Table 2 for details).  
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3.2.4 Controlling Variables  
We use the gravity model of trade and control for two sets of variables; (i) trading partner 
factors and (ii) bilateral border factors (Hühne, Meyer & Nunnenkamp, 2014a; Calì & Velde, 
2011; Schudel, 2008; Hoekman & Shingal, 2020; Jong & Bogmans, 2011; Tinbergen, 1962; 
Anderson & Van Wincoop, 2003). We controlled the following trading partner factors; First, 
GDP and Population, to control the economic conditions and consumer market size (Cali & 
Velde, 2011). Second, Openness to Trade as a proxy for a country’s trade policy (Gnangnon, 
2018). Finally, we controlled for the investment policy through two proxies; Net FDI Inflows 
and Openness to FDI (Cali & Velde, 2011; Chenery & Strout, 1966).  
Further, we controlled for the following bilateral border factors (Anderson & Van Wincoop, 
2003; Jong & Bogmans, 2011): (i) Distance between OECD country and trading partner; (ii) 
Common Language between OECD country and trading partner; (iii) Colonial Link between 
OECD country and trading partner; and (iv) Common Border between OECD country and 
trading partner (see Table 2 for details).  
Table 2. Variables, Measurements, and Data Sources 






Bilateral Exports1 The natural log of export is the total volume of 
exports in US dollars by exporting country 
(ODCD) (i) to importing country (trading partners) 
(j) 
(IMF, 2020) 
Bilateral Imports2 The natural log of import represents the total 
volume of imports in US dollars to the importing 
country (OECD) (i) from the exporting country 





Corruption   
Trading partner’s 
corruption (WGI*) 
Corruption index of a trading partner from 0 (low) 





Corruption index of trading partners from 0 (low) 











The aid, ODA disbursement-net total represents 
bilateral aid from OECD country (i) to trading 





The aid, ODA commitments-net total represents 
bilateral aid from OECD country (i) to trading 












Aid for Trade ODA disbursement-net total 
represents bilateral AfT from OECD country (i) to 
trading partners (j) in US million dollars. 





The natural log of gross domestic product in US 
dollars represents the OECD’s trading partner’s 
national income.  
WDI (2020) 
Trading partner 
Population   
The natural log of the total population of OECD’s 
trading partner.  
WDI (2020) 
Trading partner 
Openness to FDI 
The indicator of the level of investment freedom in 
the OECD country’s trading partner, from 1 (high 





NET FDI Inflow  
The FDI net inflows (BoP, current US$) are 
investment inflows in the OECD’s trading partner.  
WDI (2020) 
Trading partner  
Openness to Trade 
The indicator of the level of trade freedom in 
the OECD country’s trading partner, from 1 (high 




Distance It is the natural log of the greater circle distance 
between the OECD country and trading partner 
centers. 






It is the common language between OECD country 
and their trading partners. Dummy indicator, 1 
(common language), or 0 (not common language).  




Colonel link  Dummy indicator that OECD country and trading 
partner ever had a colonial relationship, 1 (colonial 
relationship) or 0 (not colonial relationship). 




Common Border Dummy indicator that OECD member country and 
trading partner share a common border, 1 (sharing) 
OR 0 (not sharing) 




Note: This table shows the details of variables, measurements, and data sources. *WGI=World Governance 






3.3 Estimation Strategy 
Researcher widely used the gravity model in the literature to investigate the association 
between corruption, foreign aid, and international trade (Gnangnon,2018; Calì & Velde, 2011; 
Thede & Gustafson, 2012; Musila & Sigué, 2010; Jong  & Bogmans, 2011; Schudel, 2008; 
Isaksson, & Kotsadam, 2018). Thus, we use the gravity model of a trade by aggregating 
bilateral components (See Figure 1) (Anderson & Van Wincoop, 2003; Tinbergen, 1962). We 
employ a fixed-effect model for our panel data.  The first model specification that explores the 
impact of corruption and foreign aid on the OECD country’s imports is the following.  
Model-A:  
Ln Importsijt= β0ijt +β1Trading partner’s corruption ij, t-1 + β2Foreign aidij,t +β3Trading 
partner’s corruptionij, t-1 X  Foreign aidij,t + γ Xij, t-1 + εij,t ………………Equation 1.  
Where Ln Importsijt is a bilateral import of OECD country (i) from a trading partner (j) in the 
year (t). β0ijt is the mean of unobserved heterogeneity. β1Trading partner’s corruptionij, t-1 is the 
level of corruption in a trading partner. β2 Foreign aidij,t represents two categories of foreign 
aid (ODA & AfT) from OECD countries (i) (donor) to the trading partner. β3Trading partner’s 
corruptionij, t-1 X Foreign aidij,t is an interaction term (moderator) that is generated by 
multiplying the independent variable (corruption) with the moderator (foreign aid) (Akien, 
West, & Reno, 2018). Thus, the impact of the independent variable (corruption) on the 
dependent (trade) is contingent on the moderator (foreign aid) (Jaccard, Wan, & Turrisi, 1990). 
γ Xij, t-1 is the Xij, t-1 is the vector of the control variables, and εij,t is the error term. We 
lagged all independent variables to avoid the problem of reverse causality (Qian & Sandoval-
Hernandez, 2016) and consider that foreign aid and institutions (corruption) may take time to 
affect the trade decision.  
Model-B:  
In the second model, we analyzed the impact of corruption and foreign aid on OECD countries’ 
exports to trading partners. The international trade flows are the bilateral exports of OECD 
countries (i) to trading partner (j) in the year (t). The other specification is the same as explained 
above in Model-A. The specification of Model-B is given below.   
Ln Exportsijt= β0ijt +β1Trading partner’s corruption ij, t-1 + β2Foreign aidij,t +β3Trading 




We applied Breusch-Pagan test6 to check that our panel technique’s application is appropriate 
for this data compared to ordinary least squares (OLS) by following past literature (Greene, 
2003). Tables 4 and 5 show the test results for Models A and B that panel analysis is appropriate 
for this data. Furthermore, we also applied Hausman’s (1978)7 test to decide which random-
effect or fixed-effect model is suitable for this data. The results confirm that the fixed-model 
is suitable for the framework (See Tables 4 & 5). Figure 1 presents both Models A and B.    
 
4. RESULTS  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics, variance inflationary factors (VIF), and pairwise 
correlations. The correlation matrix shows no multicollinearity problem as the correlations 
among variables are less than defined thresholds of 0.7 (Kennedy, 2008). However, the 
correlation coefficients between imports and exports and ODE-Disbursement: net total and 
ODE- Commitment are 0.769 and 0.723. They are positively correlated because they represent 
the same elements, trade, and foreign aid, respectively. Thus, we do not include these variables 
together in the same model. Further, the results show our VIF values are less than 5, a suggested 
rule of thumb (Studenmund, 2011). Therefore, we confirm that there is no problem with 
multicollinearity among variables. 
The high correlation among variables is expected because of prior literature due to several 
country-level indicators in the model (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Hoekman & Shingal, 2020). 
The correlation matrix presents a statistically negative relationship between trading partner’s 
corruption (ICRG & WGI) and the OECD countries’ trade, bilateral imports, and exports at p 
< 0.01. Thus, it confirms the direction and formation of our hypotheses H1a and H1b that 
corruption negatively and significantly impacts the OECD countries’ imports and exports. 
Further, all three indicators of bilateral foreign aid, ODA-Disbursements, ODA-Commitment, 
and Aid for Trade, have a positive and significant impact on OECD countries’ trade and trading 
partners’ corruption p < 0.01. The findings confirm our theoretical argument that bilateral 
foreign aid from OECD countries to their trading partner has a reduction effect on trading 
partner’s corruption and promotes bilateral trade with OECD countries. Thus, it confirms the 
directions of our hypothesis H2a and H2b in Model A and B.  
Table 4 shows the results of fixed-effect panel regression analysis related to Model-A (See 
Figure 1). In the Model-A, we analyzed the moderating role of bilateral foreign aid on the 
negative impact of trading partners' corruption on OECD countries’ bilateral imports. We used 
the corruption index of ICRG for the primary analysis. Table 4, Model 1 is the baseline model, 
163 
 
which includes dependent (imports), independents (corruption), and control variables. It 
confirms hypothesis H1a that trading partner’s corruption has a negative and significant impact 
on OECD countries’ trade at p <0.01. Models 2 to 4 investigate the hypothesis H2a (Model-A) 
that bilateral foreign aid has a moderating role in the impact of trading partner’s corruption on 
OECD countries’ bilateral imports. The empirical results show that in Model 2 and 3, ODA-
Disbursement and ODA-Commitment have no moderating effect on the relationship between 
corruption and imports. However, in Model 4, the AfT negatively moderates the negative 
impact of corruption on imports, and as a result, the original relationship becomes positive and 
significant at p <0.01. The results confirm that only AfT has a moderating effect on the 
relationship between trading partners’ corruption and OECD countries’ imports. Still, overall, 
we conclude that bilateral foreign aid plays no moderating role. Thus, we reject H2a, and 
overall, the Model-A is not confirmed.   
Table 5 shows the fixed-effect panel regression analysis related to Model-B (See Figure 1). In 
Model-B, we examined the moderating role of bilateral foreign aid on the negative impact of 
trading partners' corruption on the OECD country’s bilateral exports. In Table 5, Model 5 is 
the baseline model representing our hypothesis H1b that trading partner’s corruption hurts 
OECD countries’ exports. The results show that corruption has a negative and significant effect 
on OECD countries’ bilateral exports at p <0.01. Thus, we accept our hypothesis H1b in Model-
B. 
Further, Models 6 to 8 examine bilateral foreign aid’s moderating role between corruption and 
OECD countries’ bilateral exports. The empirical results show that bilateral foreign aid (ODA-
Disbursement, ODA-Commitment, and AfT) negatively moderate the negative impact of 
trading partner’s corruption on OECD countries’ bilateral exports. As a result, the original 
negative impact of corruption on exports becomes positive. Therefore, we accept hypothesis 
H2b in Model-B. And we conclude that bilateral foreign aid moderates the negative impact of 
corruption on OECD countries’ bilateral exports.  
Summing up, based on the results presented in Tables 4 and 5, we rejected the framework in 
Model-A, but we accept Model-B. We conclude that bilateral foreign aid plays a moderating 
role in the negative impact of corruption and OECD countries’ exports, but not on imports. 





4.1 Robustness Test 
We confirm our framework in the Model-A and B and empirical results by using another 
measure of the level of corruption of trading partners. We used the corruption index provided 
by WGI for the robustness test (Okada, & Samreth, 2012; Musila & Sigué, 2010). In Appendix 
A, Table A1, and A2, we present the fixed-effect panel regression analysis results for Model A 
and B by using the corruption index of WGI. In the Tabla A1, the Models i to iv show that 
corruption has a negative impact on imports, but foreign aid has no moderating effect between 
corruption and OECD countries’ imports. As a result, we accept H1a and rejects H2a. Overall, 
the Model-A is not confirmed. Further, in Table A2, the Models v to viii show that corruption 
negatively impacts OECD countries’ exports, and foreign aid has a moderating effect between 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table. 4. Moderating role of foreign aid on the relationship between corruption and OECD Imports 
Dependent Variable:  International Trade Flows (Imports) 
Independent Variable: Trading partner’s corruption (ICRG) 

















Trading partner’s corruption (ICRG) -0.0292*** -0.0180* -0.0016 0.0314*** 
   (0.0095) (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0098) 
Trading partner GDP 0.0182*** 0.0160*** 0.0153*** 0.0196*** 
   (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0032) 
Trading partner Population -0.0095 -0.0098 -0.0047 -0.0084 
   (0.0060) (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0061) 
Trading partner Trade Freedom 0.0074*** 0.0071*** 0.0068*** 0.0075*** 
   (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Trading partner FDI Freedom  -0.0003 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 
   (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Trading partner Net FDI Inflow 0.0079*** 0.0086*** 0.0086*** 0.0080*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012) 
Common Boarder  0.7058*** 0.4005 0.4245* 0.7046*** 
   (0.2674) (0.2567) (0.2499) (0.2676) 
Common Language  0.1708*** 0.2264*** 0.2083*** 0.1749*** 
   (0.0578) (0.0601) (0.0653) (0.0582) 
Colonial Link  -0.0295 -0.2522** -0.0866 -0.0306 
   (0.0950) (0.1028) (0.1115) (0.0952) 
Distance  -0.0182 0.0177 0.0100 -0.0181 
   (0.0273) (0.0288) (0.0307) (0.0276) 
Aid-ODA- disbursement: net total  0.0022***   
    (0.0007)   
Aid-ODA- disbursement: net total x 




Aid-ODA- total commitments   0.0006  
     (0.0005)  
Aid-ODA- total commitments X 
Trading partner’ corruption (ICRG) 
  -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
 
Aid for Trade-disbursement: net total    0.0002 
      (0.0002) 
 Aid for Trade-disbursement: net 
total x Trading partner’s corruption 
(ICRG) 
   -0.0050* 
(0.0300) 
Constant  5.8594*** 5.7821*** 5.8776*** 5.8165*** 
   (0.2568) (0.2720) (0.2913) (0.2597) 
 Observation  46860 39803 35713 45923 
 R-squared  0.0080 0.0085 0.0081 0.0425 
Breusch test: p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0200 0.0001 
Hausman test: p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0010 





Table 5. Moderating Role of Foreign Aid on the relationship between Corruption and OECD 
Export 
Dependent Variable:  International Trade Flows (Export) 
Independent Variable: Trading partner’s corruption (ICRG) 

















Trading partner’s corruption 
(ICRG) 
-0.0369*** 0.0275*** 0.0217** 0.0397*** 
   (0.0085) (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0087) 
Trading partner GDP 0.0300*** 0.0254*** 0.0240*** 0.0299*** 
   (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0028) 
Trading partner Population -0.0178*** -0.0129** -0.0105* -0.0162*** 
   (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0054) 
Trading partner Trade 
Freedom 
0.0102*** 0.0086*** 0.0088*** 0.0102*** 
   (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Trading partner FDI Freedom  -0.0006 -0.0007* -0.0006 -0.0004 
   (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Trading partner Net FDI 
Inflow 
0.0079*** 0.0071*** 0.0070*** 0.0080*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Common Boarder  -0.3481 -0.3366 -0.3163 -0.3429 
   (0.2376) (0.2213) (0.2134) (0.2376) 
Common Language  0.1019** 0.0346 0.0521 0.1068** 
   (0.0514) (0.0519) (0.0558) (0.0517) 
Colonial Link  -0.1114 -0.1106 -0.0351 -0.1130 
   (0.0845) (0.0886) (0.0951) (0.0846) 
Distance  0.0054 0.0194 0.0475* -0.0000 
   (0.0243) (0.0248) (0.0262) (0.0245) 
Aid-ODA- disbursement: net 
total 
 0.0029***   
    (0.0006)   
Aid-ODA- disbursement: net 






Aid-ODA- total commitments   0.0009**  
     (0.0004)  
Aid-ODA- total commitments 
X Trading partner’s corruption 
(ICRG) 




Aid for Trade-disbursement: 
net total 
   0.0005*** 
      (0.0002) 
 Aid for Trade-disbursement: 
net total x Trading partner’s 
corruption (ICRG) 
   -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
 
Constant  5.6205*** 5.9255*** 5.7728*** 5.6316*** 
   (0.2283) (0.2345) (0.2487) (0.2305) 
 Observation  46860 39803 35713 45923 
 R-squared  0.0192 0.0167 0.0176 0.0196 
Breusch test: p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman test: p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: This table lists the fixed effect of regression on international trade flows (exports). *** p<0.01, ** 




5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Contributions 
In this study, we proposed and investigated a framework that bilateral foreign aid (as a formal 
institution) has a moderating role on the negative impact of trading partners’ corruption (as an 
informal institution) on OECD countries’ international trade flows (see Figure 1). We proposed 
the moderating role of foreign aid as a formal institution through the lens of neo institutional 
economics and transaction cost theory. Model-A and B show a combined nexus among 
corruption, foreign aid, and international trade flows (imports and exports).  We considered 
two main categories of bilateral foreign aid: Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Aid 
for Trade (AfT) as a moderator. We investigate the proposed framework using the gravity 
model of bilateral trade flows between 29 OECD countries and their 150 trading partners from 
1995 to 2018.  
Our theoretical framework and empirical analysis contribute to the literature in the following 
ways. First, we confirm that the trading partner’s corruption hurts OECD country’s imports 
and exports. These findings also confirm the OECD member follow the guidelines of the Anti-
Bribery Convention 1997 to combat corruption in international business transactions (FID and 
trade) (OECD, 1997). Second, we show that bilateral aid (ODA) has no moderating effect on 
corruption’s negative impact on imports of OECD countries. However, only AfT has a 
moderating effect on OECD imports. These findings show that the OECD member avoids 
importing from corrupt trading partners and AfT boost trade of aid recipient country (OECD, 
2005). Third, our results confirm that bilateral foreign aid (ODA and AfT) moderates the 
negative impact of trading partners’ corruption on OECD exports. These findings also confirm 
the role of foreign aid as formal institutions on OECD member exports.  Fourth, this study used 
a unique sample of OECD countries’ international trade because of their extensive trade 
volume. They are also the largest donors of bilateral aid to low-income countries. Thus, this 
study’s findings are useful for firms’ managers, OECD policymakers, and governments of 
OECD and low-income countries to understand foreign aid (ODA and AfT) impact on 
institutions, economic development, and international trade flows. Finally, this study 
contributes to the literature by explaining corruption and foreign aid on international trade 
flows through neo institutional economics and transaction cost theory. We proposed and 
confirmed that foreign aid behaves as a formal institution due to its standards, norms, and rules 
& regulations as defined by OECD and other multilateral institutions.   
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5.2 Policy and Managerial Implications 
This paper’s findings also have vital managerial and policy implications for managers of firms, 
governments, and OECD policymakers.  
First, firms should consider foreign aid as a formal institution that reduces corruption's negative 
impact on international trade flows. The foreign aid grants (ODA and AfT) help low-income 
countries boost economic development and trade volume, which helps MNEs build trust in 
foreign trading partners to conduct a business transaction. Second, the findings are useful for 
trading partners; they should realize that OECD countries’ business people and firms avoid 
importing for them due to the high level of corruption. Thus, they need to reduce the corruption 
level to boost their exports to OECD countries.  
Third, our findings are useful for the OECD policymakers that OECD country's business people 
and firms avoid doing international business transactions (import and exports) with corrupt 
trading partners to confirm the implementation of the Anti-Bribery Convention 1997 (OECD, 
1997). Finally, the OECD policymakers should understand that foreign aid (ODA and AfT) 
plays a moderating role in reducing corruption and increasing trade flows. Thus, formulating a 
systematic framework of granting aid with strict conditions to improve governance and 
institutional quality will lower corruption. Further, the results confirm the OECD objective that 
foreign aid (ODA and AfT) should boost economic development and trade.  
5.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
This paper also has the following limitation, which could be future research directions. First, 
we analyzed the impact of corruption and foreign aid on international trade flows (imports and 
exports) of OECD countries. Therefore, we recommend that future studies examine the 
framework presented in this study for other developing and emerging countries. Second, we 
investigated the proposed Model A and B by considering bilateral foreign aid and trade 
relationships between 29 OECD and 150 trading partners. Future studies should investigate 
this framework by considering a differential regional effect, such as Asia, Africa, America, the 
Middle East, and Europe. Third, we do not include the individual country effect of OECD 
countries because we want to investigate the overall behavior of OECD members related to 
OECD policies about foreign aid (ODA and AfT) and trade. 
Further, the researcher can examine this framework for induvial OECD countries. Fourth, we 
test our framework for bilateral foreign aid and trade. Future researchers should investigate the 
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framework for multilateral foreign aid. Finally, we used country-level data to confirm our 
framework. Future researchers can investigate this model by using firm-level data.   
Footnotes:  
1Import: Imports are reported on a cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) basis (IMF, 2020).  
2Export: Exports are reported on a free on board (FB) basis (IMF, 2020). 
3Aid-Official Development Assistance-Disbursement: Net total:   
“Aid for development and welfare purposes. It may be provided bilaterally, from donor 
to recipient, or channeled through a multilateral development agency such as the United 
Nations or the World Bank. The aid includes grants, “soft” loans (where the grant 
element is at least 25% of the total), and the provision of technical assistance. It does 
not include credit for military purposes. For this study, we considered only bilateral aid 
(OECD, 2020).” 
4Aid-Official Development Assistance-Total Commitments:   
“Total commitments under ODA, which are expected to be disbursed on a pre-defined 
date as per the contract (OECD, 2019). The difference between the commitment and 
disbursement is happening of actual aid activity between two countries.” 
5Aid for Trade-Official Development Assistance-Disbursement: Net total:  
“Aid for the development of trade. It is provided bilaterally, from donor to recipient. It 
is the sum of aid provided for the development of trade in the following categories: 
technical assistance for trade policy and regulations, trade-related infrastructure, 
productive capacity building, trade-related adjustment, and other trade-related needs.”  
6Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test of Heteroskedasticity: OR Variance across 
entities is zero.  
(i) Ho: No significance difference across units (homoskedasticity) (i.e., no panel effect) 
(ii)  if p<0.05, reject ho and apply panel data analysis and vice versa. 
 
7Hausman test: To decide between a random effect’s regression or fixed effects 
regression.  
(i) H0: the random effect is appropriate.  
(ii) If P-value >0.05, we accept H0, the RE model is preferred. If P-value <0.05, we 
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Table A1. Moderating Role of Foreign Aid on the relationship between Corruption and 
OECD Imports 
Dependent Variable:  International Trade Flows (Imports) 
Independent Variable: Trading partner’s corruption (WGI) 

















Trading partner’s corruption 
(WGI) 
-0.0283* -0.0143* -0.0003* 0.0326* 
   (0.0186) (0.0207) (0.0217) (0.0189) 
Trading partner GDP 0.0238*** 0.0246*** 0.0270*** 0.0249*** 
   (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0029) 
Trading partner Population -0.0068 -0.0015 -0.0008 -0.0060 
   (0.0054) (0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0055) 
Trading partner Trade 
Freedom 
0.0073*** 0.0080*** 0.0078*** 0.0074*** 
   (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Trading partner FDI Freedom  -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004 
   (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Trading partner Net FDI 
Inflow 
0.0078*** 0.0080*** 0.0083*** 0.0081*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) 
Common Boarder  0.7616*** 0.4519** 0.4578** 0.7615*** 
   (0.2363) (0.2305) (0.2271) (0.2367) 
Common Language  -0.0626 0.0546 0.0662 -0.0571 
155 
 
   (0.0513) (0.0562) (0.0615) (0.0518) 
Colonial Link  0.1816** 0.0250 0.1077 0.1783** 
   (0.0819) (0.0921) (0.1017) (0.0822) 
Distance  -0.0255 -0.0230 -0.0245 -0.0306 
   (0.0241) (0.0266) (0.0287) (0.0244) 
Aid-ODA- disbursement: net 
total 
 0.0005   
    (0.0009)   
Aid-ODA- disbursement: net 
total x Trading partner’s 






  -0.0003  
     (0.0006)  
Aid-ODA- total 
commitments X Trading 
partner’s corruption (WGI) 
(WGI) 
  0.0002 
(0.0002) 
 
Aid for Trade-disbursement: 
net total 
   0.0004 
      (0.0002) 
 Aid for Trade-disbursement: 
net total x Trading partner’s 
corruption (WGI) (WGI) 
   -0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
Constant  4.8191*** 4.9634*** 5.0246*** 4.8227*** 
   (0.2318) (0.2578) (0.2789) (0.2350) 
 Observation  70339 57657 51606 68801 
 R-squared  0.0066 0.0084 0.0089 0.0071 
Note: This table lists the fixed effect of regression on international trade flows (imports) by using another 
measure of corruption for robustness checks. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A2. Moderating Role of Foreign Aid on the relationship between Corruption 
and OECD Exports 
Dependent Variable:  International Trade Flows (Export) 
Independent Variable: Trading partner’s corruption (WGI) 
















Trading partner’s corruption 
(WGI) 
-0.0024* 0.0110* 0.0163* 0.0121* 
   (0.0170) (0.0182) (0.0188) (0.0172) 
Trading partner GDP 0.0379*** 0.0333*** 0.0358*** 0.0380*** 
   (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0026) 
Trading partner Population -0.0187*** -0.0104** -0.0138** -0.0173*** 
   (0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0055) (0.0050) 
Trading partner Trade 
Freedom 
0.0108*** 0.0107*** 0.0109*** 0.0108*** 
   (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Trading partner FDI Freedom  -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0004 
   (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Trading partner Net FDI 
Inflow 
0.0085*** 0.0082*** 0.0084*** 0.0085*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) 
Common Boarder  -0.0454 -0.0664 -0.0664 -0.0437 
   (0.2155) (0.2027) (0.1973) (0.2158) 
Common Language  -0.0593 -0.0569 0.0114 -0.0583 
   (0.0468) (0.0494) (0.0535) (0.0472) 
Colonial Link  0.1028 0.0405 0.0245 0.0969 
156 
 
   (0.0747) (0.0810) (0.0884) (0.0750) 
Distance  -0.0352 -0.0382 -0.0370 -0.0394* 
   (0.0220) (0.0234) (0.0250) (0.0223) 
Aid-ODA- disbursement: net 
total 
 0.0001   
    (0.0008)   
Aid-ODA- disbursement: net 
total x Trading partner’s 






  -0.0008  
     (0.0005)  
Aid-ODA- total 
commitments X Trading 
partner’s corruption (WGI)  
  -0.0040** 
(0.0002) 
 
Aid for Trade-disbursement: 
net total 
   0.0003 
      (0.0002) 
 Aid for Trade-disbursement: 
net total x Trading partner’s 
corruption (WGI)  
   -0.0020* 
(0.0001) 
Constant  5.1277*** 5.5107*** 5.6006*** 5.1410*** 
   (0.2114) (0.2267) (0.2424) (0.2142) 
 Observation  70339 57657 51606 68801 
 R-squared  0.0159 0.0178 0.0199 0.0163 
Note: This table lists the fixed effect of regression on international trade flows (exports) by using another 
measure of corruption for robustness checks. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A3. List of OECD member and their trading partners  
OECD Members Countries (29 countries represent country i in Equation 1 & 2) 
“Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungry, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia Republic,  Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America.” 
Trading-Partner-Countries of OECD Members (excluding OECD) (150 countries represent country j in 
Equation 1 & 2) 
“Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Dem People 
Republic of Korea, Georgia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People Dem 
republic, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri-Lanka, 
Tajikistan, Thailand,  Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote 
dlvaire, Dem Rep of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Albania, 
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Kosovo, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, 
Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, Bahrain, Cook Islands, Fiji, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Oman, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Solomon 
Islands, Syrian Arab Republic, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Yemen, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominca 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana,  Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragu, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Rwanda, Uruguay, Venezuela.” 
Note: The table represents the list of 29 OECD member countries and 150 their trading-partner-countries 
excluding OECD.  
 
